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Abstract
This thesis proposes a formal methodology for defining, specifying, and
reasoning about micro-policies — security policies based on fine-grained tagging
that include forms of access control, memory safety, compartmentalization, and
information-flow control. Our methodology is based on a symbolic machine that
extends a conventional RISC-like architecture with tags. Tags express security
properties of parts of the program state ("this is an instruction," "this is
secret," etc.), and are checked and propagated on every instruction according to
flexible user-supplied rules. We apply this methodology to two widely studied
policies, information-flow control and heap memory safety, implementing them
with the symbolic machine and formally characterizing their security guarantees:
for information-flow control, we prove a classic notion of
termination-insensitive noninterference; for memory safety, a novel property
that protects memory regions that a program cannot validly reach through the
pointers it possesses — which, we believe, provides a useful criterion for
evaluating and comparing different flavors of memory safety. We show how the
symbolic machine can be realized with a more practical processor design, where a
software monitor takes advantage of a hardware cache to speed up its execution
while protecting itself from potentially malicious user-level code. Our
development has been formalized and verified in the Coq proof assistant,
attesting that our methodology can provide rigorous security guarantees.
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ABSTRACT
A METHODOLOGY FOR MICRO-POLICIES
Arthur Azevedo de Amorim
Benjamin C. Pierce
This thesis proposes a formal methodology for defining, specifying, and reasoning about micro-
policies—security policies based on fine-grained tagging that include forms of access control, mem-
ory safety, compartmentalization, and information-flow control. Our methodology is based on a
symbolic machine that extends a conventional RISC-like architecture with tags. Tags express secu-
rity properties of parts of the program state (“this is an instruction,” “this is secret,” etc.), and are
checked and propagated on every instruction according to flexible user-supplied rules. We apply this
methodology to two widely studied policies, information-flow control and heap memory safety, im-
plementing them with the symbolic machine and formally characterizing their security guarantees:
for information-flow control, we prove a classic notion of termination-insensitive noninterference;
for memory safety, a novel property that protects memory regions that a program cannot validly
reach through the pointers it possesses—which, we believe, provides a useful criterion for evalu-
ating and comparing diﬀerent flavors of memory safety. We show how the symbolic machine can
be realized with a more practical processor design, where a software monitor takes advantage of a
hardware cache to speed up its execution while protecting itself from potentially malicious user-level
code. Our development has been formalized and verified in the Coq proof assistant, attesting that
our methodology can provide rigorous security guarantees.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Our society has a pressing need for stronger computer security. Large, interconnected computer
systems are critical to our infrastructure (databases of medical records, mass transit networks, voting
systems, nuclear power stations, …), yet infested with vulnerabilities that could be exploited by
malicious agents. The general feeling seems to be that computer security is a hopeless pursuit, as
nicely illustrated by this New York Times report on a recent wave of cyberattacks.
But like any software, Scada [supervisory control and data acquisition] systems are
susceptible to hacking and computer viruses. And for years, security specialists have
warned that hackers could use remote access to these systems to cause physical destruc-
tion. [87]
Fortunately, reality is not as bad as it seems. There are many avenues for improving computer
security, which involve solving basic issues that aﬀect a wide variety of programs—such as the lack
of memory safety in C and related languages—but also developing tools for enforcing application-
specific policies. Among general solutions, reference monitors [3] are a popular option. Their job is
to inspect the execution of a program, mediating and checking a range of operations to ensure that
they conform to a policy of interest. If a policy violation is detected, the monitor halts execution or
signals an error. Many computer systems execute under some form of monitoring, at diﬀerent levels
of granularity. For example, operating systems use access control to prevent a user from tampering
with someone else’s files, either inadvertently or maliciously. And managed languages like Java,
Python, JavaScript, OCaml, and Haskell check the bounds of array accesses to prevent memory
corruption.
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In principle, reference monitors can prevent multiple vulnerabilities [95]—including many of
those that haunt programmers today [1, 83, 84]. Unfortunately, they are often not adopted in prac-
tice because of their cost. Security is an important software requirement, but so are performance,
flexibility, maintainability, and compatibility with legacy systems. If a security policy is significantly
at odds with any of those requirements, it might be abandoned or replaced with an approximation
that is still vulnerable to attack [23, 37, 44]. Buﬀer overflows are a good illustration of this issue.
Though they can be prevented with simple solutions that have existed for decades, such as managed
languages with bounds checking and garbage collection, they continue to pose a serious threat [77],
because techniques for comprehensive safety are unsuitable formanymemory-intensive applications.
An attractive option to make monitors more practical is the use of hardware support, especially
in the era of cheap transistors we live in today. Besides significant performance improvements,
specialized hardware could bring other benefits as well. For example, if the monitor is not tied to
a particular programming language, it can more easily apply to legacy programs: they might need
to be adapted to conform to the more restrictive execution model, but at least will not have to be
rewritten from scratch. Many monitoring mechanisms have been integrated with hardware over the
years, with virtual memory and page protection likely being the most widespread examples.
Though an interesting idea, implementing monitors with specialized hardware should be consid-
ered with care, because it incurs in development and deployment costs that are much higher than a
pure software solution. As old features become obsolete and new ones are added, hardware manufac-
turers have strong incentives to maintain bloated, redundant designs, greatly exacerbating backwards
compatibility issues. Page-based virtual memory, for example, was introduced in a time of scarce re-
sources, where disk swapping was an important feature; today, it induces great performance penalties
for applications that have widely diﬀerent memory-access patterns [15]. The issue is particularly
acute when considering security features, since their design involves trade oﬀs between security,
performance, and other factors that are fundamentally hard to evaluate in advance. For example,
some hardware extensions provide support for spatial memory safety [30, 86], which is capable of
preventing several popular, well-understood exploits, and forces attackers to find other techniques for
subverting systems. It is not clear, however, how much this restricts attacker power eﬀectively. Does
the number of vulnerabilities that need to be patched decrease for systems that use these features?
Or could attackers just as easily resort to double frees and other temporal safety violations to obtain
the same end results?
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We can avoid some of the risk associated with new hardware by focusing on generic, pro-
grammable mechanisms. Instead of committing in advance to a single, hardwired policy, the hard-
ware should make it possible to experiment with diﬀerent policy designs and their trade oﬀs. If we
find out that a policy was not strong enough, or perhaps too slow, not a problem: the hardware does
not have to change, we just have to reprogram the policy. One possibility would be a mechanism for
programming general reference monitors, but this might be too general to be made efficient: refer-
ence monitors can in principle be implemented with arbitrary programs, making it hard to imagine
what kind of support we could provide that does not exist in processors already.
A clue for reconciling performance and flexibility is to observe that many monitors of inter-
est follow a well-behaved pattern: they protect programs by pervasively checking and propagating
metadata associated with their state. Typical Unix file systems let users impose rudimentary access
control policies on their files by marking them with permission bits. Protection masks present in
modern processors allow them to distinguish between writable and executable memory, thereby pre-
venting a variety of devastating code-injection attacks. Systems for spatial memory safety enriching
pointers with bounds information to detect invalid memory accesses [30, 73]. And systems for ex-
pressive information-flow control track the provenance of intermediate results in a computation to
prevent public outputs to depend on secrets, directly or indirectly [6, 9, 10, 101]. The generality
of this metaphor led researchers to explore efficient hardware support for programmable metadata
checking and propagation. Extensions such as FlexiTaint [110], Harmoni [28], and the PUMP (Pro-
grammable Unit for Metadata Processing) [33, 34] augment the state of the program by attaching
metadata tags to memory and registers, at the granularity of individual words. As the program runs,
tags attached to the various operands and destinations are processed according to user-defined rules.
Not only are these systems capable of encoding many policies of interest that have been studied in
the literature, they also do so efficiently, with performance overheads running between 1 and 20%
for typical policies and programs [28, 33, 110].
These preliminary experiments with hardware support for programmable tags are encouraging,
and they suggest that it would be interesting to investigate tag-based policies from a more theoretical
angle. As it is the case for other enforcement techniques, like general reference monitors or program
rewriting, such a theory could help us understand the limits of what can be enforced using tags [14,
51, 95], point at new implementation strategies [36], or simply inform the use of these tools by
security engineers. To develop such a theory of tag-based policies, it would help to first have a
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rigorous definition of what these policies are. The aim of this thesis is to answer this question by
developing a programming model for tag-based policies—or, as we call them here, micro-policies.
Engaging in this exercise brings up fundamentally conflicting goals. Naturally, we would like a
definition that is general enough to accommodate a wide variety of policies that intuitively fit this
pattern, but also at an appropriate level of abstraction from the hardware mechanisms that have been
proposed to support them. As usual, to facilitate reasoning about micro-policies at a high-level—
and, in particular, about their security guarantees—we would like a programming model that hides a
fair share of tedious implementation details, such as how tags are encoded, how they are checked, and
where they are stored in the hardware. Given that hardware support for programmable tags is still in
its infancy anyway, it would not make sense to overly commit to any particular existing mechanism,
and keeping the model more abstract gives hardware freedom to evolve. Nevertheless, we would like
the model to be somewhat connected to the hardware proposed in the literature, so that we can have
a rough idea of performance when developing policies—we should not forget that efficiency was one
of the main motivations for investigating tag-based policies in the first place.
Evaluating whether a programming model meets these goals is challenging, and the issues of
convenience of reasoning and security guarantees are especially problematic. While there are simple
criteria for judging performance and other aspects of a policy, there isn’t anything quite as satisfying
for security. This gap manifests itself when we try to weigh the trade oﬀs associated with variations
of a security policy—for example, diﬀerent flavors of memory safety. It is not too hard to measure
if one policy runs faster than another one, but how do we know if it is more secure? We can test how
many known vulnerabilities each one is capable of preventing, but, as argued earlier, this provides
little insight into protection guarantees against other attack techniques that might be tried in the
future.
One idea to complement our assessment of security guarantees is to establish reasoning prin-
ciples that we can apply to a program when it is running with a monitor turned on—for instance,
we might want to reason about what parts of the system state can have an influence on the outputs
observed by a certain user. We could proceed as with most programs, by careful inspection of the
policy source code, or perhaps by proving rigorous mathematical results about it on paper. For most
functional correctness properties, this approach is adequate, provided that it is backed by extensive
testing. Though informal, pencil-and-paper reasoning about programs often turns out to be wrong,
we can hope that the conditions under which the program is tested are not so diﬀerent from when it
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ships, implying that the rate of defect would be similar on both scenarios. For security guarantees,
however, this assumption simply cannot hold: if we reason incorrectly, there is a much higher chance
that it will lead to a vulnerability in production, because it is hard to emulate in a development en-
vironment the threats that a program will face once deployed. Most bugs are the product of chance,
but attacks result from premeditated, careful, and malicious analysis.
To address these shortcomings, we have been drawn to a new set of tools [72, 83]: proof assis-
tants. Proof assistants are programs that allow users to write down precise mathematical definitions,
specifications about them, and proofs that those specifications are met. The program checks every
step in these proofs to ensure it is logically sound, giving us high confidence that the end result
is correct. Recent years have seen a surge of maturity in this technology: proof assistants such as
Coq [107], Isabelle, and ACL2 are being applied to progressively ambitious eﬀorts, ranging from
deep mathematical results, such as the proofs of the four-color theorem [45], the odd-order theo-
rem [46], the Kepler conjecture [50], etc., to complex, realistic software, such as the CompCert
C compiler [74], the seL4 micro-kernel [68], the Verasco program analyzer [62], and part of the
LLVM infrastructure [117, 118], among others. Though verification with a proof assistant is fairly
expensive, these programs exhibit a few characteristics that make this approach attractive: they are
relatively easy to specify formally (compared to interactive programs like a video editor, for exam-
ple), and their defects can have disastrous consequences for a large number of systems. And indeed,
the eﬀort pays oﬀ. The eﬀectiveness of proof assistants is attested not only by pure reason, but also
by solid empirical evidence. In a recent, thorough evaluation of bugs in C compilers by random
testing, Yang et al. noted:
The striking thing about our CompCert results is that the middleend bugs we found
in all other compilers are absent. As of early 2011, the under-development version of
CompCert is the only compiler we have tested for which Csmith cannot find wrong-code
errors. This is not for lack of trying: we have devoted about six CPU-years to the task.
The apparent unbreakability of CompCert supports a strong argument that developing
compiler optimizations within a proof framework, where safety checks are explicit and
machine-checked, has tangible benefits for compiler users. [114]
Micro-policies share all of the aforementioned virtues, making them a good candidate for formal
verification. By developing our programming model for micro-policies with a proof assistant, we
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would obtain a good way of judging its programming and security capabilities. Since proof assis-
tants aim for high assurance, they tend to be rather constrained environments, subjecting definitions
and proofs to draconian consistency checks. If we can argue about security in such a formal set-
ting, we have good evidence for the usability of our model; furthermore, others could then use our
development to build their own policies and reason about them.
Contributions In the remainder of this document, we develop a formal methodology for defining,
specifying, and reasoning about micro-policies. In sum, we
• present a formal model for defining micro-policies;
• use the model for expressing policies that have received great attention in the literature, study-
ing their security properties; and
• show how the model can be supported by a lower-level hardware model.
The technical results of this document have all been formalized in the Coq proof assistant; the formal
development is available at https://github.com/micro-policies/micro-policies-coq. We
have decided to work with the Coq proof assistant, which combines an expressive theory, with a ma-
ture code base, decent tool support, and active user community. We believe that other platforms
(such as Isabelle, for example), would have been just as appropriate. As it is typical for many re-
sults of this kind, these proofs are challenging because of the large number of cases that needs to be
handled, but tend to be somewhat tedious. Thus, we omit the proofs of most technical results in the
thesis, referring the curious reader to our formalization instead.
The cornerstone of our methodology is the symbolic machine introduced in Chapter 2. The
symbolic machine provides a programmingmodel for both user programs and the micro-policies that
monitor them. To user programs, the symbolic machine is a simple, conventional RISC processor.
Programs run at a fairly low-level, by executing individual instructions that manipulate values stored
in registers andmemory. Micro-policies, on the other hand, are richer. They operate onmetadata tags
attached to every machine word in the program state, including the program counter. On each cycle,
the policy decides whether the user code is allowed to execute by analyzing the tags on the operands
on the program counter, current instruction, and each of that instruction’s operands. Crucially, this
analysis is not limited to a handful of operations: any function defined in Coq can be used as a micro-
policy. Coq has a fairly expressive functional programming language that is particularly well suited
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for writing micro-policies. This design has two benefits. First is that it frees policy designers from
low-level implementation details, allowing them to focus on high-level policy behavior. Second, it
still makes it possible to discuss very low-level properties of the code that the policy protects, making
it well-suited for applications of tagged monitors described in the literature.
After describing the basis of our methodology, we proceed to apply it to two policy use cases
that have received attention in the literature: a policy for information-flow control (Chapter 3), which
protects programs against certain breaches of confidentiality, and a policy for heap memory safety
(Chapter 4), which prevents out-of-bound accesses and uses of a pointer after it has been freed. The
policies demonstrate a wide range of features available for the model; for example, the information-
flow policy relies on the ability to define policy-specific privileged services to implement a protected
call stack, used to prevent user programs from revealing secret information through their control
flow. We evaluate the security guarantees of both policies by proving formal theorems about their
behavior. First, we define higher-level abstract machines where both policies are built in and show
that the symbolic machine running each micro-policy accurately implements the corresponding ab-
stract machine, in the sense of refining its behavior. These abstract machines provide a simpler, more
self-contained description of each policy that does not rely on the tag-propagation model of the sym-
bolic machine. We then use these refinement results as stepping stones to derive more end-to-end
results about the guarantees of the policies. For the information-flow policy, we prove a standard
termination-insensitive noninterference result [42], which guarantees that secret information stored
in the machine state has no influence on its public observable behaviors, with the possible exception
of termination and timing. For thememory-safety policy, we devise a new correctness criterion based
on pointer reachability. Roughly, the criterion says that pointers in a memory-safe setting behave as
capabilities, in the sense that they grant access to clearly defined parts of the program state. We
prove another security property reminiscent of noninterference, which guarantees that a program’s
execution cannot aﬀect or be aﬀected by memory regions that it cannot reach via its pointers. To our
knowledge, this is the first proposal of a correctness criterion for memory safety that tries to explore
extensional (that is, related to program behavior) consequences of preventing errors such as buﬀer
overflows. We further analyze the possible consequences that various pragmatically motivated relax-
ations of the memory-safety policy—for example, allowing pointer-to-integer casts—might have on
these guarantees. We also show how the guarantees of memory safety apply to a simple imperative
language with memory-safety checks, and use this setting to relate the guarantees of memory safety
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to the local reasoning principles of separation logic [90], a well-established framework for reasoning
about heap-manipulating programs.
Finally, Chapter 5, we show how the symbolic machine can be implemented by a lower-level con-
crete machine. This concrete machine is meant to model more realistic hardware mechanisms that
have been proposed in the literature for enforcing tag-based policies—specifically, the PUMP exten-
sion of Dhawan et al. [33], one of the most general of the proposed designs. Given that production-
grade processors with built-in support for micro-policies are still underway [24], the concrete ma-
chine does not attempt to provide a faithful, detailed model of a hardware architecture; rather, it tries
to capture implementation strategies that could be used to build such a system—specifically, combin-
ing software implementations of the monitors with a hardware cache for avoiding having to execute
the monitor on every instruction. We prove a theorem saying that the concrete machine refines the
symbolic one, assuming that the machine-code implementation of the micro-policy is correct. In
particular, this guarantees that the mechanisms of the concrete machine are capable of isolating the
monitor implementation from user-level code, thereby preserving its integrity.
Chapter 6 concludes and points to promising directions for future work. Appendix A briefly
reviews basic mathematical concepts evoked in the text, and sets up notation.
The work reported here is mostly extracted from three conference papers written during my
Ph.D. studies [8, 9, 11], one of which was subsequently extended and published in a journal [10].
This material is based upon work supported by the DARPA CRASH program through the United
States Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) under Contract No. FA8650-10-C-7090. (The views
expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department
of Defense or the U.S. Government.) This work has also been supported by the supported by National
Science Foundation award 1513854,Micro-Policies: A Framework for Tag-Based SecurityMonitors.
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Chapter 2
Symbolic Machine
The methodology we propose for specifying and verifying micro-policies is based on a simple ab-
stract machine, here dubbed the symbolic machine. This chapter describes the symbolic machine,
and gives some basic examples of micro-policies we can define with it.
In essence, the symbolic machine blends in two programming substrates. The bottom-most layer
resembles the programming interface of typical RISC processors, such as an ARM or PowerPC, and
is meant for running user-level applications. On each cycle, the machine looks up an instruction and
manipulates values stored in the memory and in the register bank. Above this layer, the machine runs
a monitor with a much more flexible execution model. Instead of operating on machine words, the
monitor operates on structured tags that describe the data manipulated by the user-level program.
Rather than analyzing these tags with assembly code, the other program is free to apply arbitrary
mathematical functions on them. Crucially, both tags and the functions that analyze them are not
fixed in advance, but determined by a policy designer for enforcing a certain security policy.
2.1 Tags and Machine State
All words stored in the state of the symbolic machine—including in its memory, registers, or even
its program counter—have individual metadata tags attached to them.
Definition 2.1. The tag parameters of the symbolic machine are given by three sets Tag
u�u�
, Tag
u�
,
andTag
u�
, used to tag the contents of the program counter (PC), registers, and memory. We useTag
to refer collectively to these three parameters. (In our formal development, these parameters can be
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given by arbitrary Coq data types, including user-defined ones.)
The machine imposes no arbitrary constraints on tags, and policy designers can choose them as
they see fit. To maintain secrecy and integrity guarantees in a system, for example, we could choose
from one-bit taint marks to much richer information-flow labels [78]. By tagging data with finite
automata [69], we express rich declassification constraints allowing the release of information from
a system. We can even enforce several policies simultaneously by packing their tags in a tuple.
Perhaps surprisingly, this flexibility can be supported with efficient, practical hardware [33], by
interpreting word-sized tags as pointers to memory data structures. As these data structures become
more complex, policy performance degrades; however, a policy designer is free to choose what
overhead is adequate for the security guarantees they want to enforce.
Instead of having diﬀerent tags for the PC, registers, and memory, we could have opted for a
seemingly simpler design where all these tags are drawn from a single set. Our approach, however,
makes it possible for policy designers to enforce tagging invariants through typing. This simplifies
policy definitions and their proofs of correctness, which only need to consider combinations of tags
that can arise during execution. The memory-safety policy of Chapter 4, for example, uses memory
tags to keep track of allocation information. This information is not needed for the PC or data stored
in registers, which can have much simpler tags.
Definition 2.2. Suppose we are given tag parameters Tag, and
• a setWord of all bit vectors of a given length,
• a finite set Reg of register names, and
• another set Extra.
We define a symbolic machine state as a tuple (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑝𝑐, 𝑒), where
• 𝑚 ∈Word⇀Word× Tag
u�
is the memory of the machine;
• 𝑟𝑠 ∈ Reg⇀Word× Tag
u�
is the register bank of the machine;
• 𝑝𝑐 ∈Word× Tag
u�u�
is the program counter (PC); and
• 𝑒 ∈ Extra is the private monitor state.
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We note State the set of system states. (Technically, this defines State as a function of four param-
eters, but we will leave those implicit in the notation. The 𝑒 component of the state can be ignored
for now; its role will become clear when we explain the semantics of the machine in Section 2.4.)
We’ll often refer to pairs (𝑥, 𝑡) comprising a value 𝑥 tagged with tag 𝑡 as atoms, and write them as
𝑥@𝑡. The term “atom” hints that values in a system governed by amicro-policy cannot be dissociated
from their tags. When the choice of tags is clear, we refer to atoms inWord×Tag
u�
,Word×Tag
u�
,
andWord×Tag
u�u�
asmemory, register, and PC atoms. The exact choice of word size, as well asReg,
does not pay a major role in the security aspects of the policy, and we can assume for concreteness
that they are set once and for all (for example, to a set of 32 registers and 64-bit words). We assume
that Reg contains at least four registers: two registers 𝑟u�u�u�1 and 𝑟u�u�u�2 for passing arguments to a
function, a register 𝑟u�u�u� to return values to a function caller, and another register 𝑟u� for saving return
addresses after a function call.
An unusual aspect of the above definition is that the register bank is a partial function: if a
program attempts to access a register that is not defined in the bank, it causes the symbolic machine
to halt. We can mostly ignore this choice at this point; the sole reason for allowing some registers
to be undefined is that it simplifies the connection with the lower-level concrete machine introduced
in Chapter 5. Typically, registers that are undefined at the symbolic level are defined at the concrete
level, but store private state that is inaccessible to user programs. The four registers mentioned
above, 𝑟u�u�u�1, 𝑟u�u�u�2, 𝑟u�u�u�, and 𝑟u�, are meant to be manipulated by user programs, and thus should
be defined in the register bank.
Before explaining how the machine executes and how it interacts with tags, we can give a rough
idea of how policies work by describing a few simple tagging schemes.
Example 2.3. We can keep code and data separate in memory with the following tags.
Tag
u�u�
= Tag
u�
= {NONE} Tag
u�
= {C, D}
Paraphrasing in words, these tags mark every word in memory as either “code” or “data,” and do not
attach any information to words stored in the register bank or the PC. We later program the symbolic
machine to make data non executable and code non writable. This policy is somewhat redundant,
given that many modern architectures (IA-64, x86-64, etc.) already provide this functionality; still,
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it provides a simple example of what can be done with tags.
Example 2.4. As a slightlymore interesting example, we can use tags to implement dynamic sealing,
a data protection mechanism similar to perfect symmetric encryption [79, 103]. Like for the simple
policy sketched above, we set Tag
u�u�
to the singleton {NONE}, so PC tags of this policy carry no
information. The other tags are defined as follows, using typical data-type notation.
Tag
u�
= Tag
u�
= UNSEALED ∣ SEALED(𝑘 ∈ ℕ) ∣ KEY(𝑘 ∈ ℕ)
The UNSEALED tag is used for ordinary data, SEALED(𝑘) is used for words that have been sealed with
the key 𝑘, and KEY(𝑘) represents the key 𝑘. The idea is that we want to prevent most operations
from being performed on sealed values, and only allow sealing and unsealing values when the code
possesses a matching key. We chose to store the key value in the key tag to support an arbitrarily
large number of keys; we could also have chosen to confine the set of possible keys to Word, and
represent keys with atoms of the form 𝑤@KEY.
2.2 Checking Tags
On each cycle, the machine fetches a word from the memory position referenced by its current PC,
checks whether that word corresponds to a valid instruction 𝑖 ∈ Instr, and if so acts accordingly.
Figure 2.1 summarizes the possible instructions. Excluding the interaction with tags, instructions
behave essentially as in conventional processors, allowing programs to perform basic operations on
registers, memory, and control flow. We assume there is a partial function decode ∈Word⇀ Instr
for converting words in memory to instructions. The operation of the machine will be detailed soon,
but we must first explain what tags do.
The role of tags on execution is governed by another parameter supplied by the policy designer,
called the transfer function, whose inputs and outputs are described in Figure 2.2. Before executing
the instruction, the machine feeds into this function (1) the opcode of the current instruction, (2)
the tag of the current PC, (3) the tag of the current instruction, and (4) tags on the arguments of the
instruction (including any old tags on its destination). Policy designers then have two choices. One
is to say that, based on these inputs, the current instruction does not violate the policy that they are
trying to enforce, and should be allowed to execute. In this case, the transfer function must output a
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Format Description
Nop No action
Const 𝑖 𝑟 Store constant 𝑖 in 𝑟
Mov 𝑟1 𝑟2 Move contents of 𝑟1 to 𝑟2
Binop
⊕
 𝑟1 𝑟2 𝑟3 Apply operation ⊕ to 𝑟1 and 𝑟2, store result in 𝑟3
Load 𝑟1 𝑟2 Load from memory address in 𝑟1, put contents in 𝑟2
Store 𝑟1 𝑟2 Store contents of 𝑟1 into memory address in 𝑟2
Jump 𝑟 Unconditional absolute jump
Bnz 𝑖 𝑟 Conditional relative jump
Jal 𝑟 Call address in 𝑟, save return in the 𝑟u� register
Halt Stop execution
⊕ ∈ {+,−,×,=,≤,∧, ∨,…}
Figure 2.1: Instructions of symbolic machine. Here, 𝑟 ranges over registers, and 𝑖 ranges over some
fixed set Imm of bit vectors. Binary operations ⊕ range over some set of basic logic and arithmetic
operations.
tag to use on the next PC, and another tag for the instruction result, if any. On the other hand, policy
designers could also decide that this combination of inputs is a sign that something dangerous is about
to happen—perhaps the current instruction is trying to modify code stored in memory, for instance.
In this case, the transfer function is undefined, forcing the machine to stop execution immediately.
We could extend the model to handle violations diﬀerently—for example, by raising an exception
that can be treated by user code—but we stick to the current one for simplicity. Note that the transfer
function is pure: its behavior depends solely on its input tags, and cannot manipulate any stored state.
The transfer function also ignores the payload portion of the atoms tagged by its inputs, making it
easier to accelerate its execution with specialized hardware [33].
In our formal development, the transfer function is supplied by the policy designer as an arbi-
trary Coq function of the appropriate type. (As it is often the case, our development models partial
functions as Coq functions that return an optional value; all functions in Coq are total.) Note that the
exact combination of input and output tags of the transfer function depends on its opcode parameter.
Coq’s theory has good support for such dependent types, making it a nice platform to develop our
methodology.
In this thesis, we’ll often specify transfer functions using a rule table of the following form:
Opcode PC Instr A1 A2 Dest PC Res
𝑜 𝑝 𝑝 𝑝 𝑝 𝑝 𝑝 𝑝
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transfer ∈ (𝑜 ∈ Opcode) ×  Tag
u�u�
× Tag
u�
× 𝑇1(𝑜) × 𝑇2(𝑜) × 𝑇u�(𝑜) ⇀ Tagu�u� × 𝑇u�(𝑜)
Opcode 𝑇1 𝑇2 𝑇u� 𝑇u�
Nop
Const Tag
u�
Tag
u�
Mov Tag
u�
Tag
u�
Tag
u�
Binop
⊕
Tag
u�
Tag
u�
Tag
u�
Tag
u�
Load Tag
u�
Tag
u�
Tag
u�
Tag
u�
Store Tag
u�
Tag
u�
Tag
u�
Tag
u�
Jump Tag
u�
Bnz Tag
u�
Jal Tag
u�
Tag
u�
Tag
u�
Figure 2.2: Signature of transfer functions for each opcode. We note Opcode the set of opcodes.
A blank cell indicates the absence of tags for the corresponding opcode. Notice that Tag
u�
only
appears as an argument or result tag under the two instructions that manipulate the memory, Load
and Store.
Opcode PC Instr A1 A2 Dest PC Res
Nop _ C NONE
Const _ C _ NONE NONE
Mov _ C _ _ NONE NONE
Binop
⊕
_ C _ _ _ NONE NONE
Load _ C _ D _ NONE NONE
Store _ C _ _ D NONE D
Jump _ C _ NONE
Bnz _ C _ NONE
Jal _ C _ _ NONE NONE
Figure 2.3: Rules for non-executable data, non-writable code (NXD+NWC)
Each row on this table describes a pattern-matching branch: if we’re currently executing an instruc-
tion with opcode 𝑜, and if the arguments match the patterns on the columns from “PC” to “Dest,”
then the instruction is allowed to execute, and the “PC” and “Res” columns on the right specify the
tags that should be used in the next PC value and on the result; otherwise, we check if the next row
matches. We sometimes attach a condition to a rule, a logical formula involving tags indicating that
that rule should only be triggered when the condition is true. If no rules match a given tag combina-
tion, the transfer function is undefined. A missing pattern indicates that that tag is not used by that
instruction, whereas _ is a wild-card pattern that matches anything. We will always provide rules
that agree with the signature given in Figure 2.2.
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Opcode PC Instr A1 A2 Dest PC Res
Nop _ UNSEALED NONE
Const _ UNSEALED _ NONE UNSEALED
Mov _ UNSEALED 𝑡 _ NONE 𝑡
Binop
⊕
_ UNSEALED UNSEALED UNSEALED _ NONE UNSEALED
Load _ UNSEALED UNSEALED 𝑡 _ NONE 𝑡
Store _ UNSEALED UNSEALED 𝑡 _ NONE 𝑡
Jump _ UNSEALED UNSEALED NONE
Bnz _ UNSEALED UNSEALED NONE
Jal _ UNSEALED UNSEALED _ NONE UNSEALED
Figure 2.4: Rules for dynamic sealing
As a simple illustration of rules, consider the ones given in Figures 2.3 and 2.4, which apply to
the tagging schemes defined in Examples 2.3 and 2.4. The rules for non-executable data and non-
writable code (Figure 2.3) cause the machine to halt whenever the tag on the current instruction is not
C, and whenever we try to write to a memory location tagged as C. They also enforce the somewhat
less conventional policy of preventing code from loading instructions into registers, as can be seen
in the rule for Load. The rules for dynamic sealing (Figure 2.4) prevent code from doing anything
with values tagged as SEALED(𝑘) or KEY(𝑘) besides moving them between registers and memory
locations.
2.3 System Services
The rules for dynamic sealing show that something is missing: ways of sealing and unsealing values
using a given key, and of generating new keys. We remedy this by allowing policy designers to
specify a set of privileged system services that can be invoked by user code. These services allow
users to change tags in controlled ways that are not possible with normal instructions; in particular,
they make it possible to implement the missing operations for the sealing policy mentioned above.
System services are similar to typical procedures. They reside at fixed addresses in memory
and can be invoked by jumping to those addresses with the Jal instruction. However, unlike typical
procedures, system services in the symbolic machine are not implemented with machine code.
Definition 2.5. A system service for a given choice of parameters of the symbolic machine is a
partial function 𝑓 ∈ State ⇀ State. A service table is a partial function service from Word to
system services.
15
MkKey
𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�) = 𝑤u�u�@UNSEALED 𝑟𝑠[𝑟u�u�u� ↦ 0@KEY(𝑘)] = 𝑟𝑠
′ 𝑘 is fresh
mkkey(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, _, 𝑒) = (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠′, 𝑤u�u�@NONE, 𝑒)
Seal
𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�u�u�1) = 𝑤@UNSEALED 𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�u�u�2) = _@KEY(𝑘)
𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�) = 𝑤u�u�@UNSEALED 𝑟𝑠[𝑟u�u�u� ↦ 𝑤@SEALED(𝑘)] = 𝑟𝑠
′
seal(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, _, 𝑒) = (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠′, 𝑤u�u�@NONE, 𝑒)
Unseal
𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�u�u�1) = 𝑤@SEALED(𝑘) 𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�u�u�2) = _@KEY(𝑘)
𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�) = 𝑤u�u�@UNSEALED 𝑟𝑠[𝑟u�u�u� ↦ 𝑤@UNSEALED] = 𝑟𝑠
′
unseal(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, _, 𝑒) = (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠′, 𝑤u�u�@NONE, 𝑒)
Figure 2.5: Sealing system services
Once again, our formal development allows policy designers to supply arbitrary Coq functions
as system services. To illustrate the use of system services, let’s consider how we can use them
to implement the missing operations from the sealing micro-policy. We assume that Reg contains
special registers 𝑟u�, 𝑟u�u�u�1, 𝑟u�u�u�2, and 𝑟u�u�u�. The first one, 𝑟u�, is used to store the return address
when calling a function through Jal; we will see how this works when presenting the rest of the
operational semantics of the machine. The other three, 𝑟u�u�u�1, 𝑟u�u�u�2, and 𝑟u�u�u�, are used for passing
arguments to the services and receiving values from them.
Figure 2.5 defines the services for the sealing policy. The first service,mkkey, makes it possible
to generate a new key. The key 𝑘 is chosen in a way that is fresh with respect to the current state, by
which we mean that there should not be any tags of the form KEY(𝑘) or SEALED(𝑘) stored anywhere.
We can choose 𝑘 according to any deterministic procedure that guarantees this property. Note that
we make sure that the return address stored in 𝑟u� is not sealed. As we will see, it is possible for user
code to call system services with the contents of 𝑟u� set to whatever they choose, by simply calling
these services using other instructions than Jal. Thus, this check prevents user code from potentially
leaking sealed information. Finally, the definition does not need to assume anything about the current
PC. As we will see, each system service is invoked by a generic rule in the operational semantics
which makes sure that the current PC matches the address that the service corresponds to.
The two other services allow code to use a key to seal and unseal values. Note that sealing fails
if the value is not currently unsealed; it would be possible to consider nested sealed values, but this
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would slightly complicate our choice of tags. Similarly, we do not allow sealing keys.
With all the services we need in hand, we can finally complete the sealing micro-policy. We
choose three addresses 𝑤u�u�u�u�u�, 𝑤u�u�u�u�, and 𝑤u�u�u�u�u�u�, and define a service table serviceu�u�u�u�u�u�u�
that maps each one of them to the services mkkey, seal and unseal.
2.4 Operational Semantics
Now that we have described all the parameters that govern its function, we are ready to give a formal
operational semantics to the symbolic machine. The rules in Figures 2.6 and 2.7 describe how each
instruction is executed. There is no rule forHalt, since it simply causes themachine to stop execution.
The Const rule implicitly performs a signed conversion of the immediate 𝑤 ∈ Imm into a full-sized
word. (We will tacitly adopt this convention when presenting other machines.) The Svc rule covers
the invocation of system services. The machine checks whether any system call corresponds to the
current PC in the service table; if so, it runs the service on the current state. (It also ensures that
there are no instructions stored in memory at the location given by the PC. This is not fundamentally
important, but it keeps the semantics deterministic.)
The rules show that system services are the only mechanism available for modifying the private
state of the machine. Though we haven’t made use of this feature yet, many policies require access
to encapsulated mutable state to correctly enforce the security properties they were designed for.
For example, the micro-policy for information-flow control of Chapter 3 uses the private state to
implement a protected call stack, used to prevent illegal leaks through the control flow of the program.
And the memory-safety policy of Chapter 4 uses the private state to keep track of which memory
region are currently allocated and which ones are free.
Strictly speaking, private monitor state is not actually needed for implementing micro-policies,
because of the generality of tags and system services. Instead of keeping a list of free regions, the
memory-safety policy could simply inspect the entire machine state and its tags to decide where to
allocate some chunk of memory requested by the user. In an extreme case, we could also imagine
a micro-policy that piggybacks the entire monitor state on its PC tag. Although perfectly valid
from a purely logical standpoint, these strategies would be too inefficient if implemented on lower-
level mechanisms that have been proposed to support micro-policies, such as the concrete machine
of Chapter 5. Private monitor state allows us to keep some performance concerns in mind when
17
developing micro-policies, without overly complicating the model or giving up on convenience.
Another point worth noting is that the Svc rule is the only one that does not invoke the transfer
function. We could consider a diﬀerent design where, before calling a service, the machine consults
the transfer function to determine whether the call is legal. This extension does not fundamentally
change what system services can do, since they are already allowed to execute arbitrary checks and
operations on the machine state; nevertheless, it may allow micro-policies in the symbolic machine
to more closely correspond to a concrete implementation, which might use tags to control access to
services for performance reasons.
The possibility of invoking the transfer function on system services was explored in the original
model of the symbolic machine [11], where it was used to restrict access to system services in a
control-flow-integrity [1] micro-policy. It can be implemented by adding a few parameters to the
symbolic machine: a new set Tag
u�
of tags for system services, an extended service table that assigns
a tag in Tag
u�
to each system call, and an extended transfer function that can be passed a new Service
“opcode” that signals that a system call is about to be performed. The semantics of service invocation
would then become:
Svc*
𝑚(𝑤u�u�) = ⊥ service 𝑤u�u� = (𝑓, 𝑡u�)
transfer(Service, 𝑡u�u�, 𝑡u�) ≠ ⊥ 𝑓(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�@𝑡u�u�, 𝑒) = 𝑠
′
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�@𝑡u�u�, 𝑒) → 𝑠
′
2.5 Refinement
To ensure that micro-policies can protect programs, we would also like to state specifications for
them and verify—ideally, using mechanized proofs on top of a formalization like the one proposed
here—that these properties hold. Among the many properties that we could consider, one class is
particularly useful: refinement properties.
When reasoning about a micro-policy, the generality of the symbolic machine can easily become
a burden, especially in a formal setting like a proof assistant. Instead of explicitly reasoning about
calls to the transfer functions and system services during execution, which may involve manually
simplifying them, ignoring useless cases, etc., it is usually easier to relate the micro-policy to a more
specific machine semantics where that micro-policy is built-in, by showing that every execution of
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Nop
𝑚(𝑤u�u�) = 𝑖@𝑡u� decode 𝑖 = Nop transfer(Nop, 𝑡u�u�, 𝑡u�) = 𝑡
′
u�u�
(𝑚, 𝑟, 𝑤u�u�@𝑡u�u�, 𝑒) → (𝑚, 𝑟, (𝑤u�u� + 1)@𝑡
′
u�u�, 𝑒)
Const
𝑚(𝑤u�u�) = 𝑖@𝑡u� decode 𝑖 = Const 𝑤 𝑟
𝑟𝑠(𝑟) = _@𝑡 transfer(Const, 𝑡u�u�, 𝑡u�, 𝑡) = (𝑡
′
u�u�, 𝑡
′) 𝑟𝑠[𝑟 ↦ 𝑤@𝑡′] = 𝑟𝑠′
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�@𝑡u�u�, 𝑒) → (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠
′, (𝑤u�u� + 1)@𝑡
′
u�u�, 𝑒)
Mov
𝑚(𝑤u�u�) = 𝑖@𝑡u� decode 𝑖 = Mov 𝑟 𝑟u� 𝑟𝑠(𝑟) = 𝑤@𝑡 𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�) = _@𝑡u�
transfer(Mov, 𝑡u�u�, 𝑡u�, 𝑡, 𝑡u�) = (𝑡
′
u�u�, 𝑡
′
u�) 𝑟𝑠[𝑟u� ↦ 𝑤@𝑡
′
u�] = 𝑟𝑠
′
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�@𝑡u�u�, 𝑒) → (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠
′, (𝑤u�u� + 1)@𝑡
′
u�u�, 𝑒)
Binop
𝑚(𝑤u�u�) = 𝑖@𝑡u� decode 𝑖 = Binop⊕ 𝑟1 𝑟2 𝑟u�
𝑟𝑠(𝑟1) = 𝑤1@𝑡1 𝑟𝑠(𝑟2) = 𝑤2@𝑡2 𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�) = _@𝑡u�
transfer(Binop
⊕
, 𝑡u�u�, 𝑡u�, 𝑡1, 𝑡2, 𝑡u�) = (𝑡
′
u�u�, 𝑡
′
u�) 𝑟𝑠[𝑟u� ↦ (𝑤1 ⊕𝑤2)@𝑡
′
u�] = 𝑟𝑠
′
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�@𝑡u�u�, 𝑒) → (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠
′, (𝑤u�u� + 1)@𝑡
′
u�u�, 𝑒)
Load
𝑚(𝑤u�u�) = 𝑖@𝑡u� decode 𝑖 = Load 𝑟 𝑟u�
𝑟𝑠(𝑟) = 𝑤@𝑡 𝑚(𝑤) = 𝑤′@𝑡′ 𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�) = _@𝑡u�
transfer(Load, 𝑡u�u�, 𝑡u�, 𝑡, 𝑡
′, 𝑡u�) = (𝑡
′
u�u�, 𝑡
′
u�) 𝑟𝑠[𝑟u� ↦ 𝑤
′@𝑡′u�] = 𝑟𝑠
′
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�@𝑡u�u�, 𝑒) → (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠
′, (𝑤u�u�+1)@𝑡
′
u�u�, 𝑒)
Store
𝑚(𝑤u�u�) = 𝑖@𝑡u� decode 𝑖 = Store 𝑟u� 𝑟u�
𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�) = 𝑤u�@𝑡u� 𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�) = 𝑤u�@𝑡u� 𝑚(𝑤u�) = _@𝑡u�
transfer(Store, 𝑡u�u�, 𝑡u�, 𝑡u�, 𝑡u�, 𝑡u�) = (𝑡
′
u�u�, 𝑡
′
u�) 𝑚[𝑤u� ↦ 𝑤u�@𝑡
′
u�] = 𝑚
′
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�@𝑡u�u�, 𝑒) → (𝑚
′, 𝑟𝑠, (𝑤u�u� + 1)@𝑡
′
u�u�, 𝑒)
Jump
𝑚(𝑤u�u�) = 𝑖@𝑡u� decode 𝑖 = Jump 𝑟
𝑟𝑠(𝑟) = 𝑤′u�u�@𝑡 transfer(Jump, 𝑡u�u�, 𝑡u�, 𝑡) = 𝑡
′
u�u�
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�@𝑡u�u�, 𝑒) → (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤
′
u�u�@𝑡
′
u�u�, 𝑒)
Figure 2.6: Semantics of symbolic machine
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Bnz
𝑚(𝑤u�u�) = 𝑖@𝑡u� decode 𝑖 = Bnz 𝑟 𝑛 𝑟𝑠(𝑟) = 𝑤@𝑡
transfer(Bnz, 𝑡u�u�, 𝑡u�, 𝑡) = 𝑡
′
u�u� 𝑤
′
u�u� = if 𝑤 = 0 then 𝑤u�u� + 1 else 𝑤u�u� + 𝑛
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�@𝑡u�u�, 𝑒) → (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤
′
u�u�@𝑡
′
u�u�, 𝑒)
Jal
𝑚(𝑤u�u�) = 𝑖@𝑡u� decode 𝑖 = Jal 𝑟 𝑟𝑠(𝑟) = 𝑤
′
u�u�@𝑡1 𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�) = _@𝑡u�u�
transfer(Jal, 𝑡u�u�, 𝑡u�, 𝑡1, 𝑡u�u�) = (𝑡
′
u�u�, 𝑡
′
u�u�) 𝑟𝑠[𝑟u� ↦ (𝑤u�u� + 1)@𝑡
′
u�u�]
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�@𝑡u�u�, 𝑒) → (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤
′
u�u�@𝑡
′
u�u�, 𝑒)
Svc
𝑚(𝑤u�u�) = ⊥ service 𝑤u�u� = 𝑓 𝑓(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�@𝑡u�u�, 𝑒) = 𝑠
′
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�@𝑡u�u�, 𝑒) → 𝑠
′
Figure 2.7: Semantics of symbolic machine (continued)
the symbolic machine instantiated with that micro-policy corresponds to a matching execution of
the more specific machine. This is what we call a refinement result. By giving a more explicit
definition of a policy, refinements help us understand what a micro-policy does; furthermore, it
can serve as a stepping stone for proving more complex results, by showing them first on the more
specialized machine, and then transferring them to the symbolic machine. Indeed, refinement will be
an important ingredient when reasoning about our main case studies of micro-policies in Chapters 3
and 4. As a warm-up exercise, we present here a refinement result for the sealing micro policy
described earlier.
Definition 2.6. The set Val of values of the sealing machine is given by the following data-type
declaration:
Val = 𝑤 ∈Word ∣ Sealed(𝑤, 𝑘) ∣ 𝑘 ∈ ℕ
The set of states of the sealing machine, written Stateu�u�u�u�u�u�u�, is the set of triples (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑝𝑐), where
• 𝑚 ∈Word⇀ Val is the memory;
• 𝑟𝑠 ∈ Reg⇀ Val is the register bank; and
• 𝑝𝑐 ∈Word is the program counter.
Thus, the state of the sealing machine is obtained by simplifying the state of the symbolic ma-
chine running the sealing micro-policy. We can easily define when a state of the symbolic machine
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represents a state of the sealing machine.
Definition 2.7. We say that a memory or register atom 𝑤@𝑡 of the sealing micro-policy refines a
value 𝑣 ∈ Val, noted 𝑤@𝑡B 𝑣, if one of the following holds:
• 𝑡 = UNSEALED and 𝑣 = 𝑤;
• 𝑡 = SEALED(𝑘) and 𝑣 = Sealed(𝑤, 𝑘); or
• 𝑡 = KEY(𝑘) and 𝑣 = Key(𝑘).
We say that a state 𝑠1 = (𝑚1, 𝑟𝑠1, 𝑝𝑐1@𝑡u�u�, 𝑒1) of the symbolic machine running the sealingmicro-
policy refines a state 𝑠2 = (𝑚2, 𝑟𝑠2, 𝑝𝑐2) of the sealing machine, written 𝑠1B𝑠2, if their memories
and registers are pointwise related by the value refinement relation above (cf. Definition A.1), and if
𝑝𝑐1 = 𝑝𝑐2. (Since the tag on the PC and the private state play no role for this policy, they are simply
ignored.)
We can now play the same gamewith the stepping relation of the symbolic machine; the resulting
relation is given for reference in Figures 2.8 and 2.9. The two semantics are related by the following
result.
Theorem 2.8. Let 𝑠1 and 𝑠
′
1 be states of the symbolic machine instantiated with the sealing micro-
policy, and let 𝑠2 be a state of the sealing machine. Suppose that 𝑠1 →
∗ 𝑠′1 and that 𝑠1B 𝑠2. There
exists a state 𝑠′2 of the sealing machine such that 𝑠2 →
∗ 𝑠′2 and 𝑠
′
1 B 𝑠′2.
The proof of this result follows by induction on the number of steps taken by the symbolic ma-
chine, by considering all possible instructions that could have been executed at each point. A similar
result stated for a slightly diﬀerent sealingmicro-policy has been formalized in our Coq development.
Refinement results such as Theorem 2.8 allow us to obtain safety guarantees for the symbolic
machine by analyzing the behavior of its higher-level counterparts: if the higher-level machine fail-
stops on a violation, then so does the symbolic machine. It would also be desirable to have a converse
liveness result, saying that any execution of the higher-level machine can be realized by the symbolic
one; however, we will not consider such properties here.
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Nop
𝑚(𝑤u�u�) = 𝑖 ∈Word decode 𝑖 = Nop
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�) → (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u� + 1)
Const
𝑚(𝑤u�u�) = 𝑖 ∈Word decode 𝑖 = Const 𝑤 𝑟 𝑟𝑠[𝑟 ↦ 𝑤] = 𝑟𝑠
′
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�) → (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠
′, 𝑤u�u� + 1)
Mov
𝑚(𝑤u�u�) = 𝑖 ∈Word decode 𝑖 = Mov 𝑟 𝑟u� 𝑟𝑠(𝑟) = 𝑣 𝑟𝑠[𝑟u� ↦ 𝑣] = 𝑟𝑠
′
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�) → (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠
′, 𝑤u�u� + 1)
Binop
𝑚(𝑤u�u�) = 𝑖 ∈Word decode 𝑖 = Binop⊕ 𝑟1 𝑟2 𝑟u�
𝑟𝑠(𝑟1) = 𝑤1 𝑟𝑠(𝑟2) = 𝑤2 𝑟𝑠[𝑟u� ↦ 𝑤1 ⊕𝑤2] = 𝑟𝑠
′
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�) → (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠
′, 𝑤u�u� + 1)
Load
𝑚(𝑤u�u�) = 𝑖 ∈Word decode 𝑖 = Load 𝑟 𝑟u�
𝑟𝑠(𝑟) = 𝑤 𝑚(𝑤) = 𝑣 𝑟𝑠[𝑟u� ↦ 𝑣] = 𝑟𝑠
′
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�) → (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠
′, 𝑤u�u� + 1)
Store
𝑚(𝑤u�u�) = 𝑖 ∈Word decode 𝑖 = Store 𝑟u� 𝑟u�
𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�) = 𝑤u� 𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�) = 𝑣 𝑚[𝑤u� ↦ 𝑣] = 𝑚
′
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�) → (𝑚
′, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u� + 1)
Jump
𝑚(𝑤u�u�) = 𝑖 ∈Word decode 𝑖 = Jump 𝑟 𝑟𝑠(𝑟) = 𝑤
′
u�u�
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�) → (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤
′
u�u�)
Bnz
𝑚(𝑤u�u�) = 𝑖 ∈Word decode 𝑖 = Bnz 𝑟 𝑛
𝑟𝑠(𝑟) = 𝑤 𝑤′u�u� = if 𝑤 = 0 then 𝑤u�u� + 1 else 𝑤u�u� + 𝑛
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�) → (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤
′
u�u�)
Jal
𝑚(𝑤u�u�) = 𝑖 ∈Word decode 𝑖 = Jal 𝑟 𝑟𝑠(𝑟) = 𝑤
′
u�u� 𝑟𝑠[𝑟u� ↦ 𝑤u�u� + 1] = 𝑟𝑠
′
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�) → (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠
′, 𝑤′u�u�)
Figure 2.8: Semantics of sealing machine
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MkKey
𝑚(𝑤u�u�u�u�u�) = ⊥ 𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�) = 𝑤u�u� 𝑟𝑠[𝑟u�u�u� ↦ Key(𝑘)] = 𝑟𝑠
′ 𝑘 is fresh
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�u�u�u�) → (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠
′, 𝑤u�u�)
Seal
𝑚(𝑤u�u�u�u�) = ⊥ 𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�u�u�1) = 𝑤 𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�u�u�2) = Key(𝑘)
𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�) = 𝑤u�u�@ 𝑟𝑠[𝑟u�u�u� ↦ Sealed(𝑤, 𝑘)] = 𝑟𝑠
′
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�u�u�) → (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠
′, 𝑤u�u�)
Unseal
𝑚(𝑤u�u�u�u�u�u�) = ⊥ 𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�u�u�1) = Sealed(𝑤, 𝑘) 𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�u�u�2) = Key(𝑘)
𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�) = 𝑤u�u� 𝑟𝑠[𝑟u�u�u� ↦ 𝑤] = 𝑟𝑠
′
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�u�u�u�u�) → (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠
′, 𝑤u�u�)
Figure 2.9: Semantics of sealing machine (continued)
2.6 Discussion and Related Work
The symbolic machine described here was introduced by me in previous work with other collabo-
rators [11], where it was used to specify and verify four micro-policies: the sealing policy we have
seen here, heap memory safety (discussed in Chapter 4), control-flow integrity [1], and process-level
compartmentalization, following the SFImodel ofWahbe et al. [111]. It evolved from an earlier, sim-
pler form [9, 10] that was used only as an intermediate refinement step in a proof of correctness for
an information-flow monitor; only recently did it become a formalism for specifying generic micro-
policies.
For some of the micro-policies studied by us [11], refinements were the final soundness results,
guaranteeing that the micro-policy correctly implemented a higher-level abstract machine that em-
bodied the notion of security that we were interested in. For others, refinement was simply used
as a stepping stone to derive a higher-level property—for example, a trace property used by Abadi
et al. [1] to characterize control-flow integrity, or noninterference for the IFC monitor developed for
the PUMP’s earlier incarnation [9, 10]. This double use is commonplace in formal security results:
while the correctness of information-flow control in the PROSPER systemwas stated as a refinement
result [21, 22, 66], work on the seL4 micro kernel [68] used refinement to transfer a noninterference
result from the system’s abstract specification to its C implementation [81, 82].
Other formalisms for defining and reasoning about security policies have been proposed in the
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literature. A particularly relevant one is the notion of security automaton introduced by Schneider
[95] to describe properties that can be enforced by a dynamic monitor. A security automaton is
similar to a non-deterministic finite automaton, and is given by
• a countable set 𝑄 of states;
• a set 𝑄0 ⊆ 𝑄 of initial states;
• a countable set 𝐼 of input symbols; and
• a transition relation 𝛿 ⊆ 𝑄 × 𝐼 × 𝑄.
In this formalism, the execution of a system corresponds to a (possibly infinite) trace of input sym-
bols, representing the states traversed by the system during execution, actions performed by the
system, etc. Conceptually, the automaton maintains a set 𝑄′ of current states, initially set to 𝑄0,
and it executes by successively analyzing input symbols produced by the system it monitors. When
reading a symbol 𝑖, it transitions from𝑄′ to⋃
u�∈u�′
{𝑞′ ∣ (𝑞, 𝑖, 𝑞′) ∈ 𝛿}. If𝑄′ ever becomes empty,
the automaton considers that a policy violation occurred, and proceeds to terminate the monitored
program.
One diﬀerence between security automata and our micro-policies is that the state of our monitors
have a more fixed structure. Another important point of divergence is that execution of our monitors
is more directly connected to the programs they supervise, whereas in the formalism of security
automata the behavior of the monitor is almost completely decoupled from the underlying program.
These diﬀerences are mostly to keep our model closer to the mechanisms that have been proposed
to accelerate its execution.
Other formalisms for security policies were conceived with rather diﬀerent use cases in mind.
One example is the Legalease language of Sen et al. [96]. Legalease is a language for privacy policies
for big-data systems that restrict how user data is handled, and for what purposes it can be used.
Besides the more specific end application, Legalease policies are used to inspect programs statically,
and rely on another analysis that attempts to map program concepts to the higher-level entities in
Legalease.
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Chapter 3
Information-Flow Control
One of the original motivations for the tagging capabilities of the PUMP, as they were initially de-
veloped in the context of the SAFE platform [25], was to provide efficient support for dynamic
information-flow control (IFC) [29], a discipline for guaranteeing data confidentiality. In IFC sys-
tems, each piece of data is marked with a security label that describes what users or parts of the
system are allowed to read that data. For example, a system could classify its data as either public or
secret, stipulating that secret data can only be observed by users marked with high clearance, while
placing no restrictions on how public data is used. This becomes challenging once we try not only
to prevent users from reading data labeled in a certain way directly, but also from learning anything
about that data indirectly, through the results of other computations that might depend on it. For
example, if the hypothetical system described above stores the salaries of all users as secret informa-
tion, it should not be possible for any information that is presented as public in the system to depend
on those salaries—even the sum of all salaries or their average, which could in principle be computed
as derived information somewhere in the system but inadvertently stored as public information.
Traditionally, IFC systems with formal claims of soundness relied on clever static analyses such
as specialized type systems [52, 93]. Though many of the mechanisms for enforcing IFC were dy-
namic, especially those devised in the systems literature [35, 109], it was unknown whether they
could be sound due to the possibility of implicit flows, whereby a secret can be leaked indirectly
through the control flow of the program. This state of aﬀairs changed rather recently, with works
demonstrating that it was possible to enforce IFC dynamically and soundly [49], spurring great inter-
est in dynamic mechanisms [6, 54, 94, 101]. Though dynamic mechanisms can be more costly than
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their static counterparts in terms of performance, they are also more permissive and well adapted
to settings such as web browsers, where the evaluation of freshly generated code is commonplace.
This chapter presents a micro-policy for information-flow control and discusses the formal guaran-
tees it provides. This is essentially an adaptation of previous designs developed by me and other
collaborators [9, 10, 55, 56] for a diﬀerent, more structured machine model that mimicked special
features present in the SAFE hardware—notably, a protected call stack, which is needed for correctly
invoking procedures that manipulate sensitive data.
It is worth noting that a vast body of work in the IFC literature has demonstrated that its tech-
niques go beyond pure confidentiality guarantees, being capable of enforcing integrity properties as
well, controlling which parties in a system are allowed to influence certain data items. For example,
we might want to prevent unprivileged users in a system from modifying the programs installed in
that system. We will restrict our discussion to confidentiality properties in what follows, for simplic-
ity.
3.1 Confidentiality Labels
To describe secrecy constraints, typical IFC systems impose an ordering ⊑ on the set 𝐿 of data
labels [29]. Intuitively, 𝑙1 ⊑ 𝑙2 states that the label 𝑙2 is “more restrictive” than 𝑙1, meaning that
data labeled with 𝑙2 can be used in fewer contexts than data labeled with 𝑙1. In a system that has
only two classes of data, public and secret, the set of labels 𝐿 would comprise two security levels 𝑃
and 𝑆, ordered as 𝑃 ⊑ 𝑆. The idea is that 𝑃 is used to label public data, whereas 𝑆 labels secret
data that requires special clearance to be observed (e.g., the user might have to be logged in as a
system administrator). As a more elaborate example, we could take as elements of 𝐿 sets of users of
a system: each 𝑙 ∈ 𝐿 then would describe which users are allowed to observe a given piece of data.
In this case, we define 𝑙1 ⊑ 𝑙2 as 𝑙1 ⊇ 𝑙2, the idea being that the fewer users can observe a value,
the more secret that value is.
For our IFC micro-policy, we need to impose more structure on labels than simply an ordering:
it should be possible to combine two labels 𝑙1 and 𝑙2 into a new label 𝑙1 ⊔ 𝑙2 that is as restrictive as
𝑙1 and 𝑙2. To see why, suppose that we have two pieces of data 𝑥1 and 𝑥2 that are used as inputs to
some program 𝑓 , and that their uses are governed by the labels 𝑙1 and 𝑙2. Then the use of the result
𝑓(𝑥1, 𝑥2) should combine the restrictions associated with 𝑥1 and 𝑥2, since in general it might allow
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observers to infer properties about both inputs; to track this dependency, we mark this result with
the compound label 𝑙1 ⊔ 𝑙2. For this to make sense, we require some properties of the ⊔ operation,
summarized in the following definition.
Definition 3.1. A semi-lattice is an idempotent monoid (𝐿, ⊔,⊥). Spelled out explicitly, this means
that𝐿 is a set equipped with an element⊥ ∈ 𝐿 and a binary operation ⊔ that maps a pair of elements
𝑙1, 𝑙2 ∈ 𝐿 to an element 𝑙1⊔𝑙2 ∈ 𝐿, and that this data is required to satisfy the following properties:
Commutativity 𝑙1 ⊔ 𝑙2 = 𝑙2 ⊔ 𝑙1;
Associativity 𝑙1 ⊔ (𝑙2 ⊔ 𝑙3) = (𝑙1 ⊔ 𝑙2) ⊔ 𝑙3;
Identity ⊥ ⊔ 𝑙 = 𝑙; and
Idempotence 𝑙 ⊔ 𝑙 = 𝑙.
We refer to ⊥ as bottom, and to 𝑙1 ⊔ 𝑙2 as the join of the elements 𝑙1 and 𝑙2. We will often use
the word label to refer generically to elements of a semi-lattice, reserving “tag” for the more general
use in other policies.
This definition does not mention any notion of order on labels, but such an ordering is not nec-
essary, as it can be fully recovered from the join operation: given a semi-lattice 𝐿 and two labels
𝑙1, 𝑙2 ∈ 𝐿, we stipulate that 𝑙1 ⊑ 𝑙2 if and only if 𝑙2 = 𝑙1 ⊔ 𝑙2. Notice that this definition places
the bottom element below all other labels, since 𝑙 = 𝑙 ⊔ ⊥ by commutativity and identity. Under
the security reading of the order relation given above, this means that bottom is the least restrictive
security level. By similar algebraic manipulations, we can show that ⊑ is a partial order, meaning
that it is
Reflexive 𝑙 ⊑ 𝑙 (because of idempotence);
Transitive 𝑙1 ⊑ 𝑙2 ∧ 𝑙2 ⊑ 𝑙3 ⇒ 𝑙1 ⊑ 𝑙3 (because of associativity); and
Antisymmetric 𝑙1 ⊑ 𝑙2 ∧ 𝑙2 ⊑ 𝑙1 ⇒ 𝑙1 = 𝑙2 (because of commutativity).
The interpretation that we gave of the join operation above, as computing a security level that is
at least as restrictive as the one of its arguments, makes sense because
𝑙1 ⊑ 𝑙1 ⊔ 𝑙2 𝑙2 ⊑ 𝑙1 ⊔ 𝑙2.
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Furthermore, we can show that 𝑙1 ⊔ 𝑙2 ⊑ 𝑙3 is equivalent to 𝑙1 ⊑ 𝑙3 and 𝑙2 ⊑ 𝑙3, which means
that the join operation computes the smallest label that is as restrictive as its arguments. Thus, if
we use 𝑙1 ⊔ 𝑙2 to label the result of a computation 𝑓(𝑥1, 𝑥2) performed on two values 𝑥1 and 𝑥2
labeled as 𝑙1 and 𝑙2, we are placing the least amount of restrictions on the result to correctly track
the dependency on the inputs that were used to produce it.
To better understand these ideas, it is useful to analyze some examples of semi-lattices.
Example 3.2. Consider the first set of IFC labels mentioned above, with two security levels, 𝑃 ⊑ 𝑆.
We can derive this order from a semi-lattice structure by taking ⊥ to be 𝑃 , and by defining the join
operation as follows:
𝑙1 ⊔ 𝑙2 =
⎧
{
⎨
{
⎩
𝑆 if 𝑙1 = 𝑆 or 𝑙2 = 𝑆
𝑃 otherwise.
Example 3.3. Let 𝑈 be a set of users in a system. We might want to tag the data in a system with
the set of users that are allowed to read that data. We can express this policy with the semi-lattice
(𝒫(𝑈), ∩, 𝑈), where 𝒫(𝑈) is the set of all subsets of 𝑈 . Intuitively, the bottom label 𝑈 is the least
restrictive label because it allows every user in the system to make use of the data it classifies.
Example 3.4. The natural numbers form a semi-lattice by taking the join operation to be max, and
the bottom element to be 0.
In what follows, we will build an IFC micro-policy that is parameterized by an arbitrary semi-
lattice 𝐿, used to describe data secrecy levels. Note that some IFC systems require more structure
of labels than simply forming a semi-lattice. Reactive information flow [69], for example, uses as
labels finite automata describing what users of the system are allowed to observe some information
after a sequence of operations has been performed on it, enabling more permissive policies such as
allowing users of an electronic voting system to learn about the outcome of an election, after all the
votes having been tallied, while preventing them from observing choices cast in particular votes.
Nevertheless, the order structure we employ is used as a basic building block even in these more
complex systems, and the basic micro-policy we describe could certainly serve as a starting point to
design new ones.
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3.2 Information-Flow Rules
We begin by presenting a simple micro-policy with no system services, whose sole purpose is to
correctly track the dependencies between data items that arise during execution. Having chosen
some semi-lattice 𝐿, the labels used in this policy are as follows.
Tag
u�u�
= Tag
u�
= 𝐿
Tag
u�
= C ∣ D(𝑙 ∶ 𝐿)
Memory tags are used to distinguish between code and data, just as in the basic policy of Figure 2.3,
but data items in memory carry an additional IFC label describing their security. Similarly, data
stored in registers has its own labels, as well as the PC. Labeling the PC is commonplace in IFC
systems, so that they can deal with implicit flows, where the control flow of the program may be used
to leak information. As a simple example, consider the following piece of code:
if (secret) {
leaked = 1;
} else {
leaked = 0;
}
Suppose that a regular, unprivileged user has the ability to observe the value of the variable leaked
above, and that we want to conceal the value of the variable secret from that user. It is clear that
the value will depend on the value of the variable secret; however, with a naive flow analysis,
we might not be able to detect this dependency, since the value of secret is not directly copied to
leaked. The PC label is used precisely to remedy this problem: its value is an upper bound on the
confidentiality restrictions of all values that have influenced the current control flow. By keeping
track of this label, we can, for example, decide at the moment of the write to leaked that this might
result in a data leak, and stop the program.
Figure 3.1 defines the transfer function for this policy. The PC label stays the same in most cases,
except for branching instructions (Jump, Bnz and Jal), where it accounts for possible influences on
the next PC value (the destination address, in the case of Jump and Jal, or the branch condition, in
the case of Bnz). The result of each instruction is labeled by combining the security levels of the
29
Opcode PC Instr A1 A2 Dest PC Res
Nop 𝑙u�u� C 𝑙u�u�
Const 𝑙u�u� C _ 𝑙u�u� ⊥
Mov 𝑙u�u� C 𝑙u� _ 𝑙u�u� 𝑙u�
Binop
⊕
𝑙u�u� C 𝑙1 𝑙2 _ 𝑙u�u� 𝑙1 ⊔ 𝑙2
Load 𝑙u�u� C 𝑙u�u�u� D(𝑙u�u�u�) _ 𝑙u�u� 𝑙u�u�u� ⊔ 𝑙u�u�u�
Store 𝑙u�u� C 𝑙u�u�u� 𝑙u�u�u� D(𝑙u�) 𝑙u�u� D(𝑙u�u�u� ⊔ 𝑙u�u�u� ⊔ 𝑙u�u�)
if 𝑙u�u�u� ⊔ 𝑙u�u� ⊑ 𝑙u�
Jump 𝑙u�u� C 𝑙u�u�u�u� 𝑙u�u� ⊔ 𝑙u�u�u�u�
Bnz 𝑙u�u� C 𝑙u�u�u�u� 𝑙u�u� ⊔ 𝑙u�u�u�u�
Jal 𝑙u�u� C 𝑙u�u�u�u� _ 𝑙u�u� ⊔ 𝑙u�u�u�u� ⊥
Figure 3.1: IFC transfer function
inputs that were used to compute it; for Const, since there are no inputs, this label is simply ⊥. In a
sense, we could see the current PC as part of these inputs, since it is responsible for choosing what
instruction to execute. However, no instructions propagate the PC label to the label of results stored
in registers, because this would not be necessary: the policy implicitly treats the entire register bank
as having been influenced by the PC.
Assuming that the code does not try to access instructions as data or to execute data as instruc-
tions, there is nothing in the rules that can stop execution. The only exception is the Store instruc-
tion, which can only execute when 𝑙u�u�u� ⊔ 𝑙u�u� ⊑ 𝑙u�u�u� holds—usually known in the literature as the
no-sensitive-upgrade condition [6, 115]. The reason for this restriction is intuitively similar to the
problem faced before with implicit flows: it should not be possible for a program to make the use of
a memory location more restricted by writing to it from a high context, because it might change what
an observer can infer about the state of the system. The issue will become clearer once we discuss
the security property enforced by this policy.
3.3 Restoring the PC
A careful inspection of the rules of Figure 3.1 reveals an interesting problem with the micro-policy
we have presented so far: since every rule makes the new PC label at least as restrictive as the
previous one, it is impossible for that label to ever go down. This choice is too conservative, since
as the computation evolves, diﬀerent confidentiality levels creep into the PC label, restricting what
values can be manipulated.
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Typical IFC systems deal with this label creep problem by exploiting the control-flow structure
of the program. Consider a program like the one we saw earlier, where we take advantage of the
knowledge we obtain by being on each branch of the if statement to leak a secret. After the if
statement, when the control flows of both branches meet, we are not under the influence of the secret
condition we branched on, since the code to be executed is the same independently of which branch
we took. This suggests that it should be possible to soundly restore the value of the PC to whatever
it was before control branched [6, 54, 101].
Adapting this idea to work with machine code is challenging, given the unstructured nature of
its control flow. The IFC policy for the SAFE platform [9, 10] attacked this problem by maintaining
a stack of security labels managed with explicit call and return instructions. In this setting, if we
want to restore the PC label after some branching construct—including conditionals and loops—we
must compile that construct to a function call: before branching, we save the PC label on the stack,
compute, and return after the merge point to restore the label. To guarantee soundness, it shouldn’t
be possible for user code to access this stack directly—otherwise, the PC label could be incorrectly
downgraded on a return. The SAFE platformmade it possible to implement this scheme by exposing
a hardware protected stack for function calls; however, general micro-policies cannot directly rely
on this feature, which is absent from conventional processors. The solution we propose is to protect
this stack from user code by keeping it as part of the internal state of the micro-policy, exposing
only special call and return system services that have the privilege to manipulate it. Specifically, the
internal state of the IFC micro-policy is a stack of call frames, which are pairs of the form (𝑝𝑐, 𝑟𝑠):
• 𝑝𝑐 is an atom 𝑣u�u�@𝑙u�u� comprising a PC value 𝑣u�u� ∈Word and a label 𝑙u�u� ∈ 𝐿; and
• 𝑟𝑠 is a register bank (that is, a map Reg⇀Word×𝐿), for saving previous register values, as
explained below.
The system services for manipulating the stack, defined in Figure 3.2, are inspired by previous
work on adapting our IFC policy to a machine with registers [56]. We assume that we have two
designated registers 𝑟u�u�u� and 𝑟u�u�u� for passing arguments to system services, and that the services
Call and Return are invoked by performing a Jal to addresses 𝑤u�u�u�u� and 𝑤u�u�u�u�u�u�.
It is worth taking some time to explain the mechanism of calls and returns, beginning with the
contents of the call stack. We have already seen that we want to record the previous PC labels on the
stack, so that we can restore them on every return. However, call frames also record the entire state
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Call
𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�) = 𝑝𝑐u�u�u�u�u�u�@𝑙u�u�u�u�u�u� 𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�u�u�) = 𝑝𝑐u�u�u�u�u�u�@𝑙u�u�u�u�u�u� 𝑙
′
u�u� = 𝑙u�u�u�u�u�u� ⊔ 𝑙u�u�u�u�u�u� ⊔ 𝑙u�u�
𝑐𝑓 = (𝑝𝑐u�u�u�u�u�u�@(𝑙u�u�u�u�u�u� ⊔ 𝑙u�u�), 𝑟𝑠)
Call(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�u�u�@𝑙u�u�, 𝑐𝑠) = (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑝𝑐u�u�u�u�u�u�@𝑙
′
u�u�, 𝑐𝑓 ∷ 𝑐𝑠)
Return
𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�u�u�) = 𝑤u�u�u�@𝑙u�u�u� 𝑟𝑠
′[𝑟u�u�u� ↦ 𝑤u�u�u�@(𝑙u�u� ⊔ 𝑙u�u�u�)] = 𝑟𝑠
″
Return(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�u�u�u�u�@𝑙u�u�, (𝑤
′
u�u�@𝑙
′
u�u�, 𝑟𝑠
′) ∷ 𝑐𝑠) = (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠″, 𝑤′u�u�@𝑙
′
u�u�, 𝑐𝑠)
Figure 3.2: System services for manipulating the IFC call stack
of the registers at the moment of each call, as seen in the rule for Call. The reason for this, intuitively,
is that registers are not subject to the same restrictions on stores as the ones used for the memory.
In order to prevent similar issues with implicit flows, we simply make such flows impossible, by
restoring the state of almost all registers at the moment of a Return, when the PC label is lowered.
The only exception is the special register 𝑟u�u�u�, where the callee is allowed to leave a return value
for the caller. To make this return mechanism sound, we must join to the label of that register the
label on the PC that called the Return service, to correctly track the data that influenced that returned
value.
A point worth noting about the semantics of function calls is that the call stack records not only
the value of the current PC label, 𝑙u�u�, but also the label of whatever PC performed that call, 𝑙u�u�u�u�u�u�.
When the Call service is invoked as usual, by performing a Jal to its address, it is necessarily the
case that 𝑙u�u�u�u�u�u� ⊑ 𝑙u�u�, so this update might not sound necessary. However, it could also be the
case that somebody tries to trick the service into returning to a lower PC than the one that performed
the Call, by storing that PC value directly in the specially designated 𝑟u� register used by Jal, and
subsequently jumping to 𝑤u�u�u�u�. This adjusted level fixes these issues.
Performing calls and returns with special system services might raise performance concerns.
Indeed, these services need to save and restore not only the current PC but the entire register bank,
thus consuming several cycles to perform a single function call. Nevertheless, it is unclear how
problematic this would be in practice, since we only need the special Call and Return services for
restoring the PC label after the return, which may not be needed very often. Indeed, there are other
systems built upon this assumption. For example, in concurrent LIO [99], an IFC library for Haskell,
the only way to inspect secret information without raising the PC label is by forking a thread to
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perform the task, which should be at least as expensive as our approach.
3.4 Noninterference
Now that we have described the IFC micro-policy, it is time to analyze its security guarantees. Fol-
lowing standard practice, we will use as our correctness criterion the property of noninterference,
originally introduced by Goguen andMeseguer [42]. Although noninterference can be formalized in
a multitude of ways [52], the basic idea is simple: if two systems diﬀer only in data that is secret with
respect to some security level, then running the two systems should produce identical observations
at that level.
To state a noninterference property, we begin by explaining what it means for two states to be
indistinguishable.
Definition 3.5. Let 𝑙 be a security label. We say that two register atoms 𝑤1@𝑙1 and 𝑤2@𝑙2 are
𝑙-indistinguishable, written 𝑤1@𝑙1 ≈u� 𝑤2@𝑙2, if
𝑙1 ⊑ 𝑙 ∨ 𝑙2 ⊑ 𝑙 ⇒ 𝑤1@𝑙1 = 𝑤2@𝑙2.
We say that two memory atoms 𝑤1@𝑡1 and 𝑤2@𝑡2 are 𝑙-indistinguishable if they are equal or if
there are labels 𝑙1 and 𝑙2 such that 𝑡u� = DATA(𝑙u�) and 𝑤1@𝑙1 ≈u� 𝑤2@𝑙2.
Two memories𝑚1 and𝑚2 (with IFC memory tags) are 𝑙-indistinguishable if they are pointwise
related by 𝑙-indistinguishability for memory atoms (cf. Definition A.1).
Finally, two states 𝑠1 and 𝑠2 are 𝑙-indistinguishable if they agree on all components (except
for their memories, which should be 𝑙-indistinguishable), and their output traces are empty; that is,
𝑠u� = (𝑚u�, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑝𝑐, 𝑐𝑠, []) and𝑚1 ≈u� 𝑚2.
Next, we slightly modify our policy by introducing another component in its internal state: a
trace of output events. This output trace would probably not be stored in an actual implementation
of this micro-policy; rather, it is a modeling device to represent the outputs that the machine has
produced during its execution. Concretely, an output event is simply an atom 𝑤@𝑙 that combines a
word 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊 and a label 𝑙 ∈ 𝐿. The label 𝑙 on this event models who is capable of reading the data;
in a more realistic design, communication with the outside world would probably require some form
33
Output
𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�u�u�) = 𝑤@𝑙 𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�) = 𝑤u�u�@𝑙
′
u�u�
Output(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�u�u�u�u�@𝑙u�u�, 𝑐𝑠, 𝑡) = (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�@(𝑙u�u� ⊔ 𝑙
′
u�u�), 𝑐𝑠, 𝑡 · [𝑤@(𝑙 ⊔ 𝑙u�u�)])
Figure 3.3: Output system service. Here, · represents sequence concatenation.
of encryption, guaranteeing that only principals explicitly allowed by the label 𝑙 have the ability of
reading it.
Output is performed with a new Output system service, detailed in Figure 3.3. This is the only
operation that can modify the output trace in the internal state; the other system services Call and
Return are modified to leave the trace intact. Note that we must taint the label on the new PC in a
similar fashion to the Call service.
Output traces also carry their own notion of indistinguishability.
Definition 3.6. Given a label 𝑙, we say that two traces of output events 𝑡1 and 𝑡2 are 𝑙-indistinguishable
if the following condition holds. Let 𝑡′u� be the trace obtained by filtering out from 𝑡u� all the output
events 𝑤@𝑙′ that do not satisfy 𝑙′ ⊑ 𝑙. Then there should exist a trace 𝑡′ such that 𝑡′1 = 𝑡
′
2 · 𝑡
′ or
𝑡′2 = 𝑡
′
1 · 𝑡
′. In other words, the filtered traces 𝑡′1 and 𝑡
′
2 should share a common maximal prefix.
Thus, if it is not the case that 𝑡1 ≈u� 𝑡2—that is, if the traces are distinguishable—that there must
be an index 𝑖 such that the filtered traces 𝑡′1 and 𝑡
′
2 are bigger than 𝑖 but diﬀer in their 𝑖-th element.
The filtering of the traces represents the outputs that an observer with observation power bounded
by 𝑙 would receive.
Definition 3.7. We say that the symbolic machine has noninterference if the following property
holds. Given a label 𝑙 and a pair of indistinguishable states 𝑠1 ≈u� 𝑠2, suppose that 𝑠1 →
∗ 𝑠′1 and
𝑠2 →
∗ 𝑠′2. Then the traces generated during these executions (that is, the trace component of the
internal state of 𝑠′1 and 𝑠
′
2) are 𝑙-indistinguishable.
This notion of noninterference does allow some secret information to leak. The number of ex-
ecution steps between output events in two traces is irrelevant when defining indistinguishability,
implying that secret data can influence computation time—that is, our notion is timing insensitive.
Furthermore, since cropping a suffix of a trace yields an indistinguishable trace, varying a secret can
cause an output trace to stop prematurely, by making the computation enter an infinite loop with-
out observable outputs, or by triggering a run-time error. This is usually known in the literature as
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termination-insensitive (or progress-insensitive [5]) noninterference. We discuss the implications of
this choice in Section 3.6.
3.5 Verifying Noninterference
Now that we have a micro-policy and a correctness criterion for it, it is time to verify it. The proof
strategy mimics the one we used in previous work [9, 10]. First, we show that the symbolic machine
running the IFC micro-policy simulates a morally equivalent machine where all the IFC checks
and propagation rules are built in. Since this machine is tailored for IFC, it is much easier to prove
noninterference for it directly, with a set of unwinding conditions [43] that can be used in an inductive
proof. Once this is done, we can transfer the noninterference property to the symbolic machine via
a preservation argument.
Definition 3.8. The state of the IFC machine is a tuple (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑝𝑐, 𝑐𝑠), where
• 𝑚 ∈Word⇀ Instr +Word× 𝐿;
• 𝑟𝑠 ∈ Reg⇀Word× 𝐿;
• 𝑝𝑐 ∈Word× 𝐿; and
• 𝑐𝑠 is a call stack, as used in the private state of the IFC micro-policy.
The step relation of the IFC machine is defined in Figures 3.4 and 3.5. Note that this is a 3-place
relation: 𝑠 → 𝑠′ means that 𝑠 steps to 𝑠′ without producing any output events, whereas 𝑠 →u� 𝑠
′
means that 𝑠 steps to 𝑠′ while producing an output 𝑜 ∈ Word × 𝐿 (note that this can only occur in
the rule for output; no other operations can produce events). We will sometimes write 𝑠 →u� 𝑠
′ to
indicate that 𝑠 steps to 𝑠′ either producing no output, when 𝑒 is the silent event 𝜏 , or an output 𝑜.
To prove noninterference for this machine, we will need to generalize the notion of state equiv-
alence so that it can be maintained throughout an inductive proof.
Definition 3.9. Two output events 𝑒1 and 𝑒2 are 𝑙-indistinguishable if they are both 𝜏 or both 𝑙-
indistinguishable atoms.
Two call frames 𝑓1 = (𝑤1@𝑙1, 𝑟𝑠1) and 𝑓2 = (𝑤2@𝑙2, 𝑟𝑠2) are 𝑙-indistinguishable if 𝑙1 ⊑
𝑙 ∨ 𝑙2 ⊑ 𝑙 ⇒ 𝑓1 = 𝑓2.
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Nop
𝑚(𝑤u�u�) = Nop
(𝑚, 𝑟, 𝑤u�u�@𝑙u�u�, 𝑐𝑠) → (𝑚, 𝑟, (𝑤u�u� + 1)@𝑙u�u�, 𝑐𝑠)
Const
𝑚(𝑤u�u�) = Const 𝑤 𝑟 𝑟𝑠[𝑟 ↦ 𝑤@⊥] = 𝑟𝑠
′
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�@𝑙u�u�, 𝑐𝑠) → (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠
′, (𝑤u�u� + 1)@𝑙u�u�, 𝑐𝑠)
Mov
𝑚(𝑤u�u�) = Mov 𝑟 𝑟u� 𝑟𝑠(𝑟) = 𝑤@𝑙 𝑟𝑠[𝑟u� ↦ 𝑤@𝑙] = 𝑟𝑠
′
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�@𝑙u�u�, 𝑐𝑠) → (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠
′, (𝑤u�u� + 1)@𝑙u�u�, 𝑐𝑠)
Binop
𝑚(𝑤u�u�) = Binop⊕ 𝑟1 𝑟2 𝑟u�
𝑟𝑠(𝑟1) = 𝑤1@𝑙1 𝑟𝑠(𝑟2) = 𝑤2@𝑙2 𝑟𝑠[𝑟u� ↦ (𝑤1 ⊕𝑤2)@(𝑙1 ⊔ 𝑙2)] = 𝑟𝑠
′
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�@𝑙u�u�, 𝑐𝑠) → (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠
′, (𝑤u�u� + 1)@𝑙u�u�, 𝑐𝑠)
Load
𝑚(𝑤u�u�) = Load 𝑟 𝑟u� 𝑟𝑠(𝑟) = 𝑤@𝑙 𝑚(𝑤) = 𝑤
′@𝑙′ 𝑟𝑠[𝑟u� ↦ 𝑤
′@(𝑙 ⊔ 𝑙′)] = 𝑟𝑠′
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�@𝑙u�u�, 𝑐𝑠) → (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠
′, (𝑤u�u�+1)@𝑡
′
u�u�, 𝑐𝑠)
Store
𝑚(𝑤u�u�) = Store 𝑟u� 𝑟u� 𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�) = 𝑤u�@𝑙u� 𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�) = 𝑤u�@𝑙u� 𝑚(𝑤u�) = _@𝑙u�
𝑙u�u� ⊔ 𝑙u� ⊑ 𝑙u� 𝑚[𝑤u� ↦ 𝑤u�@𝑡
′
u�] = 𝑚
′
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�@𝑙u�u�, 𝑐𝑠) → (𝑚
′, 𝑟𝑠, (𝑤u�u� + 1)@𝑙u�u�, 𝑐𝑠)
Jump
𝑚(𝑤u�u�) = Jump 𝑟 𝑟𝑠(𝑟) = 𝑤
′
u�u�@𝑙
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�@𝑙u�u�, 𝑐𝑠) → (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤
′
u�u�@(𝑙u�u� ⊔ 𝑙
′
u�u�), 𝑐𝑠)
Bnz
𝑚(𝑤u�u�) = Bnz 𝑟 𝑛 𝑟𝑠(𝑟) = 𝑤@𝑙 𝑤
′
u�u� = if 𝑤 = 0 then 𝑤u�u� + 1 else 𝑤u�u� + 𝑛
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�@𝑙u�u�, 𝑐𝑠) → (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤
′
u�u�@(𝑙u�u� ⊔ 𝑙
′
u�u�), 𝑐𝑠)
Jal
𝑚(𝑤u�u�) = Jal 𝑟 𝑟𝑠(𝑟) = 𝑤
′
u�u�@𝑙1 𝑟𝑠[𝑟u� ↦ (𝑤u�u� + 1)@(𝑙u�u� ⊔ 𝑙1)]
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�@𝑙u�u�, 𝑐𝑠) → (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠
′, 𝑤′u�u�@(𝑙u�u� ⊔ 𝑙1), 𝑐𝑠)
Figure 3.4: Semantics of instructions for IFC machine
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Call
𝑚(𝑤u�u�u�u�) = ⊥ 𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�) = 𝑝𝑐u�u�u�u�u�u�@𝑙u�u�u�u�u�u� 𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�u�u�) = 𝑝𝑐u�u�u�u�u�u�@𝑙u�u�u�u�u�u�
𝑙′u�u� = 𝑙u�u�u�u�u�u� ⊔ 𝑙u�u�u�u�u�u� ⊔ 𝑙u�u� 𝑐𝑓 = (𝑝𝑐u�u�u�u�u�u�@(𝑙u�u�u�u�u�u� ⊔ 𝑙u�u�), 𝑟𝑠)
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�u�u�@𝑙u�u�, 𝑐𝑠) → (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑝𝑐u�u�u�u�u�u�@𝑙
′
u�u�, 𝑐𝑓 ∷ 𝑐𝑠)
Return
𝑚(𝑤u�u�u�u�u�u�) = ⊥ 𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�u�u�) = 𝑤u�u�u�@𝑙u�u�u� 𝑟𝑠
′[𝑟u�u�u� ↦ 𝑤u�u�u�@(𝑙u�u� ⊔ 𝑙u�u�u�)] = 𝑟𝑠
″
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�u�u�u�u�@𝑙u�u�, (𝑤
′
u�u�@𝑙
′
u�u�, 𝑟𝑠
′) ∷ 𝑐𝑠) → (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠″, 𝑤′u�u�@𝑙
′
u�u�, 𝑐𝑠)
Output
𝑚(𝑤u�u�u�u�u�u�) = ⊥ 𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�u�u�) = 𝑤@𝑙 𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�) = 𝑤u�u�@𝑙
′
u�u�
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�u�u�u�u�@𝑙u�u�, 𝑐𝑠) →u�@(u�⊔u�u�u�) (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�@(𝑙u�u� ⊔ 𝑙
′
u�u�), 𝑐𝑠)
Figure 3.5: Semantics of services for IFC machine
Two call stacks 𝑐𝑠1 and 𝑐𝑠2 are 𝑙-indistinguishable if they have the same length, and at ev-
ery position their call frames are 𝑙-indistinguishable. They are weakly 𝑙-indistinguishable, written
𝑐𝑠1 ≋u� 𝑐𝑠2, if they are 𝑙-indistinguishable after removing from them the largest prefix of call frames
whose PC label is not below 𝑙; that is, if 𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑝(𝑐𝑠1) ≈u� 𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑝(𝑐𝑠2), where
𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑝([]) = [] 𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑝((𝑝𝑐@𝑙u�u�, 𝑟𝑠) ∷ 𝑐𝑠) =
⎧
{
⎨
{
⎩
(𝑝𝑐@𝑙u�u�, 𝑟𝑠) ∷ 𝑐𝑠 if 𝑙u�u� ⊑ 𝑙
𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑝(𝑐𝑠) otherwise.
Two memory values 𝑣1, 𝑣2 ∈ Instr+Word×𝐿 are 𝑙-indistinguishable if they are both the same
instruction, or if they are both 𝑙-indistinguishable atoms. Two memories are 𝑙-indistinguishable if
they are pointwise 𝑙-indistinguishable, and similarly for two register banks.
Finally, two states 𝑠1 = (𝑚1, 𝑟𝑠1, 𝑤1@𝑙1, 𝑐𝑠1) and 𝑠2 = (𝑚2, 𝑟𝑠2, 𝑤2@𝑙2, 𝑐𝑠2) of the IFC
abstract machine are 𝑙-indistinguishable if one of the following two conditions hold.
• 𝑙1 ⊑ 𝑙, 𝑤1@𝑙1 = 𝑤2@𝑙2,𝑚1 ≈u� 𝑚2, 𝑟𝑠1 ≈u� 𝑟𝑠2, and 𝑐𝑠1 ≈u� 𝑐𝑠2; or
• 𝑙1 ⋢ 𝑙, 𝑙2 ⋢ 𝑙,𝑚1 ≈u� 𝑚2, and 𝑐𝑠1 ≋u� 𝑐𝑠2.
Intuitively, this definition says that indistinguishable states should execute in lockstep as long
as their PCs are below the level of observation 𝑙, with all their components being pairwise indistin-
guishable. However, as soon as their PC labels go beyond 𝑙, this condition becomes too strong to
maintain: this happens when the machines execute a branching instruction that makes their next PC
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value depend on a secret, causing both machines to enter diﬀerent execution paths. The no-sensitive-
upgrade condition on stores is enough to guarantee that the memories stay indistinguishable during
this execution; as there are no similar checks for the register banks, there is nothing we can guarantee
for them. Finally, removing all the high frames stored on the call stack is all it takes to make the two
match up.
The next set of unwinding conditions [43] describes the pattern that two parallel executions go
through when started at indistinguishable states, and will play a crucial role in establishing nonin-
terference by induction.
Lemma 3.10. Let 𝑠1 ≈u� 𝑠2 be two indistinguishable states. Suppose that 𝑠1 →u�1 𝑠
′
1. Let 𝑙1 and
𝑙′1 be the PC labels of 𝑠1 and 𝑠
′
1.
1. If 𝑙1 ⊑ 𝑙 and 𝑠2 →u�2 𝑠
′
2, then 𝑠
′
1 ≈u� 𝑠
′
2 and 𝑒1 ≈u� 𝑒2.
2. If 𝑙1 ⋢ 𝑙 and 𝑙
′
1 ⋢ 𝑙, then 𝑠
′
1 ≈u� 𝑠2. Moreover, if 𝑒 = 𝑤@𝑙u�, then 𝑙u� ⋢ 𝑙.
3. If 𝑙1 ⋢ 𝑙, 𝑙
′
1 ⊑ 𝑙, 𝑠2 →u�2 𝑠
′
2, and the PC label of 𝑠
′
2 is below 𝑙, then 𝑠
′
1 ≈u� 𝑠
′
2, and
𝑒1 = 𝑒2 = 𝜏 .
We can visualize these four cases in pictures; the dotted lines represent conclusions, the solid lines
represent hypotheses.
𝑠1
𝑠2
𝑠′1
𝑠′2
≈u�
𝑒1
𝑒2
≈u�
(1)
𝑒1 ≈u� 𝑒2
𝑠1
𝑠2
𝑠′1
𝑠2
≈u�
𝑒1
=
≈u�
(2)
𝑠1
𝑠2
𝑠′1
𝑠′2
≈u�
𝑒1
𝑒2
≈u�
(3)
𝑒1 = 𝑒2 = 𝜏
The proof of these conditions is a straightforward (but tedious) case analysis on all possible
kinds of steps that 𝑠1 can take. With these conditions in hand, we can show that the IFC machine is
noninterfering.
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Lemma 3.11 (Noninterference for IFCmachine). Let 𝑠1 ≈u� 𝑠2 be a pair of 𝑙-indistinguishable states
of the IFC machine. Suppose that we have two executions 𝑠1 →
∗
u�1
𝑠′1 and 𝑠2 →
∗
u�2
𝑠′2, where the
subscripts indicate the traces of non-silent output events produced during execution. Then 𝑡1 ≈u� 𝑡2.
Proof. By induction on the sum of the number of steps taken by both executions, making use of
Lemma 3.10 and of the fact that 𝑙-indistinguishability of states is a symmetric relation.
To transfer this noninterference result to our IFC micro-policy, we need to relate the execution
of both machine models. This can be done by simply abstracting the state of the symbolic machine
into a matching IFC state.
Definition 3.12. We say that a symbolic state 𝑠u� refines a state 𝑠u� of the IFC machine, written
𝑠u�B 𝑠u�, if their register banks, PCs, and call stacks are equal, and if their memories𝑚u� and𝑚u� are
pointwise related by the relation ∼ generated by the following rules (cf. Definition A.1):
decode 𝑖 = 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟
𝑖@C ∼ 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟
decode 𝑖 = ⊥
𝑖@C ∼ Halt 𝑤@D(𝑙) ∼ 𝑤@𝑙
(Relating words that are tagged as instructions but not decodable as such is just a trick to simplify
the proof of noninterference later on, and has no major significance.)
Lemma 3.13. Let 𝑠u� B 𝑠u� be two refined states. Suppose that 𝑠u� → 𝑠′u�. Then there exists a state
𝑠′u� of the IFC machine and an output event 𝑒 such that 𝑠u� →u� 𝑠
′
u�, 𝑠
′
u� B 𝑠′u�, and either
• 𝑒 = 𝜏 , and the output traces of 𝑠u� and 𝑠
′
u� are equal; or
• 𝑒 ∈Word× 𝐿, and the trace of 𝑠′u� is equal to the trace of 𝑠u� with 𝑒 added at the end.
By iterating this lemma step by step, we can reconstruct an entire execution of the symbolic
machine at the level of the IFC machine.
Corollary 3.14. Let 𝑠u� B 𝑠u� be two refined states. Suppose that 𝑠u� →∗ 𝑠′u�. There exists an out-
put trace 𝑡 such that the trace of the internal state of 𝑠′u� is obtained by adding 𝑡 at the end of the
corresponding component of 𝑠u�. Furthermore, there exists 𝑠
′
u� such that 𝑠u� →
∗
u� 𝑠
′
u�.
We have now all the ingredients we need to show our main result.
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Theorem 3.15. The symbolic machine running the IFC micro-policy has noninterference.
Proof. Let 𝑠1 ≈u� 𝑠2 be a pair of indistinguishable states of the symbolic machine, and suppose
that they yield two parallel executions 𝑠1 →
∗ 𝑠′1 and 𝑠2 →
∗ 𝑠′2. It is possible to construct a
pair 𝑠u�1 ≈u� 𝑠u�2 of indistinguishable states of the IFC machine such that 𝑠1𝑠u�1 and 𝑠2𝑠u�2. By
Corollary 3.14, these executing these two states yields output traces 𝑡1 and 𝑡2, and these traces are
exactly the traces of 𝑠′1 and 𝑠
′
2. We conclude by Lemma 3.11.
3.6 Discussion and Related Work
The IFC micro-policy presented here draws heavily from the earlier design of Hrițcu et al. [55] and
its subsequent extension [56] to a richer register-based machine. The variant of noninterference used
here and its proof were adapted from previous work published byme and other collaborators [9, 10].1
Compared to these previous developments, the setup presented here uses the monitor private state
to implement the protected call stack required to restore PC values, but it does not address some of
the challenges these works tackled—notably, dynamic memory allocation, and the extension of the
proofs of noninterference to a machine-code implementation of the policy verified with a custom
Hoare logic. The introduction of dynamic allocation somewhat complicates the invariants used to
prove noninterference (as seen in the work of Banerjee and Naumann [13], for instance), but this
should have no major impact on proof mechanization. On the other hand, adapting the infrastructure
for verifying machine code to this new setting (and, in particular, to the concrete machine described
in Chapter 5) might be laborious due to the use of registers instead of a stack.
One feature we could consider adding to the policy described here is turning labels into first-
class values [54, 101], allowing programs to extract the label of a value during execution, perform
tests on this label (for example, “is this label below a certain threshold?”), and act depending on the
result of these tests. One of our earlier verification works did feature a proof of noninterference for
an abstract machine that supports public labels [56],2 but it did not discuss how this policy could
be implemented in terms of a more generic mechanism like the symbolic machine. One possible
encoding would be to augment memory and register tags with elements of the form LABEL(𝑙, 𝑙′),
where 𝑙 and 𝑙′ are labels. The idea is that an atom with such a tag represents a label 𝑙 that has itself
1The Coq proofs of the original work on verified IFC are available at https://github.com/micro-policies/
verified-ifc.
2The Coq proofs are available at https://github.com/QuickChick/IFC.
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an associated IFC label 𝑙′—a recurrent theme in systems supporting this feature. The payload of
atoms with such tags would simply be ignored. The policy could then expose the primitives for
manipulating labels as system services. Because first-class labels are stored in tag space (which
cannot be arbitrarily accessed by user code), this scheme keeps the representation of tags opaque,
which might be needed for avoiding information leaks in a systemwith dynamically generated labels.
(As we will see in Chapter 4, such an issue is also crucial for guaranteeing confidentiality through
memory safety.)
The variant of noninterference proved here protects code against illicit explicit and implicit infor-
mation flows, but leaves open the possibility of leaks through side channels such as timing or energy
consumption. Dealing with timing channels is potentially difficult in the context of the PUMP, since
caching the transfer function might exacerbate the eﬀects of secrets on these side channels. If such
leaks are a practical concern, we could resort to quantitative variants of information-flow control to
try to contain them [12, 98, 100, 116].
It was often claimed in the literature that termination-insensitive noninterference can leak at
most one bit of secret information during execution. Askarov et al. [5] note that this guarantee
applies only to batch-processing systems that do not produce intermediate outputs. In a mechanism
like ours, where outputs are possible and the level of the PC can be lowered after inspecting a secret,
an attacker can perform slightly better with a brute-force search, as follows.
i = 0;
while (1) {
output(i);
if (i == secret) loop();
i = i + 1;
}
Nevertheless, Askarov et al. prove this is the best option the attack has, in the sense that reliably
leaking a uniformly distributed secret of some size—for example, a private key—takes more than
polynomial time in the size of the secret. The presence of concurrency complicates things [52], since
a direct adaptation of our mechanism might make it possible to leak a secret in linear time, as the
following example suggests:
test(bit, i) {
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if (secret[i] != bit) loop();
output(i);
fork(test(true, i + 1));
fork(test(false, i + 1));
}
fork(test(true, 0));
fork(test(false, 0));
At its core, the issue results from lowering PC labels after computing on sensitive data. Concur-
rent LIO [99] attacks the problem by never restoring PC labels; to prevent label creep, users should
fork new threads to manipulate sensitive information. Its approach seems worth considering, as LIO
has been used in a number of programs, including web frameworks and applications.
The seL4 micro kernel [68] features a proof of information-flow security checked in the Is-
abelle/HOL proof assistant [81, 82]. Instead of the noninterference property studied here, they con-
sider a variant of the finer notion of intransitive noninterference [92]. In the context of seL4, this
property says that information can only flow between system partitions through a fixed list of com-
munication channels that is set up once the system starts running. The proof of their property follows
a strategy similar to ours: they first show intransitive noninterference to an abstract specification of
the system, and then transfer this result by refinement to a more concrete implementation—in their
case, C code.
Some formulations of noninterference are subject to the refinement paradox [59], where the ab-
stract specification of a system may satisfy noninterference even though its refinements do not. This
problem typically arises when the refinement removes some of the non-determinism present in the
specification, allowing one to learn more about the state of a system by observing its execution. The
refinement paradox does not apply in our case because the machines we consider are determinis-
tic. Even though seL4 has a non deterministic specification, their proof also manages to avoid the
refinement paradox by preventing sources of nondeterminism from being observed by partitions.
PROSPER [22] is a separation kernel for ARMv7 that was formally verified with HOL4. Unlike
the verification eﬀorts mentioned here, the final correctness result for PROSPER is not noninterfer-
ence, but a trace equivalence between the machine code implementation of the system and a more
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abstract specification. In this specification, the system consists of two ARMv7 machines that run
separate partitions communicating through asynchronous message passing. The rationale behind
their choice is that, since message passing is the only mechanism of communication in the model,
the same should hold for the concrete implementation. As a sanity check, they show a result assert-
ing that, when running partitions that do not send messages, the partitions do not interference with
each other.
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Chapter 4
Heap Memory Safety
Many security holes in today’s software arise from low-level memory errors such as buﬀer overflows
and double frees in C and C++ [105]. They are hard to spot, easy to introduce inadvertently, and
tend to break subtle invariants that programmers might hope to hold of their code. Even simple,
intuitive desiderata for a program, such as preventing a function from accessing the local variables
of its callers, cannot be enforced without inspecting our code in excruciating detail to rule out such
errors.
Preventing and controlling memory errors is far from trivial. Simple solutions exist—for exam-
ple, programming in memory-safe languages like OCaml, Haskell, Java, JavaScript, or Python—but
they can break common low-level coding idioms, suﬀer from compatibility problems, force us to
reimplement legacy software, and—worst of all—be prohibitively expensive in terms of performance
for programs that make heavy use of the memory. Cheaper, more permissive alternatives for mem-
ory safety can thus have far-reaching consequences for the security of our software infrastructure,
especially if they apply to legacy programs written in C or C++.
Practical challenges often lead to the development of security tools that trade in security guar-
antees for returns in run-time performance and other benefits. In the case of memory safety, some
tools might choose to prevent only temporal violations [83], or might not try to detect overflows that
occur between fields of an object, among other concessions. We have argued that a good method for
evaluating this trade oﬀ would be to formulate the security guarantees that we care about as formal
reasoning principles that can be applied to programs that conform to a policy. Unfortunately, there
is no consensus on what these reasoning principles would be for memory safety. Popular character-
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izations of the concept are usually stated as the absence of a certain class of low-level errors during
program execution. The Wikipedia article on the subject, for example, defines memory safety as
“the state of being protected from various software bugs and security vulnerabilities when dealing
with memory accesses” [112], a definition that appears in one form or another in many formal inves-
tigations of memory safety [72, 84]. Although conceptually simple and intuitive, some researchers
have felt that this picture is incomplete from a formal perspective [53]. We believe this is due to a
few reasons. First, there is often disagreement about which behaviors qualify as errors. For example,
many C programs rely on unrestricted pointer arithmetic [76], even though it may lead to undefined
behavior according to the language standard [58, §6.5.6]. Second, from the point of view of secu-
rity, the problem is not the errors themselves, but rather the erratic behavior that they induce when
they occur in unsafe languages like C. Indeed, in settings that are usually seen as memory safe, like
Java, it is possible for programs to run into errors such as accessing an array out of bounds; however,
instead of wild undefined behavior, such actions have a well-behaved, sensible semantics. Finally,
knowing what low-level errors are prevented alone does not provide much insight into what kinds of
threats a program is immune to. It allows us to rule out attacks that have already been documented,
but it might leave the door open to other threads based on slightly diﬀerent techniques that manage to
bypass the mechanism. This gap between our intuitions about memory errors and the security guar-
antees of memory safety may help explain why it remains so elusive: though memory protection
mechanisms keep coming up, many of them are quickly defeated by new, ingenious attack strategies.
The first goal of this chapter is to present a micro-policy for memory safety. It is based on a
scheme originally due to Clause et al. [19], which uses tags on memory locations to track which
memory region they belong to, and that has been subsequently expanded and ported to the PUMP
by Dhawan et al. [33]. We prove that this micro-policy allows the symbolic machine to implement
(that is, refine) a higher-level abstract machine that has memory-safety checks built in.
The second goal of this chapter is to propose a new characterization of memory safety, and show
that our micro-policy conforms to it. Our characterization is based on the observation that typical
memory errors arise when a pointer is used to access a resource that it was not meant to access, either
because it lies outside of its bounds, or because its region has been freed. As has been noted pre-
viously, this discipline ensures that pointers in a memory-safe language behave as capabilities [53].
Thus, if memory errors in a piece of code are prevented or controlled, we can conclude that its ex-
ecution is independent of memory regions it cannot access through the pointers it possesses. We
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formalize this idea as a noninterference result that we prove for both the symbolic machine run-
ning the memory-safety policy and its higher-level counterpart (Theorems 4.12 and 4.13). We show
how these results carry over to a setting that is more familiar to programmers, a simple imperative
language with dynamic allocation, and we use this setting to relate our characterization of memory
safety to the reasoning principles of separation logic [90], a proof system for heap-manipulating pro-
grams. Finally, to demonstrate the generality of our characterization, we discuss how it is aﬀected
by common pragmatically motivated relaxations of the memory safety.
4.1 Policy Tags
We begin by describing the memory-safety micro-policy that forms the base of our discussion. The
idea is to use tags to track which pointers may access which memory regions, and which region each
memory location belongs to. When a memory access occurs, the policy checks that the pointer tag
allows it to access the region corresponding to that location; if not, a fatal run-time error is triggered.
The micro-policy is based on two sets of tags: data and memory tags.
Tag
u�
= Tag
u�u�
= Data = NPTR ∣ PTR(𝑖 ∈ Id)
Tag
u�
= FREE ∣ D(𝑖 ∈ Id, 𝑡 ∈ Data)
Here, Id is a set of identifiers used to distinguish memory regions allocated at diﬀerent times; we
assume it to be countably infinite.3 We order Id according to some fixed enumeration of its elements,
and note nextId the function that, given an identifier, returns the next identifier on that enumeration.
The Data tags attached to the PC and registers are used to distinguish pointer values from ev-
erything else; a word tagged as PTR(𝑖) is a pointer that is only allowed to access region 𝑖, whereas
everything else is grouped under the NPTR tag.
Memory tags are more complex. The FREE tag denotes a location that does not belong to any
allocated region, whereas D(𝑖, 𝑡) denotes a location that belongs to region 𝑖, and that furthermore
currently stores a word described by the data tag 𝑡. A tag of the form D(𝑖1, PTR(𝑖2)), for example,
represents a location of region 𝑖1 that stores a pointer to a potentially diﬀerent region 𝑖2. As shown
later, the allocator creates a new memory region by choosing a contiguous segment of memory
3This assumption is not strictly necessary, and does not appear in the Coq formalization, but it simplifies the memory-
safe abstract machine introduced later, and the refinement result between it and the symbolic machine.
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Opcode PC Instr A1 A2 Dest PC Res
Nop PTR(𝑖u�) D(𝑖u�, NPTR) PTR(𝑖u�)
Const PTR(𝑖u�) D(𝑖u�, NPTR) _ PTR(𝑖u�) NPTR
Mov PTR(𝑖u�) D(𝑖u�, NPTR) 𝑡 _ PTR(𝑖u�) 𝑡
Binop
⊕
PTR(𝑖u�) D(𝑖u�, NPTR) NPTR NPTR _ PTR(𝑖u�) NPTR
Binop
+
PTR(𝑖u�) D(𝑖u�, NPTR) PTR(𝑖) NPTR _ PTR(𝑖u�) PTR(𝑖)
Binop
+
PTR(𝑖u�) D(𝑖u�, NPTR) NPTR PTR(𝑖) _ PTR(𝑖u�) PTR(𝑖)
Binop
−
PTR(𝑖u�) D(𝑖u�, NPTR) PTR(𝑖) NPTR _ PTR(𝑖u�) PTR(𝑖)
Binop
−
PTR(𝑖u�) D(𝑖u�, NPTR) PTR(𝑖) PTR(𝑖) _ PTR(𝑖u�) NPTR
Binop
=
PTR(𝑖u�) D(𝑖u�, NPTR) PTR(𝑖) PTR(𝑖) _ PTR(𝑖u�) NPTR
Load PTR(𝑖u�) D(𝑖u�, NPTR) PTR(𝑖) D(𝑖, 𝑡) _ PTR(𝑖u�) 𝑡
Store PTR(𝑖u�) D(𝑖u�, NPTR) PTR(𝑖) 𝑡 D(𝑖, _) PTR(𝑖u�) D(𝑖, 𝑡)
Jump PTR(𝑖u�) D(𝑖u�, NPTR) PTR(𝑖) PTR(𝑖)
Bnz PTR(𝑖u�) D(𝑖u�, NPTR) NPTR PTR(𝑖u�)
Jal PTR(𝑖u�) D(𝑖u�, NPTR) 𝑡 _ 𝑡 PTR(𝑖u�)
Figure 4.1: Memory-safety transfer function
tagged as FREE and changing its tags to D(𝑖, NPTR), where 𝑖 is some fresh identifier that has not been
assigned to any currently existing region. Because of the simple type structure, nothing prevents the
memory from storing cyclic data structures. Consider for instance the following situation: a memory
location 𝑙1 contains a pointer that references another location 𝑙2, and vice versa. We could depict
this situation as follows, assuming that these locations belong to regions marked as 𝑖1 and 𝑖2.
𝑙2@PTR(𝑖2) 𝑖1𝑙1 ∶ 𝑙1@PTR(𝑖1) 𝑖2𝑙2 ∶
To represent such a cycle, it suffices to store 𝑙2@D(𝑖1, PTR(𝑖2)) in 𝑙1, and 𝑙1@D(𝑖2, PTR(𝑖1)) in 𝑙2.
Figure 4.1 defines the transfer function for this policy. It is worth taking some time to relate the
rules shown there to checks commonly present in various systems that enforce memory safety.
The most basic property that this policy tries to enforce is that a memory access can only occur if
performed with a pointer that has the appropriate permission to do so. The rules for Load and Store
require (1) that the pointer argument supplied to the function is indeed tagged as a pointer, and (2)
that the memory location being accessed is tagged as being currently allocated in a region whose
identifier matches the pointer’s. If those checks pass, the operation is allowed; otherwise, the policy
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signals that a violation occurred. Similarly, every instruction checks that the current PC is tagged as
a pointer, and that the instruction that it is currently being executed belongs to a matching region.
Violations of these checks occur when we try to access memory using invalid pointers—that is,
those that point past the bounds of their regions, or dangling pointers that reference regions that have
already been freed. When explaining the behavior of the memory manager, we will see that freeing
a memory region has the eﬀect of changing all of its tags to FREE. Since no rule allows manipulating
locations tagged this way, any subsequent access to that region will be caught and stopped. As for
out-of-bounds accesses, they arise (as it is usually the case) through pointer arithmetic, which is
allowed by the policy. The rule for addition, for example, allows us to add an integer to a pointer, the
result of which is a pointer to the same memory region as before. Similarly, it is possible to subtract
an integer from a pointer. Note that moving a pointer past its bounds is not an error by itself—in
opposition to the C standard, for instance [58, §6.5.6]. However, if we try to access memory with
such an invalid pointer, we will hit a memory location marked as free, or perhaps as belonging to a
diﬀerent memory region, leading the policy to signal a violation.
For these checks to make sense, the policy imposes a basic type discipline that completely sep-
arates pointers from other kinds of values. First, it is not possible to convert an arbitrary integer
value into a pointer by changing its tag. All values tagged as pointers are obtained by performing
operations on previously existing pointer values, and these operations preserve the region identifiers
attached to them. We have seen that pointer arithmetic has this eﬀect. Any instruction sets the tag
on the next PC to match either the one on the previous PC, or the one on the target of a jump instruc-
tion. Finally, moving values between registers and memory locations preserves tags as well. The
only exception is the allocation system service presented later, which has the privilege to fabricate
pointers to previously unallocated regions. It is also not possible to change the region of a memory
location, as we can see by inspecting the rule for Store, the only instruction of the symbolic machine
that can change those tags.
Another aspect of our type distinction is that many integer operations are disallowed on pointers.
This includes most binary operations, with the exception of addition, subtraction, and equality com-
parisons, which allow only a select number of well-behaved uses; for instance, we are cannot add two
pointers together, or to test if pointers to diﬀerent regions are equal. Moreover, we are not allowed to
run pointers as instructions, as we can see by inspecting the “Instr” column of the rules. The reason
for enforcing these restrictions is that treating pointers as integers may reveal information about their
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physical address, which could result in secrecy violations—we return to this point in Section 4.7.2.
Note that the rules allow subtracting two pointers to the same memory region, as this only reveals
the relative placement of the pointers, and nothing about their physical addresses.
Some of restrictions described here can be partially lifted: for example, by encapsulating equality
tests as a system service, it is possible to compare pointers to diﬀerent regions (which is, unfortu-
nately, more costly, since it requires a function call instead of a single instruction).
4.2 System Services
The memory safety policy has four system services. Two of them, malloc and free, are named after
the corresponding C functions, and used to allocate and free memory.
A base service is used to reset the oﬀset of a pointer to its base. Though somewhat exotic, this
service illustrates what kinds of operations can be performed on pointer values without giving up on
the security guarantees analyzed later. We can use base and pointer subtraction to extract the oﬀset
of a pointer relative to its base as an integer; conversely, if we had a service for extracting oﬀsets,
it would be possible to encode base by subtracting a pointer’s oﬀset from the pointer itself. (The
language of Section 4.5 explores this possibility.)
Finally, there is an eq service for soundly testing any two values for equality, including pointers
to diﬀerent memory regions. The crucial diﬀerence between this service and the analogous machine
instruction is that the service is free to take region identifiers into account when comparing two
pointers, whereas the instruction can only consider their physical addresses.
To allow programs to invoke system services, the rules for the Jal instruction do not force its
destination to be a pointer. Programs can thus hard-wire the addresses of these services in their
code, without the need for a special mechanism to load tagged pointers to these services in registers.
Real implementations of memory managers use auxiliary data structures to track which parts of
memory are currently allocated and which ones are free. Given the generality of system services,
it would have been possible for us to have a much higher-level algorithm that assigns new regions
by sweeping the entire memory, looking for a segment of the appropriate size that is tagged FREE;
however, this would be too inefficient to be adopted in practice. We chose to instead to stick with a
more realistic design that tracks the status ofmemory regionswith an explicit list of block descriptors.
Definition 4.1. The private state of the memory safety policy is a pair (𝑖, 𝑏𝑠), where 𝑖 ∈ Id is the
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Malloc
0 < 𝑤u�u� ≤ 𝑤
′
u�u� 𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�u�u�1) = 𝑤u�u�@NPTR
𝑏𝑠 = 𝑏𝑠1 · [(⊥,𝑤u�u�, 𝑤
′
u�u�)] · 𝑏𝑠2 𝑏𝑠1 minimal
𝑏𝑠′ = 𝑤u�u� < 𝑤
′
u�u�?[(𝑖, 𝑤u�u�, 𝑤u�u�); (⊥,𝑤u�u� +𝑤u�u�, 𝑤
′
u�u� −𝑤u�u�)] ∶ [(𝑖, 𝑤u�u�, 𝑤u�u�)]
𝑚[𝑤u�u�,…,𝑤u�u� +𝑤u�u� − 1 ↦ 0@D(𝑖, NPTR)] = 𝑚
′
𝑟𝑠[𝑟u�u�u� ↦ 𝑤u�u�@PTR(𝑖)] = 𝑟𝑠
′ 𝑟(𝑟u�) = 𝑤u�u�@PTR(𝑖u�u�)
malloc(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, _, 𝑖, 𝑏𝑠) = (𝑚′, 𝑟𝑠′, 𝑤u�u�@PTR(𝑖u�u�), nextId(𝑖), 𝑏𝑠1 · 𝑏𝑠
′ · 𝑏𝑠2)
Free
𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�u�u�1) = 𝑤@PTR(𝑖) 𝑏𝑠(𝑘) = (𝑖, 𝑤u�u�, 𝑤u�u�) 𝑤u�u� ≤ 𝑤 < 𝑤u�u� +𝑤u�u�
𝑚[𝑤u�u�,…,𝑤u�u� +𝑤u�u� − 1 ↦ 0@FREE] = 𝑚
′
𝑏𝑠[𝑘 ↦ (⊥,𝑤u�u�, 𝑤u�u�)] = 𝑏𝑠
′ 𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�) = 𝑤u�u�@PTR(𝑖u�u�)
free(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, _, 𝑖′, 𝑏𝑠) = (𝑚′, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�@PTR(𝑖u�u�), 𝑖
′, 𝑏𝑠′)
Base
𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�u�u�1) = 𝑤@PTR(𝑖) (𝑖, 𝑤u�u�, _) ∈ 𝑏𝑠 𝑟𝑠[𝑟u�u�u� ↦ 𝑤u�u�@PTR(𝑖)] = 𝑟𝑠
′
𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�) = 𝑤u�u�@PTR(𝑖u�u�)
base(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, _, 𝑖′, 𝑏𝑠) = (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠′, 𝑤u�u�@PTR(𝑖u�u�), 𝑖
′, 𝑏𝑠)
Eq
𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�u�u�1) = 𝑤1@𝑡1 𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�u�u�2) = 𝑤2@𝑡2 𝑏 = if 𝑤1@𝑡1 = 𝑤2@𝑡2 then 1 else 0
𝑟𝑠[𝑟u�u�u� ↦ 𝑏@NPTR] = 𝑟𝑠
′ 𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�) = 𝑤u�u�@PTR(𝑖u�u�)
eq(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, _, 𝑖, 𝑏𝑠) = (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠′, 𝑤u�u�@PTR(𝑖u�u�), 𝑖, 𝑏𝑠)
Figure 4.2: System services for memory safety policy
first identifier that has not been assigned to a block, and 𝑏𝑠 is a list of block descriptors, which are
elements of (Id ⊎ {⊥}) ×Word×Word.
A block descriptor of the form (⊥,𝑤u�u�, 𝑤u�u�) indicates that there is a free segment of memory
of size 𝑤u�u� starting at address 𝑤u�u�. A block of the form (𝑖, 𝑤u�u�, 𝑤u�u�), on the other hand, indicates
that the segment of size 𝑤u�u� starting at 𝑤u�u� is allocated, and currently associated with the identifier
𝑖.
Figure 4.2 defines the system services. The most complex one,malloc, reads the size of the block
to be allocated (𝑤u�u�), and looks for the first block descriptor that is currently marked as free and
whose size 𝑤′u�u� is large enough to fit the new block. If both sizes match (𝑤u�u� = 𝑤
′
u�u�), we simply
mark that block as allocated, assigning to it the fresh identifier 𝑖. If they don’t match (𝑤u�u� < 𝑤
′
u�u�),
then malloc splits the block in two parts: the lower one, of size 𝑤u�u�, and the upper one, of size
𝑤′u�u� − 𝑤u�u�. The new block is then initialized to 0@D(𝑖, NPTR), indicating that each of its positions
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belongs to block 𝑖, and we bump the next identifier in the private state. Finally, malloc stores a
pointer to the beginning of the new block in 𝑟u�u�u�, and returns to its caller. By keeping the invariant
that the identifier 𝑖 stored in the private state is “bigger” (that is, comes later in the enumeration of
identifiers) than any other identifiers in the program state, we guarantee thatmalloc always produces
a memory region that cannot be accessed with other available pointers. Furthermore, a piece of
code that allocates a new memory region cannot use the pointer received from malloc to access
other regions. We return to this point in Section 4.7.4.
The free service does the opposite ofmalloc: it finds the block descriptor that matches the iden-
tifier of its argument, marks it as free, and tags the contents of the block accordingly. Note, however,
that free does not try to prevent fragmentation by merging consecutive free blocks. This would be
an important optimization in practice, but does not aﬀect the security guarantees discussed later.
4.3 Memory-safe Machine
Many of the restrictions that we have imposed on the use of memory thus far—preventing pointer
forging, out-of-bounds accesses, etc.—are commonplace, and reflected in other mechanisms for en-
forcing memory safety. Nevertheless, the definition of the policy is complex, especially in what
concerns the memory management services. We want to show that we can replace the memory-
safety policy by a simpler, easier-to-understand abstract machine that inlines its checks, obviates the
need for some of its tags, and uses a much higher-level allocator. Specifically, we prove a refinement
result, Theorem 4.8, showing that every execution of the symbolic machine with the memory-safety
micro-policy can be interpreted in terms of the abstract machine. Later, in Section 4.4, we prove
that the abstract machine satisfies a form of noninterference, and use the refinement result to transfer
noninterference to the symbolic machine.
Unlike the symbolic machine, where memory safety is programmed as a policy, the abstract
machine hasmemory safety built in. It distinguishes pointers from other kinds of data at the hardware
level, and has a structured memory segmented into independent blocks, as opposed to a flat memory
like the symbolic machine does.
Definition 4.2. We define the set of values Val as
Val = NPtr(𝑤 ∈Word) ∣ Ptr(𝑖 ∈ Id, 𝑤 ∈Word).
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A state of the memory-safe machine is a tuple (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑝𝑐), where
• 𝑚 ∈ Id⇀fin List(Val);
• 𝑟𝑠 ∈ Reg⇀ Val; and
• 𝑝𝑐 ∈ Val.
Values of thememory-safemachine are the analog ofwords taggedwithData tags in thememory-
safety policy: they are either words NPtr(𝑤) or a pair Ptr(𝑖, 𝑤) of a block identifier and a word
denoting an oﬀset into that block. Like its policy counterpart, this machine distinguishes between
independent memory regions by assigning them to diﬀerent identifiers. However, here the identifiers
are used for fetching the block in memory, instead of just being used to check the access was valid
afterwards: to index into a block 𝑖 at oﬀset 𝑤, we check if 𝑚(𝑖) is defined, and if so look for the
𝑤-th position of its resulting frame. In this way, every such memory defines a partial function from
Id×Word to Val, and we implicitly treat memories as such to simplify notations—for example, writ-
ing 𝑚(𝑖, 𝑤) to denote the above access. Accessing memory using out-of-bounds or freed pointers
causes the machine to look up a location that is not in the domain of the partial function, which we
will use to detect when memory-safety violations occur.
Since there are infinitely many identifiers, the memory in this machine can grow indefinitely,
and allocation is a total operation. This is similar to the many memory models used in programming
languages [27, 64, 74], but very diﬀerent from the symbolic machine, which has only finitely many
bit vectors to use as addresses and might run out of memory when executing. We will see that
this diﬀerence has consequences for the security guarantees of the two computation models, since
memory exhaustion can be used to leak secrets about the state of the machine.
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 define the machine semantics. The rule for Binop applies a binary operation
to its arguments, but each binary operation is refined here into a partial operation that takes pointer
values into account, integrating the checks of Figure 4.1:
NPtr(𝑤1) + Ptr(𝑖, 𝑤2) = Ptr(𝑖, 𝑤1) + NPtr(𝑤2) = Ptr(𝑖, 𝑤1 +𝑤2)
Ptr(𝑖, 𝑤1) − NPtr(𝑤2) = Ptr(𝑖, 𝑤1 −𝑤2)
Ptr(𝑖, 𝑤1) − Ptr(𝑖, 𝑤2) = NPtr(𝑤1 −𝑤2)
(Ptr(𝑖, 𝑤1) = Ptr(𝑖, 𝑤2)) = NPtr(𝑤1 = 𝑤2)
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The cases that combine numeric operands are defined by simply applying the corresponding opera-
tion, and all others—that is, those that have at least one pointer as their operand—fail.
In contrast to the allocator of the symbolic machine, which tries to be more realistic, the memory-
safe machine uses a more abstract design that simply chooses a new block name by traversing the
entire machine state, and then assigns a new frame to that identifier in memory (noted 𝑚′ = 𝑚 ∪
{(𝑖, 𝑘) ↦ NPtr(0) ∣ 𝑘 = 0,…, 𝑠𝑧 −1}). In that rule, fresh refers to some function that maps a finite
set of identifiers 𝐼 to an identifier 𝑖 that does not occur in 𝐼 , and supp(𝑠) (the support of 𝑠) is the set
of identifiers that appears in the state 𝑠. We can characterize the support formally by seeing the set
of states as a nominal set over Id [41]; these concepts are briefly reviewed in Appendix A.2. Note
that all blocks begin at oﬀset 0, whereas in the symbolic machine they usually begin at a non-zero
address that points to the middle of the memory.
By avoiding the explicit manipulation of the auxiliary data structures used by the micro-policy,
the memory-safe machine becomes much easier to understand. Unfortunately, this convenience
comes with a price: proving that this machine is refined by the symbolic one is a daunting task. First,
we need to show that the internal state of the memory-safety policy correctly tracks which regions
are free. Second, since the two machines use diﬀerent addressing schemes, we need to keep track of
what addresses correspond to each other through a simplified form of memory injections [75].
Definition 4.3. A memory injection is a finite partial function 𝑚𝑖 ∈ Id ⇀fin Id ×Word such that
𝑚𝑖(𝑖1) = (𝑖, 𝑤1) and𝑚𝑖(𝑖2) = (𝑖, 𝑤2) implies 𝑖1 = 𝑖2.
Memory injections map each identifier used to mark a block in a state of the symbolic machine
to (1) its corresponding identifier in the abstract machine, and (2) the base of the corresponding
block. We use them to define when values of the two machines correspond to each other, by simply
adjusting the oﬀsets and identifiers of pointers.
Definition 4.4. Let 𝑣 ∈ Val, 𝑤 ∈ Word, 𝑡 ∈ Data, and𝑚𝑖 be a memory injection. We say that the
atom 𝑤@𝑡 refines 𝑣 with respect to𝑚𝑖, noted 𝑤@𝑡Bu�u� 𝑣, if one of the following hold.
• 𝑡 = NPTR and 𝑣 = NPtr(𝑤); or
• 𝑡 = PTR(𝑖),𝑚𝑖(𝑖) = (𝑖′, 𝑤u�), 𝑣 = Ptr(𝑖
′, 𝑤u� +𝑤).
Since addresses on both machines do not correspond to each other anymore, we need a more
complex notion of refinement for memories, instead of just pointwise correspondence.
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Nop
𝑚(𝑖u�u�, 𝑤u�u�) = NPtr(𝑤u�) decode 𝑤u� = Nop
(𝑚, 𝑟,Ptr(𝑖u�u�, 𝑤u�u�)) → (𝑚, 𝑟,Ptr(𝑖u�u�, 𝑤u�u� + 1))
Const
𝑚(𝑖u�u�, 𝑤u�u�) = NPtr(𝑤u�) decode 𝑤u� = Const 𝑤 𝑟 𝑟𝑠[𝑟 ↦ NPtr(𝑤)] = 𝑟𝑠
′
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠,Ptr(𝑖u�u�, 𝑤u�u�)) → (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠
′,Ptr(𝑖u�u�, 𝑤u�u� + 1))
Mov
𝑚(𝑖u�u�, 𝑤u�u�) = NPtr(𝑤u�) decode 𝑤u� = Mov 𝑟 𝑟u� 𝑟𝑠(𝑟) = 𝑣 𝑟𝑠[𝑟u� ↦ 𝑣] = 𝑟𝑠
′
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠,Ptr(𝑖u�u�, 𝑤u�u�)) → (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠
′,Ptr(𝑖u�u�, 𝑤u�u� + 1))
Binop
𝑚(𝑖u�u�, 𝑤u�u�) = NPtr(𝑤u�) decode 𝑤u� = Binop⊕ 𝑟1 𝑟2 𝑟u�
𝑟𝑠(𝑟1) = 𝑣1 𝑟𝑠(𝑟2) = 𝑣2 𝑟𝑠[𝑟u� ↦ 𝑣1 ⊕ 𝑣2] = 𝑟𝑠
′
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠,Ptr(𝑖u�u�, 𝑤u�u�) → (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠
′,Ptr(𝑖u�u�, 𝑤u�u� + 1))
Load
𝑚(𝑖u�u�, 𝑤u�u�) = NPtr(𝑤u�) decode 𝑤u� = Load 𝑟 𝑟u�
𝑟𝑠(𝑟) = Ptr(𝑝) 𝑚(𝑝) = 𝑣 𝑟𝑠[𝑟u� ↦ 𝑣] = 𝑟𝑠
′
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠,Ptr(𝑖u�u�, 𝑤u�u�)) → (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠
′,Ptr(𝑖u�u�, 𝑤u�u� + 1))
Store
𝑚(𝑖u�u�, 𝑤u�u�) = NPtr(𝑤u�) decode 𝑤u� = Store 𝑟u� 𝑟u�
𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�) = Ptr(𝑝) 𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�) = 𝑣 𝑚[𝑝 ↦ 𝑣] = 𝑚
′
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠,Ptr(𝑖u�u�, 𝑤u�u�)) → (𝑚
′, 𝑟𝑠,Ptr(𝑖u�u�, 𝑤u�u� + 1))
Jump
𝑚(𝑖u�u�, 𝑤u�u�) = NPtr(𝑤u�) decode 𝑤u� = Jump 𝑟 𝑟𝑠(𝑟) = Ptr(𝑝)
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠,Ptr(𝑖u�u�, 𝑤u�u�), 𝑒) → (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠,Ptr(𝑝))
Bnz
𝑚(𝑖u�u�, 𝑤u�u�) = NPtr(𝑤u�) decode 𝑤u� = Bnz 𝑟 𝑛
𝑟𝑠(𝑟) = NPtr(𝑤) 𝑤′u�u� = if 𝑤 = 0 then 𝑤u�u� + 1 else 𝑤u�u� + 𝑛
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠,Ptr(𝑖u�u�, 𝑤u�u�)) → (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠,Ptr(𝑖u�u�, 𝑤
′
u�u�))
Jal
𝑚(𝑖u�u�, 𝑤u�u�) = NPtr(𝑤u�) decode 𝑤u� = Jal 𝑟
𝑟𝑠(𝑟) = 𝑣 𝑟𝑠[𝑟u� ↦ Ptr(𝑖u�u�, 𝑤u�u� + 1)]
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠,Ptr(𝑖u�u�, 𝑤u�u�)) → (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑣)
Figure 4.3: Semantics of instructions for the memory-safe machine
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Malloc
𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�u�u�1) = NPtr(𝑤) 𝑖 = fresh(supp(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠,NPtr(𝑤u�u�u�u�u�u�)))
𝑚′ = 𝑚∪ {(𝑖, 𝑘) ↦ NPtr(0) ∣ 𝑘 = 0,…, 𝑠𝑧 − 1}
𝑟𝑠[𝑟u�u�u� ↦ Ptr(𝑖, 0)] = 𝑟𝑠
′ 𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�) = Ptr(𝑝)
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠,NPtr(𝑤u�u�u�u�u�u�)) → (𝑚
′, 𝑟𝑠′,Ptr(𝑝))
Free
𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�u�u�1) = Ptr(𝑖, 𝑤) 𝑚(𝑖) ≠ ⊥ 𝑚
′ = {(𝑖′, 𝑤′) ↦ 𝑚(𝑖′, 𝑤′) ∣ 𝑖′ ≠ 𝑖}
𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�) = Ptr(𝑝)
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠,NPtr(𝑤u�u�u�u�)) → (𝑚
′, 𝑟𝑠,Ptr(𝑝))
Base
𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�u�u�1) = Ptr(𝑖, 𝑤) 𝑟𝑠[𝑟u�u�u� ↦ Ptr(𝑖, 0)] = 𝑟𝑠
′ 𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�) = Ptr(𝑝)
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠,NPtr(𝑤u�u�u�u�)) → (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠
′,Ptr(𝑝))
Eq
𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�u�u�1) = 𝑣1 𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�u�u�2) = 𝑣2 𝑣 = NPtr(if 𝑣1 = 𝑣2 then 1 else 0)
𝑟𝑠[𝑟u�u�u� ↦ 𝑣] = 𝑟𝑠
′ 𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�) = Ptr(𝑝)
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠,NPtr(𝑤u�u�)) → (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠
′,Ptr(𝑝))
Figure 4.4: Semantics of system services for the memory-safe machine
Definition 4.5. Let𝑚𝑖 be a memory injection,𝑚u� ∈ Id⇀fin Val be a memory of the memory-safe
machine, and 𝑚u� ∈ Word ⇀ Word × Tagu� be a memory of the symbolic machine instantiated
with the memory-safety policy. We say that𝑚u� refines𝑚u� with respect to𝑚𝑖, noted𝑚u� Bu�u�𝑚u�,
if the following condition holds. Suppose that 𝑚u�(𝑤1) = 𝑤2@D(𝑖, 𝑡) for 𝑤1, 𝑤2 ∈ Word, 𝑖 ∈ Id,
and 𝑡 ∈ Data. Then there exists an identifier 𝑖′, a base 𝑤 ∈Word, and 𝑣 ∈ Val such that
• 𝑚𝑖(𝑖) = (𝑖′, 𝑤);
• 𝑚u�(𝑖
′, 𝑤1 −𝑤) = 𝑣; and
• 𝑤2@𝑡Bu�u� 𝑣.
Paraphrasing, this definition says that every allocated address in the memory of the symbolic
machine matches a location in the memory of the abstract machine, and that this matching is com-
puted by oﬀsetting the address according to the memory injection. Note that this only implies that
blocks in the symbolic state have a corresponding block in the state of the memory-safe machine
whose size is at least as large as its own. It would be possible to strengthen this invariant to require
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that their sizes be equal, which would allow us to include a system service for computing the size of
a memory block.
To prove that the use of the internal state by the symbolic machine is valid, we need to ensure
that the information stored there accurately describes the tags in memory. This leads to the following
definition.
Definition 4.6. Let 𝑚 ∈ Word ⇀ Word × Tag
u�
be a symbolic memory, and 𝑚𝑖 be a memory
injection.
A block descriptor 𝑏 = (𝑥,𝑤u�u�, 𝑤u�u�) is well-formed with respect to 𝑚 and 𝑚𝑖 if 𝑤u�u� ≠ 0,
𝑤u�u� +𝑤u�u� does not overflow, and one of the following conditions hold.
• 𝑥 is some identifier 𝑖, 𝑚𝑖(𝑖) = (𝑖′, 𝑤u�u�), and for every 𝑜 ∈ Word, if 𝑜 < 𝑤u�u�, then there
exists 𝑤 ∈Word and 𝑡 ∈ Data such that𝑚(𝑤u�u� + 𝑜) = 𝑤@D(𝑖, 𝑡).
• 𝑥 = ⊥, and for every 𝑜 ∈ Word, if 𝑜 < 𝑤u�u�, then there exists 𝑤 ∈ Word such that𝑚(𝑤u�u� +
𝑜) = 𝑤@FREE.
An internal state (𝑖, 𝑏𝑠) is well-formed with respect to𝑚 and𝑚𝑖 if the following conditions hold.
Freshness 𝑖 > 𝑖′ whenever𝑚𝑖(𝑖′) ≠ ⊥.
No overlap If two block descriptors 𝑏1 = (_, 𝑤u�u�1, 𝑤u�u�1) and 𝑏2 = (_, 𝑤u�u�2, 𝑤u�u�2) in 𝑏𝑠 have
overlapping addresses (that is, if 𝑤u�u�2 ≤ 𝑤u�u�1 < 𝑤u�u�2 +𝑤u�u�2 or 𝑤u�u�1 ≤ 𝑤u�u�2 < 𝑤u�u�1 +
𝑤u�u�1), then 𝑏1 = 𝑏2. Furthermore, 𝑏𝑠 contains no repetitions.
Covering If 𝑚(𝑤) ≠ ⊥, there exists a block descriptor (_, 𝑤u�u�, 𝑤u�u�) ∈ 𝑏𝑠 such that 𝑤u�u� ≤ 𝑤 <
𝑤u�u� +𝑤u�u�.
Well-formedness Every block in 𝑏𝑠 is well-formed with respect to𝑚 and𝑚𝑖.
The freshness condition guarantees that the identifier stored in the internal state is indeed fresh.
We can now show that the symbolicmachine refines thememory-safe onewhen running thememory-
safety policy.
Definition 4.7. Suppose we have states of the symbolic and memory-safe machines:
𝑠u� = (𝑚u�, 𝑟𝑠u�, 𝑝𝑐u�@𝑡𝑝𝑐u�, 𝑖, 𝑏𝑠) 𝑠u� = (𝑚u�, 𝑟𝑠u�, 𝑣u�u�).
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We say that 𝑠u� refines 𝑠u�, written 𝑠u� B 𝑠u�, if there exists a memory injection 𝑚𝑖 such that the
following hold.
• 𝑚u� Bu�u� 𝑚u�;
• 𝑟𝑠u� is pointwise related to 𝑟𝑠u� by Bu�u�;
• 𝑣u�u� Bu�u� 𝑝𝑐u�@𝑡𝑝𝑐u�;
• (𝑖, 𝑏𝑠) is well-formed with respect to𝑚𝑖 and𝑚u�; and
• if𝑚𝑖(𝑖u�) = (𝑖u�, _), then 𝑖u� ∈ supp(𝑠u�).
Theorem 4.8. Let 𝑠u� and 𝑠
′
u� be two states of the symbolic machine, and 𝑠u� be a state of the memory-
safe machine. Suppose that 𝑠u� → 𝑠
′
u� and 𝑠u� B 𝑠u�. Then there exists a state 𝑠′u� of the memory-safe
machine such that 𝑠u� → 𝑠
′
u� and 𝑠
′
u� B 𝑠′u�.
The reverse direction, showing that a step of the memory-safe machine can be simulated by the
symbolic machine, does not hold. Recall that the memory-safe machine never runs out of memory;
therefore, there can be a situation where the symbolic machine gets stuck at an allocation because it
ran out of memory, whereas the memory-safe machine continues successfully.
4.4 Characterizing Memory Safety
We now use the two execution models introduced above to discuss what security guarantees we
expect to hold in a memory-safe setting. These guarantees take the form of a noninterference result:
a program that executes with the memory-safety micro-policy is independent of memory blocks it
cannot reach. The proof follows the same strategy we used with the information-flow micro-policy.
We begin by proving noninterference for the abstract machine, which has a much simpler semantics.
Once this is done, we transfer this result to the symbolic machine by refinement. We begin with the
following warm-up property, which says that renaming block identifiers does not have a significant
eﬀect on execution.
Lemma 4.9 (Renaming). Let 𝑠 and 𝑠′ be states of the memory-safe machine, and 𝜋 ∈ perm(Id) be
a permutation of identifiers. Suppose that 𝑠 → 𝑠′. Then, there exists another permutation 𝜋′ such
that 𝜋 · 𝑠 → 𝜋′ · 𝑠′.
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Here, 𝜋 ·𝑠 denotes the renaming of all identifiers that appear in 𝑠 according to the permutation 𝜋.
The formal definition of this operation can be obtained by describing 𝑠 as a nominal set over Id [41],
as reviewed in Appendix A.2.
Roughly speaking, Lemma 4.9 states that the choices of fresh identifiers performed by the alloca-
tor are irrelevant: they can only aﬀect the identifiers that appear at the end of execution, and nothing
else. This is a direct consequence of not allowing pointers to be treated as integers—specifically, of
not allowing programs to observe the identifier of a pointer as an integer. Though Lemma 4.9 might
not seem deep, it does have security implications: if it failed to hold, it could mean that programs can
learn information about the memory layout of the program, which could lead to secrecy violations
(cf. Section 4.7.2).
Lemma 4.9 immediately implies that renaming preserves errors. Suppose that a state 𝑠 is stuck—
that is, it is not the case that 𝑠 → 𝑠′ for any 𝑠′. Then 𝜋 · 𝑠 must also be stuck. For suppose that
𝜋 · 𝑠 → 𝑠′. By applying Lemma 4.9, we find 𝜋′ such that 𝑠 = 𝜋−1 · 𝜋 · 𝑠 → 𝜋′ · 𝑠, contradicting the
assumption that 𝑠 was stuck. Similarly, Lemma 4.9 implies that renaming identifiers cannot change
the values of integers stored in the final machine state. We will use this result later to argue that the
behavior of the machine does not fundamentally change if the allocator is forced to perform other
choices of fresh identifiers—specifically, because the state of the heap when it executed was slightly
diﬀerent.
We analyze how execution interacts with unreachable memory by partitioning the memory of a
state into reachable and unreachable blocks, and considering what happens when the unreachable
blocks are removed. To describe this partitioning, we need some notation. Let 𝑠 = (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑝𝑐) be a
state of the memory-safe machine, and 𝑚′ ∈ Id ⇀fin List(Val) a memory. We define a new state
𝑚′ ∗ 𝑠 that is like 𝑠, except that we add all memory blocks that are defined in𝑚′. Formally,
𝑚′ ∗ 𝑠 ≜ (𝑚′ ∪⃗ 𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑝𝑐),
where𝑚′ ∪⃗ 𝑚 denotes the left-biased union of two partial functions:
(𝑚′ ∪⃗ 𝑚)(𝑖) ≜
⎧
{
⎨
{
⎩
𝑚′(𝑖) if𝑚′(𝑖) ≠ ⊥
𝑚(𝑖) otherwise.
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The following framing results describe what happens when we frame the initial state of an execu-
tion with unreachable memory. The first one says that adding unreachable memory to the beginning
of a successful step yields another successful step.
Lemma 4.10 (Frame OK). Let 𝑠 and 𝑠′ be states of the memory-safe machine, and 𝑚 ∈ Id ⇀fin
List(Val) a memory. Suppose that 𝑠 → 𝑠′ and that supp(𝑠) ∩ dom(𝑚) = ∅.4Then there exists a
permutation 𝜋 such that𝑚 ∗ 𝑠 → 𝑚 ∗ (𝜋 · 𝑠′) and supp(𝜋 · 𝑠′) ∩ dom(𝑚) = ∅.
The premise supp(𝑠) ∩ dom(𝑚) = ∅ guarantees that the newly added memory is disjoint from
the blocks already stored in 𝑠, but also unreachable through pointers in that state. It allows, however,
pointers stored in 𝑚 to reference blocks stored in 𝑠. The conclusion shows that executing on 𝑚 ∗ 𝑠
yields a final state that can still be partitioned into two components: the first one is 𝑚, which has
been left intact, and the second one, 𝜋 · 𝑠, is almost the same as the original one, modulo a renaming
of block identifiers. Moreover,𝑚 is still unreachable from 𝜋 · 𝑠.
Lemma 4.10 is what forces us to consider permutations in our results. The problem is that when
stepping from 𝑠 to 𝑠′, the allocator might have chosen some fresh identifier 𝑖 that already corresponds
to a block in𝑚—and that, therefore, is not fresh with respect to𝑚∗𝑠. This means that the allocator
will have to choose a diﬀerent fresh identifier 𝑖′ to use for the new block when executing on𝑚 ∗ 𝑠.
The next frame result covers the other case—namely, when running the initial state yields an
error.
Lemma 4.11 (Frame Error). Let 𝑠 be a state of the memory-safe machine and𝑚 ∈ Id⇀fin List(Val)
be a memory. Suppose that supp(𝑠) ∩ dom(𝑚) = ∅ and that 𝑠 is stuck. Then𝑚 ∗ 𝑠 is also stuck.
By combining these two results, we can relate executions of arbitrary length.
Theorem 4.12 (Noninterference). Let 𝑠 be a state of the memory-safe machine,𝑚1,𝑚2 ∈ Id⇀fin
List(Val) two memories, 𝜋 a permutation, and 𝑛 ∈ ℕ. Suppose that
supp(𝑠) ∩ dom(𝑚1) = ∅ supp(𝜋 · 𝑠) ∩ dom(𝑚2) = ∅.
Then one of the two possibilities hold.
4Considering the analogous result proved later for the memory-safe language (Lemma 4.15), it should be possible to
weaken this hypothesis to dom(u�′) ∩ dom(u�) = ∅, whereu�′ is the memory of the initial state u�.
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• There exists a state 𝑠′ and a permutation 𝜋′ such that
𝑚1 ∗ 𝑠 →
u� 𝑚1 ∗ 𝑠
′ supp(𝑠′) ∩ dom(𝑚1) = ∅
𝑚2 ∗ (𝜋 · 𝑠) →
u� 𝑚2 ∗ (𝜋
′ · 𝑠′) supp(𝜋′ · 𝑠′) ∩ dom(𝑚2) = ∅.
• There are no states 𝑠′1 and 𝑠
′
2 such that𝑚1 ∗ 𝑠 →
u� 𝑠′1 and𝑚2 ∗ 𝑠 →
u� 𝑠′2.
Proof. By induction on 𝑛. The base case is trivial. For the induction step, suppose that the result is
valid for 𝑛. First, suppose that there exists 𝑠′ such that 𝑠 → 𝑠′. By Lemma 4.10, we can find 𝜋1 such
that𝑚1 ∗ 𝑠 → 𝑚1 ∗ (𝜋1 · 𝑠
′) and supp(𝜋1 · 𝑠
′) ∩ dom(𝑚1) = ∅. By Lemma 4.9, we find 𝜋
′ such
that 𝜋 · 𝑠 → 𝜋′ · 𝑠′. Again by Lemma 4.10, we find 𝜋2 such that𝑚2 ∗ (𝜋 · 𝑠) → 𝑚2 ∗ (𝜋2 · 𝜋
′ · 𝑠′),
with supp(𝜋2 · 𝜋
′ · 𝑠′) ∩ dom(𝑚2) = ∅. Since 𝜋2 · 𝜋
′ · 𝑠′ = (𝜋2 · 𝜋
′ · 𝜋−11 ) ∘ 𝜋1 · 𝑠
′, we can apply
the induction hypothesis and close this case.
Now, suppose that 𝑠 is stuck. By Lemma 4.9, we find that 𝜋 · 𝑠 is also stuck. By Lemma 4.11,
this implies that both𝑚1 ∗ 𝑠 and𝑚2 ∗ (𝜋 · 𝑠) are stuck, thus allowing us to conclude.
This formulation of noninterference is similar to the one used in the information-flow micro-
policy (Definition 3.7). Call two states 𝑠1 and 𝑠2 indistinguishable if their reachable memory regions
coincide modulo a permutation—that is, if there exists 𝑚1, 𝑚2, 𝜋 and 𝑠 such that 𝑠1 = 𝑚1 ∗ 𝑠,
𝑠2 = 𝑚2 ∗ (𝜋 · 𝑠), and supp(𝑠) ∩ dom(𝑚1) = supp(𝜋 · 𝑠) ∩ dom(𝑚2) = ∅. Then Theorem 4.12
says that running those states for 𝑛 steps yields either indistinguishable final states or errors. This
is a secrecy result: no information stored in unreachable memory can leak into the rest of the state,
and not even influence the occurrence of errors during executions. There is also an integrity aspect
to this result: it guarantees that unreachable memory cannot be modified.
Noninterference for the memory-safe machine yields an analogous result for the symbolic ma-
chine.
Theorem 4.13 (Noninterference for symbolic machine). Let 𝑠1, 𝑠
′
1, 𝑠2, and 𝑠
′
2 be states of the
symbolic machine, 𝑠 a state of the memory-safe machine,𝑚1 and𝑚2 two memories of the memory-
60
safe machine, 𝜋 a permutation of identifiers, and 𝑛 ∈ ℕ. Suppose that
𝑠1 B𝑚1 ∗ 𝑠 𝑠2 B𝑚2 ∗ (𝜋 · 𝑠)
𝑠1 →
u� 𝑠′1 𝑠2 →
u� 𝑠′2
supp(𝑠) ∩ dom(𝑚1) = supp(𝜋 · 𝑠) ∩ dom(𝑚2) = ∅.
Then there exists 𝑠′ and 𝜋′ such that
𝑠′1 B𝑚1 ∗ 𝑠′ 𝑠2 B𝑚2 ∗ (𝜋′ ∗ 𝑠′)
supp(𝑠′) ∩ dom(𝑚1) = supp(𝜋
′ · 𝑠′) ∩ dom(𝑚2) = ∅.
This result is stated directly using the notion of unreachability inherited from the memory-safe
machine, which avoids having to formulate a similar notion for the symbolic machine. We could also
have stated a version of this result that does not mention the memory-safe machine, although it would
probably lead to a more complicated statement, because it would have to deal explicitly with the well-
formedness of the private policy state. In Theorem 4.13, by contrast, these conditions are hidden in
the refinement relation. Note that this result is weaker than Theorem 4.12, because it only applies
if we know that both executions are capable of running for 𝑛 steps without encountering a run-time
error: if one of them gets stuck within 𝑛 steps, there is nothing meaningful we can conclude about the
other. This is a consequence of going from a machine with infinite memory to one where memory
is finite: if we change the initial heap that a piece of code runs on, we could cause a successful
execution to run out of memory and terminate earlier. We return to this point in Section 4.7.5.
The guarantees of memory safety described here are related, but not identical, to typical notions
of type safety discussed in the programming languages literature. We have seen that our policy im-
poses a basic form of type safety, because it segregates pointers from other kinds of values. However,
this separation is not enough to guarantee memory safety, in the sense of Theorem 4.13. For instance,
if the memory-safety policy did not check pointer identifiers when accessing memory, then it would
be possible to oﬀset a pointer to access memory it should not be allowed to. We could also consider
a hypothetical language with a primitive for iterating over all the references of a given type. This
language might be type safe, in the sense that it satisfies sensible progress and preservation theorems,
but it is not memory safe, because a program can manipulate a memory region even if it does not
possess pointers to it.
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Besides the limitations due to finite memory, we should keep in mind that the secrecy guarantees
of memory safety are not absolute: they only protect programs against direct data leaks. It is still
possible to extract secret information from memory-safe programs by other side channels, such as
timing and energy consumption. If leaks via these side channels are a concern, then techniques from
the information-flow literature might oﬀer insight.
4.5 A Memory-safe Language
We propose that the framing properties and the noninterference result that we just proved for the two
machines is a good criterion for characterizing the security guarantees of memory safety. In this
section, we explore this idea by showing how the results carry over to a simple imperative language
with memory-safety checks. Later, we show how this allows us to relate the guarantees of memory
safety to separation logic [90]. Since these results are fairly independent from the rest of the micro-
policy development, they have been formalized separately.5
4.5.1 Language Definition
The language’s syntax, fairly standard, is summarized on Figure 4.5. The most unusual aspect is
that it separates commands that have an eﬀect on the heap from those that operate solely on local
variables. The form [𝑒] represents an access to the memory location denoted by the expression
𝑒. Expressions include basic arithmetic, logic operations, and an offset operator for extracting the
oﬀset of a pointer. (Once again, we include offset to illustrate what operations can be performed on
pointers; alternatively, we could have used a base operator, as we did for the micro-policy.) The set
var is a countably infinite set of variables.
Programs of this language manipulate values (𝒱) stored in a state (𝒮) comprising two compo-
nents: a local store 𝑙 ∈ ℒ, a finite partial function from variables to values, and a heap 𝑚 ∈ ℳ, a
finite partial function from pointers to values. Like in the micro-policy presented earlier, pointers are
pairs (𝑖, 𝑛) of an identifier 𝑖 ∈ Id and an oﬀset 𝑛 ∈ ℤ; the only diﬀerence is that we allow oﬀsets to
be arbitrary integer values, as opposed to just machine words of fixed precision. Note that there is no
expression for writing literal pointer values. Other values beside pointers include integers, Booleans,
5The Coq development is available at https://github.com/arthuraa/memory-safe-language.
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Command 𝑐 Description
𝑥 ← 𝑒 Assign to local variable
𝑥 ← [𝑒] Read from heap location
[𝑒1] ← 𝑒2 Assign to heap location
𝑥 ← alloc(𝑒) Allocate heap block of size 𝑒
free(𝑒) Free block starting at 𝑒
skip Do nothing
if 𝑒 then 𝑐1 else 𝑐2 end Conditional
while 𝑒 do 𝑐 end Loop
𝑐1; 𝑐2 Sequencing
var = {𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧,⋯}
𝑒 = 𝑥 ∈ var ∣ 𝑛 ∈ ℤ ∣ 𝑏 ∈ 𝔹 ∣ nil ∣ 𝑒 ⊕ 𝑒 ∣ ¬𝑒 ∣ offset 𝑒
⊕ ∈ {+,−,×,=,≤,∧, ∨}
Figure 4.5: Syntax of memory-safe language
𝑠 ∈ 𝒮 ≜ ℒ×ℳ (states)
𝑙 ∈ ℒ ≜ var⇀fin 𝒱 (local stores)
𝑚 ∈ℳ ≜ Id× ℤ ⇀fin 𝒱 (heaps)
𝑣 ∈ 𝒱 ≜ ℤ ⊎ 𝔹 ⊎ {nil} ⊎ Id× ℤ (values)
𝒪 ≜ Res(𝒮) ⊎ {error} (outcomes)
Figure 4.6: Program states and values for memory-safe language
and nil, used to represent an invalid pointer. These definitions are summarized in Figure 4.6; the set
𝒪 represents the possible outcomes of a computation, and will be explained soon.
To detail how programs execute, we begin by defining expression evaluation. Given an expres-
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sion 𝑒 and a local store 𝑙, we define a value ⟦𝑒⟧(𝑙) as follows:
⟦𝑥⟧(𝑙) ≜
⎧
{
⎨
{
⎩
𝑙(𝑥) if 𝑙(𝑥) ≠ ⊥
nil otherwise
⟦𝑛⟧(𝑙) ≜ 𝑛
⟦𝑏⟧(𝑙) ≜ 𝑏
⟦nil⟧(𝑙) ≜ nil
⟦𝑒1 ⊕ 𝑒2⟧(𝑙) ≜ ⟦𝑒1⟧(𝑙) ⊕ ⟦𝑒2⟧(𝑙)
⟦¬𝑒⟧(𝑙) ≜ ¬⟦𝑒⟧(𝑙)
⟦offset 𝑒⟧(𝑙) ≜
⎧
{
⎨
{
⎩
𝑛 if ⟦𝑒⟧(𝑙) = (𝑖, 𝑛)
nil otherwise.
Note that ⟦𝑒⟧ is a total function. We have lifted the definition of binary and unary operators to
values to allow pointer arithmetic, and to assign nil to nonsensical combinations. (It would also have
been possible to make expression evaluation a partial operation without aﬀecting the results reported
here.) The complete definition of these operations is included in Figure 4.7.
Now that we can evaluate expressions, we are ready to define how programs execute. To each
program 𝑐, we associate a partial function ⟦𝑐⟧ ∈ 𝒮 ⇀ 𝒪, which takes an initial state 𝑠 to an outcome
⟦𝑐⟧(𝑠) ∈ 𝒪 (cf. Figure 4.6). Contrary to the conventions we have been following thus far, partiality
represents non-termination instead of a run-time error, which corresponds to the outcome value
error. Crucially, in an implementation of this language, run-time errors should cause the program to
terminate. This is rather diﬀerent from languages like C, where many errors lead to erratic undefined
behavior, which can manifest itself in a myriad of diﬀerent ways during execution.
When a program successfully terminates, it yields a result [𝐼, 𝑠] ∈ Res(𝒮); intuitively, this final
state is a pair of a state 𝑠 and a finite set of identifiers 𝐼 that has been used to refer to new blocks
allocated during execution; however, we quotient this set of pairs to allow renaming newly allocated
blocks, and dropping names of blocks that have been allocated and subsequently freed. This is a
technical device to simplify the definition of program execution and the statement of our results, and
can be mostly ignored by the casual reader; we refer to Appendix A.2 for the formal definition of
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𝑣1 + 𝑣2 ≜
⎧
{
⎨
{
⎩
𝑛1 + 𝑛2 if 𝑣u� = 𝑛u� ∈ ℤ
(𝑖, 𝑛1 + 𝑛2) if 𝑣u� = (𝑖, 𝑛1) and 𝑣u� = 𝑛2, with 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗
nil otherwise
𝑣1 − 𝑣2 ≜
⎧
{
{
⎨
{
{
⎩
𝑛1 − 𝑛2 if 𝑣u� = 𝑛u� ∈ ℤ
(𝑖, 𝑛1 − 𝑛2) if 𝑣1 = (𝑖, 𝑛1) and 𝑣2 = 𝑛2
𝑛1 − 𝑛2 if 𝑣1 = (𝑖, 𝑛1) and 𝑣2 = (𝑖, 𝑛2)
nil otherwise
𝑣1 × 𝑣2 ≜ {
𝑛1 × 𝑛2 if 𝑣u� = 𝑛u� ∈ ℤ
nil otherwise
𝑣1 ≤ 𝑣2 ≜ {
𝑛1 ≤ 𝑛2 if 𝑣u� = 𝑛u� ∈ ℤ
nil otherwise
𝑣1 ∧ 𝑣2 ≜ {
𝑏1 ∧ 𝑏2 if 𝑣u� = 𝑏u� ∈ 𝔹
nil otherwise
𝑣1 ∨ 𝑣2 ≜ {
𝑏1 ∨ 𝑏2 if 𝑣u� = 𝑏u� ∈ 𝔹
nil otherwise
¬𝑣 ≜ {
¬𝑏 if 𝑣 = 𝑏 ∈ 𝔹
nil otherwise
Figure 4.7: Lifting of operations to values of memory-safe language
this construction.
Figure 4.8 gives the complete definition of the language semantics. Just as in the memory-safe
abstract machine, memory loads, stores, and frees lead to errors when accessing undefined memory.
Note that most of the commands yield final states that have no new block identifiers in them; that
is, the first component of the outcome is ∅. The only exceptions are allocation, sequencing, if, and
iteration.
Just as we did for states of the abstract machines analyzed in this chapter, we can endow the
set of states 𝒮 with the structure of a nominal set. Recall that, given a state 𝑠, the support supp(𝑠)
represents the finite set of block identifiers that occurs somewhere in 𝑠. In the definition of allocation,
(1) we pick some identifier 𝑖 that does not occur anywhere in the program state, (2) initialize a new
block corresponding to that identifier in memory with zeros, (3) load a pointer to the beginning of
the block in the variable 𝑥, and (4) assign 𝑖 to the set of new identifiers. Although we have not
exactly specified what value of 𝑖 should be chosen here, this choice does not matter: the nominal
infrastructure guarantees that any choice of 𝑖 leads to the same final outcome, guaranteeing that the
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⟦𝑥 ← 𝑒⟧(𝑙,𝑚) ≜ [∅, (𝑙[𝑥 ↦ ⟦𝑒⟧(𝑙)],𝑚)]
⟦𝑥 ← [𝑒]⟧(𝑙,𝑚) ≜ {
[∅, (𝑙[𝑥 ↦ 𝑣],𝑚)] if ⟦𝑒⟧(𝑙) = (𝑖, 𝑛) and𝑚(𝑖, 𝑛) = 𝑣
error otherwise
⟦[𝑒1] ← 𝑒2⟧(𝑙,𝑚) ≜ {
[∅, (𝑙,𝑚[(𝑖, 𝑛) ↦ 𝑣])] if ⟦𝑒1⟧(𝑙) = (𝑖, 𝑛) and ⟦𝑒2⟧(𝑙) = 𝑣
error otherwise
⟦𝑥 ← alloc(𝑒)⟧(𝑙,𝑚) ≜
{
[{𝑖}, (𝑙[𝑥 ↦ (𝑖, 0)],𝑚[(𝑖, 0) ↦ 0,…, (𝑖, 𝑛 − 1) ↦ 0])] if 𝑖 ∉ supp(𝑙,𝑚) and ⟦𝑒⟧(𝑙) = 𝑛 > 0
error otherwise
⟦free(𝑒)⟧(𝑙,𝑚) ≜ {
[∅, (𝑙, {(𝑖′, 𝑛) ↦ 𝑚(𝑖′, 𝑛) ∣ 𝑖′ ≠ 𝑖})] if ⟦𝑒⟧(𝑙) = (𝑖, 0) and𝑚(𝑖, 0) ≠ ⊥
error otherwise
⟦skip⟧(𝑙,𝑚) ≜ [∅, (𝑙,𝑚)] ⟦if 𝑒 then 𝑐1 else 𝑐2 end⟧(𝑙,𝑚) ≜
⎧
{
⎨
{
⎩
⟦𝑐1⟧(𝑙,𝑚) if ⟦𝑒⟧(𝑙) = true
⟦𝑐2⟧(𝑙,𝑚) if ⟦𝑒⟧(𝑙) = false
error otherwise
⟦𝑐1; 𝑐2⟧(𝑙,𝑚) ≜ {
[𝐼 ∪ 𝐼′, 𝑠′] if ⟦𝑐1⟧(𝑙,𝑚) = [𝐼, 𝑠] and ⟦𝑐2⟧(𝑠) = [𝐼
′, 𝑠′]
error otherwise
⟦while 𝑒 do 𝑐 end⟧(𝑠) ≜ ⟦if 𝑒 then 𝑐;while 𝑒 do 𝑐 end else skip end⟧(𝑠)
Figure 4.8: Semantics of program execution in memory-safe language
semantics of programs is a partial function, and not an arbitrary relation. An important technical
detail is that program execution is an equivariant operation, which guarantees that these equations
are valid. As Lemma 4.9, equivariance means intuitively program execution does not depend on the
choice of block identifiers. Formally:
Lemma 4.14. Let 𝑐 be a program, 𝑠 be a state, and 𝜋 be a permutation. Then
⟦𝑐⟧(𝜋 · 𝑠) =
⎧
{{{
⎨
{{{
⎩
⊥ if ⟦𝑐⟧(𝑠) = ⊥
error if ⟦𝑐⟧(𝑠) = error
[𝜋 · 𝐼, 𝜋 · 𝑠′] if ⟦𝑐⟧(𝑠) = [𝐼, 𝑠].
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Compare this result with Lemma 4.9, which required us to apply an additional permutation 𝜋′
to adjust the result of execution. Here, this permutation is hidden by the construction of program
outcomes.
Finally, we note that the semantics of iteration is not defined in terms the semantics of a smaller
command, making it non-structurally decreasing. We can give a rigorous sense to this definition by
applying Kleene’s fixed-point theorem, reviewed in Appendix A.6
4.5.2 Guarantees of Memory Safety
All the results proved for the memory-safe abstract machine carry over to the language setting. Just
like the equivariance result we proved (Lemma 4.14), their formulation is somewhat cleaner, thanks
to the way we manage fresh block identifiers in program outcomes.
If 𝑠1 = (𝑙1,𝑚1) and 𝑠2 = (𝑙2,𝑚2) are program states, we define a new program state 𝑠1 ∪⃗ 𝑠2
as follows:
𝑠1 ∪⃗ 𝑠2 ≜ (𝑙1 ∪⃗ 𝑙2,𝑚1 ∪⃗ 𝑚2).
We also define a set blocks(𝑙,𝑚) containing all the identifiers corresponding to blocks stored in𝑚:
blocks(𝑙,𝑚) = {𝑖 ∣ ∃𝑛.(𝑖, 𝑛) ∈ dom(𝑚).}
Finally, given a program 𝑐, we let vars(𝑐) be the set of variables that are used in 𝑐.
To state the results, fix some program 𝑐, and two program states 𝑠1 = (𝑙1,𝑚1) and 𝑠2. We
suppose that we execute 𝑐 on 𝑠1, and we will analyze how execution is aﬀected if we frame the
initial state with extra data 𝑠2. Throughout, we suppose that vars(𝑐) ⊆ dom(𝑙1), which guarantees
that all the variables needed to execute 𝑐 are defined in 𝑠1.
First, an analogue of Lemma 4.10.
Lemma 4.15 (Frame OK). Suppose ⟦𝑐⟧(𝑠1) = [𝐼, 𝑠
′
1], blocks(𝑠1) ∩ blocks(𝑠2) = ∅, and 𝐼 ∩
supp(𝑠2) = ∅. Then ⟦𝑐⟧(𝑠1 ∪⃗ 𝑠2) = [𝐼, 𝑠
′
1 ∪⃗ 𝑠2].
We assume that the execution of 𝑐 on 𝑠1 successfully terminated and that the heaps of 𝑠1 and 𝑠2
store disjoint memory regions. We also assume that the set 𝐼 of block identifiers that was allocated
6Our Coq development adopts a slightly diﬀerent definition, which takes an additional timeout parameter to bound the
maximum number of iterations performed by the program; if this number is not enough, the program simply returns ⊥.
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during execution was chosen in a way that does not conflict with the identifiers present in 𝑠2. (Such
a choice is always possible.) Then, we conclude that executing 𝑐 on a state framed with 𝑠2 yields
a successful final result that is framed similarly. Unlike the analog result obtained earlier, this one
does not guarantee directly that 𝑠′1 did not somehow create a memory block that is stored in 𝑠2. This
is guaranteed by the following result, which is needed to prove Lemma 4.15.
Lemma 4.16. Suppose that ⟦𝑐⟧(𝑙,𝑚) = [𝐼, (𝑙′,𝑚′)] and vars(𝑐) ⊆ dom(𝑙). Then dom(𝑚′) ⊆
dom(𝑚) ∪ 𝐼 and dom(𝑙′) = dom(𝑙).
Intuitively, this result guarantees (1) that the only blocks that can be stored in the final state of a
program are those that were already allocated in the initial state, plus any blocks corresponding to
the set of fresh identifiers 𝐼 ; and (2) that a program cannot change the set of variables defined on the
local store. In the statement of Lemma 4.15, the two hypotheses about the identifiers that appear on
𝑠2 allow us to conclude that the blocks of 𝑠2 are not overwritten by those of 𝑠
′
1.
A second framing result says that framing does not aﬀect infinite loops. Its proof is similar to
the one of Lemma 4.15.
Lemma 4.17 (Frame Loop). Suppose ⟦𝑐⟧(𝑠1) = ⊥ and blocks(𝑠1)∩blocks(𝑠2) = ∅. Then ⟦𝑐⟧(𝑠1 ∪⃗
𝑠2) = ⊥.
Finally, we show that framing preserves memory errors, an analog of Lemma 4.11.
Lemma 4.18 (Frame Error). Suppose ⟦𝑐⟧(𝑠1) = error and supp(𝑠1) ∩ blocks(𝑠2) = ∅. Then
⟦𝑐⟧(𝑠1 ∪⃗ 𝑠2) = error.
The proofs of these results follow by induction on the structure of the program, combined with
fixed-point induction for iteration. Taken together, these three lemmas yield a noninterference result
for our language.
Theorem 4.19 (Noninterference). Let 𝑐 be a command and 𝑠1 = (𝑙1,𝑚1), 𝑠21 and 𝑠22 be program
states. Suppose that
• vars(𝑐) ⊆ dom(𝑙1); and
• supp(𝑠1) ∩ blocks(𝑠2u�) = ∅, for 𝑖 = 1, 2.
Then one of the following three possibilities hold.
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• There exists 𝐼 and 𝑠′1 such that 𝐼 ∩ supp(𝑠2u�) = ∅ and ⟦𝑐⟧(𝑠1 ∪ 𝑠21) = [𝐼, 𝑠
′
1 ∪⃗ 𝑠2u�], for
𝑖 = 1, 2.
• ⟦𝑐⟧(𝑠1 ∪⃗ 𝑠2u�) = ⊥, for 𝑖 = 1, 2.
• ⟦𝑐⟧(𝑠1 ∪⃗ 𝑠2u�) = error, for 𝑖 = 1, 2.
4.6 Memory Safety and Separation Logic
A central theme in the properties that we have proposed is locality of reasoning. In order to analyze
the behavior of a program, we do not have to consider the entire state on which it operates; it suffices
to restrict our attention to the memory blocks that are reachable via the pointers it possesses. The
strength of locality for reasoning about programs has been long recognized in the research litera-
ture, in particular in the development of separation logic [90], a proof system for reasoning about
programs that manipulate a stateful heap. In this section, we will show that there is a strong connec-
tion between our properties and the view of locality proposed by separation logic; indeed, we show
that our properties can be used to extend the proof rules of separation logic for taking advantage of
reachability-based isolation.
In separation logic, as in Hoare logic and related formal systems, we are interested in proving
program specifications that say that some property (the postcondition) holds of the final state of the
program if we know that another property (the precondition) holds of the state when the program
starts running. The logic possesses proof rules that allow us to compose simple results about the
behavior of diﬀerent code fragments to establish a potentially much more complex specification
about the entire program.
Let’s begin by developing a version of separation logic for the language of Section 4.5.
Definition 4.20. An assertion is any subset of program states 𝑝 ⊆ 𝒮. Let 𝑐 be a program, and 𝑝 and
𝑞 be assertions. We say that a specification (or triple) {𝑝} 𝑐 {𝑞} is valid if the following condition
holds. Consider an initial state (𝑙,𝑚) such that 𝑝 holds and vars(𝑐) ⊆ dom(𝑙). There can only be
two possibilities.
• ⟦𝑐⟧(𝑙,𝑚) = ⊥; or
• ⟦𝑐⟧(𝑙,𝑚) ∈ Res(𝒮), and ∀𝐼 𝑠′.⟦𝑐⟧(𝑠) = [𝐼, 𝑠′] ⇒ 𝑠′ ∈ 𝑞.
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(Compared to usual formulations of separation logic, ours has an interesting subtlety: requiring
that 𝑞 be valid at the end of execution regardless of the choices of fresh identifiers made to represent
that final state. A similar restriction is typically imposed by using a non-deterministic semantics,
where the allocator is free to choose any available segment to store a new memory region, and by
requiring that any successfully terminating execution validate the postcondition.)
For our purposes, the most important facet of this definition is that it precludes the occurrence
of run-time errors: when run on an initial state that satisfies the precondition intended by its speci-
fication, a program can either run forever or terminate successfully. Before discussing this aspect, it
is worth getting a taste of the basic system reviewing some of its basic proof rules. For instance,
{𝑝} skip {𝑝}
This rule says that we can show that the command skip always preserves its precondition. A more
interesting rule allows us to prove results about the sequential composition of two programs.
{𝑝} 𝑐1 {𝑞} {𝑞} 𝑐2 {𝑟}
{𝑝} 𝑐1; 𝑐2 {𝑟}
That is, to prove something about two commands run in sequence, we just have to prove a specifica-
tion for each one separately, and check that the postcondition of the first one matches the precondition
of the second. Besides these two simple rules, there are many others for dealing with each syntac-
tic form for our simple imperative language. However, since our goal is merely analyzing the local
reasoning facilities of separation logic, we will not consider these other rules in what follows.
Let us go back to the issue of errors in separation logic. Avoiding errors in specifications has
two main benefits. First, it guarantees that the logic can apply to unsafe settings like C. In such
settings, memory errors do not have a well-behaved semantics like they do in our language, but lead
to wild undefined behavior. When this occurs, the ensuing behavior of the program is determined
by obscure details of the language implementation, such as the layout of data structures in memory,
making it difficult to obtain a clean proof system for reasoning about the program.
The second benefit of avoiding memory errors is enabling local reasoning. When a program does
not run into memory errors, we force its execution to depend solely on parts of the heap described
70
by its pre- and postconditions. This is captured by a proof principle known as the frame rule that, in
our setting, can be stated as follows.
Definition 4.21. Let 𝑝 and 𝑞 be assertions. We define their separating conjunction 𝑝 ∗ 𝑞 as follows.
𝑝 ∗ 𝑞 ≜ {(𝑙,𝑚1 ∪⃗ 𝑚2) ∣ (𝑙,𝑚1) ∈ 𝑝, (𝑙,𝑚2) ∈ 𝑞, blocks(𝑙,𝑚1) ∩ blocks(𝑙,𝑚2) = ∅}
We say that an assertion 𝑝 is independent of a set of program variables 𝑉 if the following condition
holds.
∀𝑙1 𝑙2𝑚.(∀𝑥 ∉ 𝑉 .𝑙1(𝑥) = 𝑙2(𝑥)) ∧ (𝑙1,𝑚) ∈ 𝑝 ⇒ (𝑙2,𝑚) ∈ 𝑝
(Intuitively, this means that the values stored in the variables corresponding to 𝑉 have no influence
on whether an assertion holds of a state or not.) Finally, given a program 𝑐, we let modvars(𝑐) be
the set of variables that appear in the left-hand side of some assignment statement in 𝑐.
Theorem 4.22. Let 𝑐 be a program, and 𝑝, 𝑞, and 𝑟 be assertions. Suppose that 𝑟 is independent of
modvars(𝑐). The following rule is sound.
Frame
{𝑝} 𝑐 {𝑞}
{𝑝 ∗ 𝑟} 𝑐 {𝑞 ∗ 𝑟}
Let’s dissect this statement. A separating conjunction 𝑝 ∗ 𝑟 roughly says that the heap of a
program can be split into two disjoint parts, one of which satisfies 𝑝, and another one that satisfies
𝑟. Thus, the frame rule says that, given a program 𝑐 with a valid specification {𝑝} 𝑐 {𝑞}, we can
always enlarge the initial heap of the programwith a disjoint portion that satisfies another assertion 𝑟.
When we do this, if the program terminates, it will yield a final state with a portion that satisfies the
postcondition 𝑞, but we will also know that the portion corresponding to 𝑟 will be left untouched. In
other words, it guarantees that the integrity of that other portion is preserved. (It would be possible
to find a formulation that captures secrecy guarantees as well, but we do not consider that, since
it would require a less standard relational proof system.) This reading hints that the frame rule is
closely related to the framing results that we have been proving so far, and this is indeed the case:
we can prove Theorem 4.22 by invoking Lemmas 4.15 and 4.17.
We claimed that the frame rule is a consequence of precluding errors in specifications. Consider
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what would happen if we attempted to derive a frame rule for the following alternative reading of
specifications.
Definition 4.23. Let 𝑐 be a program, and 𝑝 and 𝑞 assertions. We say that the weak specification
{𝑝} 𝑐 {𝑞}u� is valid if the following holds. Let 𝑠 be an arbitrary state that satisfies 𝑝. If ⟦𝑐⟧(𝑠) =
[𝐼, 𝑠′], then 𝑠′ ∈ 𝑞.
Weak specifications are just like those of Definition 4.20, except that they do not prevent pro-
grams from terminating their execution with a run-time error. Unfortunately, this new notion of
specification causes the frame rule to become unsound. Let us consider a counterexample. Let emp
be the assertion that holds of states with an empty heap. If errors are allowed, we can show that the
following specification vacuously holds:
{emp} 𝑥 ← [𝑦] {𝑥 = 0}u�
By 𝑥 = 0, we mean the postcondition that asserts that the local variable 𝑥 holds the value 0. Why is
this specification valid? If we start this program on an empty heap, trying to read from any memory
location stored in 𝑦 necessarily results in an error. Now, consider what happens if we frame this
specification with the predicate 𝑦 ↦ 1, which asserts that the current heap contains only onememory
cell referenced by the pointer stored in 𝑦, and that this memory cell stores the value 1. If the frame
rule were valid, the specification
{emp ∗ 𝑦 ↦ 1} 𝑥 ← [𝑦] {𝑥 = 0 ∗ 𝑦 ↦ 1}u�,
would be valid, which, after some simplification, is equivalent to the following one:
{𝑦 ↦ 1} 𝑥 ← [𝑦] {𝑥 = 0 ∧ 𝑦 ↦ 1}u�
This triple, however, is not valid, because if we start executing the program in a state that satisfies
the precondition, the program will terminate successfully, and the variable 𝑥 will be set to 1, not 0.
Even if excluding errors is important, there is a high price to pay for enforcing this discipline:
proving almost any nontrivial statement of a program in separation logic requires detailed, exten-
sive reasoning about its behaviors. In some settings, this might be prohibitively expensive—for
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instance, in the case of large programs, programs with complex memory access patterns, such as
image-processing algorithms, or programs that depend on third-party libraries or plugins, to whose
source code we may have no access. Unfortunately, if any part of the program is not covered by the
proof, there is nothing that separation logic allows us to say about its behavior, no matter how tiny
that part is. Even the following seemingly vacuous rule is not valid in conventional separation logic.
Taut
{𝑝} 𝑐 {true}
For a counterexample, take 𝑝 to be emp, and 𝑐 to be 𝑥 ← [𝑦], as above: running the program under
these conditions results in an error, which is not allowed by specifications. The analog of this rule,
naturally, is sound if errors are allowed:
Taut
{𝑝} 𝑐 {true}u�
Recall, however, that one of the motivations for separation logic was for it to apply to low-level
settings like C, where the occurrence of memory errors is devastating. This raises the question of
whether it is possible to salvage the frame rule somehow in a setting like ours, where memory errors
lead to predictable behavior. The answer is yes, by replacing the separating conjunction with a
stronger connective.
Definition 4.24. Let 𝑝 and 𝑞 be assertions. Define their isolating conjunction 𝑝 ⃗∗ 𝑞 as follows.
𝑝 ⃗∗ 𝑞 ≜ {(𝑙,𝑚1 ∪⃗ 𝑚2) ∣ (𝑙,𝑚1) ∈ 𝑝, (𝑙,𝑚2) ∈ 𝑞, supp(𝑙,𝑚1) ∩ blocks(𝑙,𝑚2) = ∅}
Theorem 4.25. Let 𝑐 be a program, and 𝑝, 𝑞, and 𝑟 be assertions. Suppose that 𝑟 is independent of
modvars(𝑐). The following rule is sound.
SafeFrame
{𝑝} 𝑐 {𝑞}u�
{𝑝 ⃗∗ 𝑟} 𝑐 {𝑞 ⃗∗ 𝑟}u�
The isolating conjunction is similar to the separating conjunction, but it additionally requires that
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the pointers that appear on the portion of the heap that satisfies the left assertion cannot reference
regions of memory stored on the right. This assumption, crucial for proving Lemma 4.18, guarantees
that framing cannot make the execution of a crashing program succeed, by ruling out the case where
the original state referenced a dangling pointer that happened to be defined in the framed portion.
Note, however, that pointers in the 𝑟 portion of the heap are free to reference blocks stored in 𝑝.
The modified frame rule supported by our language is incomparable with the original variant.
On the one hand, it requires a stronger notion of separation between state components; on the other, it
can apply in settings where the program we are verifying can lead to memory errors. To see how this
can be useful, imagine that we are writing an application that uses a JPEG decoder routine provided
by a third-party library. By a simple check of the program text, we see that the only interaction of
the decoder program with the heap is through its input and output buﬀers. Without heavy inspec-
tion of the program, assuming that it never frees or allocates memory, we might be able to show a
specification of the form
{𝑝} decoder {𝑝},
where 𝑝 is an assertion guaranteeing that the input and output buﬀers are allocated. If we know
that these buﬀers cannot reference a window object used by our program—which, in a realistic
language, might be established with the help of additional information, such as typing—we can use
the modified frame rule to conclude that the integrity of the window object is preserved across the
call to the decoder routine.
The crucial diﬀerence between the two variants of the frame rule is the assumptions they make.
The original variant, Theorem 4.22, is a local reasoning principle for programs that have detailed
proofs about their behavior. They may run in unsafe languages like C, but the proofs guarantee that
they never lead tomemory errors. In this sense, we could see the frame rule as a good characterization
of memory-safe programs. The variant of the frame rule considered here, Theorem 4.25, on the other
hand, allows programs to be badly behaved, in the sense that they might try to misuse the memory,
either intentionally or maliciously. However, it assumes that the run-time environment where these
programs execute provides sensible guarantees for when these errors arise. Thus, we can see our
variant of the frame rule as characterizing memory-safe platforms and languages.
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Relaxation Guarantees Integrity? Possible leaks
Pointer forging No Everything
Observing physical addresses Yes Memory size and layout
Uninitialized memory Yes Contents of old memory
Dangling pointers Usually not Memory size and layout
Finite memory Yes Memory size
Figure 4.9: Possible security consequences of common memory-safety relaxations
4.7 Relaxing Memory Safety
The mechanisms reviewed here protect programs from various kinds of memory misuse. Unfortu-
nately, the restrictions they impose are often relaxed in practical designs, usually for performance
reasons: some platforms might allow programs to allocate memory without initializing it first, while
others might allow them to extract the physical address of pointers as integers, etc. In this section, we
discuss how some popular relaxations can aﬀect the data-isolation guarantees we have analyzed. As
depicted in Figure 4.9, these eﬀects can be roughly grouped in two categories: integrity and secrecy
violations. Most relaxations do not provide a means of changing the contents of memory regions
they shouldn’t access, thus guaranteeing their secrecy. Most of them, on the other hand, make it
possible to extract information about the global state of the program, such as its total memory con-
sumption. Naturally, this distinction should be taken with a grain of salt, since integrity depends on
secrecy in many practical situations; for instance, if a system uses a password to control access to
some resource, then a secrecy violation could be escalated into an integrity violation!
Our list of vulnerabilities only tries to predict possible avenues for attack, and is not backed by
proof. In a real system, attacks can result from subtle interaction betweenmultiple features, including
some that are not considered here, such as undefined behavior arising from integer overflows in C.
4.7.1 Forging Pointers
The most basic restriction imposed by our policy is preventing pointer values from being fabricated
out of thin air. The only way to access a memory region is by using a valid pointer to it, whichmust be
obtained by allocation, or by retrieving it from some other part of the state. Thanks to this restriction,
the set of identifiers that occur in a machine state serves as a bound on the memory regions that that
state can modify. This would no longer hold if pointers would be fabricated out of thin air. Consider
a typical system that allows casting integers to pointers. In general, it is hard to tell what part of
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the memory that integer could end up accessing, implying that no range of the address space can be
properly isolated from code that uses this idiom. This is why such casts are disallowed in typical
systems that provide comprehensive memory safety. We could argue that bounds checking—one of
the most fundamental aspects of memory safety—is also a mechanism for preventing pointer forging,
given that its absence allows using a pointer to access a resource it was not meant to.
Even if the dangers of fabricating pointers are well-known, similar problems arise in languages
that are traditionally seen as memory safe. JavaScript, for example, allows programs to access global
variables by indexing into a global associative array with arbitrary strings. In this sense, we could
see global variables in JavaScript as “memory unsafe,” since it is hard to determine which global
variables a piece of code can interact with, which is known to enable several serious attacks [39,
106].
4.7.2 Observing Pointers
Thememory-safety policy does not allow programs to extract physical addresses from pointer values.
Typical memory-safe systems do not have a clear stance on this. Many practical tools for enforcing
memory safety do not impose this restriction [84, 113], as many low-level C idioms require this
functionality [76], and even traditional memory-safe languages like Java allow programs to inspect
the physical placement of objects.
The problemwith extracting physical addresses from pointers is that they reveal something about
the entire state of the program, including memory regions that we cannot access. By inspecting ad-
dresses, an attacker might learn useful information about the memory layout of the program, or its
total memory consumption—and, using this information, conclude something they were not sup-
posed to. For example, Jana and Shmatikov [60] showed how an attacker can use the memory con-
sumption of a web browser to find out what pages the user is visiting. Similar remarks would apply
if the memory-safety policy allowed programs to extract integers from pointer identifiers.
Fortunately, observing physical addresses does not fundamentally break the guarantees of mem-
ory safety. For instance, if this were possible in the memory-safety policy, we should be able to show
a variation of Theorem 4.13 where we additionally assume that if the two portions of unreachable
memory diﬀer only in what is stored in those memory locations, but not the size or placement of
those memory regions. Intuitively, such a result would mean that the only information that this re-
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laxation might reveal about unreachable regions is their placement and their size. In particular, if we
want to prevent a component from learning a private key stored in an unreachable region, a system
that allows pointer-to-integer casts might make this possible.
It is worth noting that preventing physical addresses from being observable may require more
than simply not allowing pointer-to-integer casts. Recall that our policy does not allow using the
equality comparison instruction on two pointers for diﬀerent regions, and that this operator only
takes payloads, not tags, into account. If this restriction were not enforced, an attacker could try to
learn the physical address of a pointer by oﬀsetting it and testing it for equality:
int *y = malloc(42);
if (x == y + 1729) something();
else somethingElse();
If the attacker knows the physical address of the pointer x—because it has detailed knowledge of
the allocator implementation, for instance—then the above test might reveal information about the
global state of live regions. The situation is even worse for order comparisons between pointers,
which must be prevented even when the two pointers in question reference the same region. The
problem is that we can extract the physical address of a pointer by observing when the result of such
a comparison changes due to overflows, as the following snippet shows.
int *x = malloc(42);
unsigned int i = 1;
while (x < i + x) i++;
/* at this point, sizeof (int) * i + x == 0 */
unsigned int addr = - sizeof (int) * i;
Note, however, that it is perfectly valid for programs to extract the oﬀset of the two pointers using
the base service, and then compare their relative placement.
4.7.3 Uninitialized Memory
Every region allocated in the memory-safety policy has all of its locations initialized to zero, a
behavior that is also true of many memory-safe platforms—Java for example. But this can degrade
performance for some applications, leading other systems to expose allocation primitives that do not
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initialize memory beforehand, allowing code to inspect whatever stale data happened to be stored in
the returned region. This includes mechanisms for memory safety in C [83, 84], but also languages
that emphasize safety—for example, OCaml’s Bytes.create returns an uninitialized array of bytes.
From an integrity perspective, uninitialized memory by itself is not a problem: if a program
does not hold a pointer to a live region, it will not be able to change the contents of that region. The
problem is that it may lead to secrecy breaches. Suppose that a piece of code should be kept isolated
from data stored in some memory region. If that region is freed and reused when that piece of code
allocates a new region, its contents will be made available, and isolation will be compromised.
It might be possible to prove a noninterference result for a system with uninitialized memory by
exposing the state of free memory cells, and adding a hypothesis that says that the two initial states
we run the program on agree on this free memory. Such a result could be useful in conjunction with
common programming idioms that clear memory regions that contain sensitive data before those
regions are freed.
4.7.4 Dangling Pointers
When we allocate a object in a language with garbage collection, we know it cannot be referenced by
other pointers in the program state: the only pointers are those that point to live memory regions, and
allocation returns objects that are disjoint from those. This discipline prevents forms of “passive”
pointer forging, where a program component gains privilege to an object it was not meant to access,
such as in the following snippet:
free(x);
/* ... */
int *y = malloc(42);
y[0] = secret;
/* ... */
printf("secret is %d\n", x[0]);
Even if the program did not mean to make the variable secret available to the piece of code that
prints to the screen, that data may still be leaked if the memory region that x referenced happened to
be reused in the call to malloc. Similarly, integrity would also be compromised in such a situation,
as the code that controlled x could also have changed the contents of that new region arbitrarily.
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Our policy controls dangling pointers by always marking new memory regions with fresh iden-
tifiers that do not occur anywhere else in the program state. Other systems adopt similar strategies,
using some form of identifier to distinguish between regions allocated at diﬀerent points of execu-
tion. Examples from the literature include the CETS compiler transformation [83], and the tagging
scheme of Clause et al. [19], which inspired our policy.
The use of identifiers brings interesting practical issues. For efficiency, the two example systems
given above, as well as the implementation of the memory-safety policy on the PUMP [33], can
only support a finite number of identifiers. If a large enough number is supported, then the system
behaves as if there were infinitely many available for all practical purposes. For instance, even if a
new object were allocated on every cycle on a 3GHz machine, it would take approximately 200 years
for CETS to run out of identifiers, which are 64-bits long. When this happens, to preserve strong
guarantees, a system could simply stop execution, or in theory garbage-collect stale identifiers on its
state. Another possibility is to simply reuse identifiers, hoping that a collision between a new block
and a dangling pointer would be unlikely. However, there are systems that adopt a much smaller
number of possible identifiers for performance reasons, in which case collisions become much more
likely to be exploited by an attacker. Clause et al., for example, did experiments with their scheme
using a much smaller number of colors (2, 4, or 16). It is also worth noting that some systems attempt
to provide memory safety guarantees that choose not to protect programs against dangling pointers,
treating these an orthogonal issues. SoftBound [84], for instance, focuses solely on bounds checking,
and is not capable of preventing the issues described here by itself.
In addition to referencing unintended regions, the use of dangling pointers can have other disas-
trous consequences for program security. Freeing a dangling pointer can disturb allocator invariants,
enabling many practical attacks [105].
4.7.5 Finite Memory
The two noninterference results that we have proved, Theorems 4.12 and 4.13, reveal an important
diﬀerence between the security guarantees of the idealized memory-safe abstract machine and those
of the micro-policy. Noninterference for the abstract machine guarantees that changing unreachable
memory in arbitrary ways has no significant eﬀect on program execution. On the symbolic machine,
however, this result only holds for successful executions: if one of the executions leads to an error,
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there is nothing interesting we can say about the other. The reason for that is that modifying the
amount of allocated memory at the initial execution state can cause a program to run out of memory
and terminate execution.
We have seen a similar situation in the information-flow world: the termination-insensitive non-
interference property that we proved in Chapter 3 only prevents information leaks if both execu-
tions terminate successfully. By analogy, we could call the variant of noninterference satisfied
by the memory-safety policy error-insensitive. Many of the problems discussed in the context of
information-flow control carry over to this setting [5]. Our version of error-insensitive noninter-
ference can only leak one bit of secret information. However, this could change if outputs can be
produced during execution, or in systems like Java, where memory exhaustion does not trigger a fatal
error, but rather an exception that can be caught and treated. In any case, we could hope to show that
the only information that can be leaked in this way is the total memory consumption of the process,
and likely not anything about the contents of memory regions.
4.8 Discussion and Related Work
Memory safety has been one of the main applications for micro-policies and the PUMP. Earlier
work presented policies for spatial and temporal protection of the heap [11, 33, 34] (inspired by an
approach due to Clause et al. [19]), and other designs for stack protection are underway [91].
There is an extensive literature on hardware and software mechanisms for enforcing memory
safety; we overview just a few recent ones that are particularly relevant for the micro-policy pre-
sented here. The SAFE platform [25], where the PUMP has its roots, provided memory safety with
dedicated hardware fat pointers that compress base, bounds, and oﬀset in 64 bits [73]. The mech-
anism obviates the need for marking memory locations and pointers with region identifiers, but it
requires metadata to distinguish pointers from other kinds of values and to preserve the integrity
of their base and bounds—only the highly privileged memory manager is capable of manipulat-
ing this information, similarly to our system services. HardBound [30] provides hardware support
for fat pointers by storing base and bounds information in a separate address space. This metadata
can be manipulated with special instructions provided by the architecture. These instructions can
be executed by regular user code, and pointer integrity is guaranteed by having the compiler use
them only at the right places. SoftBound [84] is a subsequent software implementation of a sim-
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ilar scheme. CHERI [113] is a RISC architecture with first-class support for capabilities. These
capabilities are fat pointers with additional permission metadata that track which operations can be
performed through that pointer—for example, read, write, or execute. They are manipulated by spe-
cial instructions inserted by the compiler, and stored in conventional memory. To preserve capability
integrity, the memory tracks where capabilities are stored, and declares them as invalid as soon as
they are modified by conventional instructions. The micro-policy presented here sits somewhere
in between hardware and software approaches: it takes advantage of specialized hardware support,
but the hardware is much more generic than other mechanisms, and still needs to be customized to
enforce memory safety.
Motivated by the critical security implications, many other works have proposed formal charac-
terizations of memory safety, and used them to evaluate the security guarantees of mechanisms for
enforcing it. These prior proposals mostly focus on guaranteeing that a particular list of erroneous
operations never arise during execution. For example, SoftBound [84] guarantees that no memory
access occurs out of bounds, while Cyclone [47], a language for safe manual memory management,
prevents type errors and references to dangling pointers. In contrast, the characterization presented
here enables reasoning about high-level data-isolation properties in programs. Related principles had
already been recognized in other works. We have closely analyzed the case of separation logic [90],
whose frame rule is similar to our results. However, as argued, separation logic was designed to apply
to radically diﬀerent settings from ours, where safety is established through proof, and where we can
rely on little support from the language. By contrast, our characterization leverages the guarantees
that are provided in memory-safe settings unconditionally.
There is also an extensive literature on reasoning principles for rich languages featuring isola-
tion guarantees similar to the frame rule that apply unconditionally to all programs, such as L3 [2] or
LNLu� [70], phrased as systems of logical relations for reasoning about typed programs. However,
these other systems tend to rely on much more expressive linguistic mechanisms than memory safety
alone, such as linear type systems, or encapsulation features that control the operations that compo-
nents of a program are allowed to perform on objects allocated in memory. Our characterization,
on the other hand, is more directly applicable to the lower-level systems where the lack of memory
safety is a concern.
We believe our characterization could serve as a criterion to guide possible strengthenings and
variations of the micro-policy described here. A clear shortcoming of the current micro-policy is the
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isolation guarantees are too strong: once a region of memory becomes unreachable, there is no way
the program can ever interact with it again. In practice, we want additional mechanisms for telling
when and where a program is allowed to manipulate certain memory regions. For example, in the
imperative language of Section 4.5, reachability is relative to the set of local variables mentioned by
a program. If some part of the program does not mention some local variable 𝑥, then we know that
that part of the program does not interfere with memory regions that can only be reached through 𝑥.
Other parts of the program, however, are free to use this otherwise unreachable region. Concretely,
we could consider strengthening thememory-safety micro-policy by including a protected stack [91],
intra-object bounds checking (as done by SoftBound [84], for example), a basic distinction between
code and data, or pointer narrowing for preventing code that receives a pointer from gaining access
to the whole memory region it corresponds to. Though these additions would make the policy more
complex, we believe that they may not have a huge impact on the proof on noninterference. On a
diﬀerent direction, we could replace the current memory allocator, which initializes every location
in a new region to 0@D(𝑖, UNINIT), where 𝑖 is a fresh identifier, to a diﬀerent allocator that only
sets the region tags to D(𝑖, UNINIT), where UNINIT is a new data tag for uninitialized values. Given
that many policies tag memory sparsely, it is conceivable that there could be architectural support
for tagging large regions of memory at once, which could lead to a faster policy [91]. Furthermore,
thanks to the UNINIT tag, it would still be possible to detect illegal uses of uninitialized memory,
thereby preventing secrecy violations like the ones discussed above.
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Chapter 5
Concrete Machine
The symbolicmachine is a convenient tool for describing security policies for low-level code. Though
we can deploy these policies by emulating the symbolic machine in software, the machine was de-
signed to be backed by efficient hardware. We now discuss how this can be achieved through a low-
level concrete machine that checks and propagates metadata tags by combining a hardware cache
with software rules programmed in machine code. We prove that the concrete machine can refine
the symbolic machine for an arbitrary choice of its parameters by instantiating it with correct imple-
mentations of the transfer function and system services and using the tagging mechanism itself to
protect the monitor’s integrity, isolating it from user code.
5.1 Machine State
To user code, there are barely any diﬀerences between the concrete machine and its symbolic coun-
terpart: both are simple RISC processors with metadata tags accompanying every word. What dis-
tinguishes them is how tags are checked and propagated. While the symbolic machine is tailored
for specification and reasoning, the concrete machine is closer to a practical processor with pro-
grammable tags. Its tags are not structured objects, but bare machine words. Instead of monitoring
execution by feeding tags into an abstract transfer function, the concrete machine uses an imple-
mentation of the transfer function in machine code to decide whether an instruction is valid or not.
To achieve good performance, the transfer function is not actually run on every instruction, but
memoized using a hardware cache: after computing the result of the function for some input, this
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information is stored on the cache, so that it can be retrieved later without running the function again.
This combination allows the concrete machine to retain the flexibility of the symbolic one without
giving up on much performance.
Definition 5.1. A state of the concrete machine is a tuple of the form (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑝𝑐, 𝑝𝑐u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒), where
• 𝑚 ∈Word⇀Word×Word is the memory;
• 𝑟𝑠 ∈ Reg⇀Word×Word is the register bank;
• 𝑝𝑐 ∈Word×Word is the PC;
• 𝑝𝑐u� ∈Word×Word is the faulting PC; and
• 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒 ∈ IVec⇀ OVec is the rule cache.
The sets IVec and OVec contain input and output tag vectors. An input vector is a tuple of the form
(𝑜, 𝑡u�u�, 𝑡u�, 𝑡u�1, 𝑡u�2, 𝑡u�), where 𝑜 is an opcode, and the other elements are words. An output vector
is a pair of words (𝑡u�u�, 𝑡u�u�u�).
Since tags are full-sized words, there is a wide range of meanings that we can ascribe to them,
from records of smaller bit vectors to pointers to complex data structures stored in memory. There
is no arbitrary limit on how many input-output lines can be stored in the rule cache. This contrasts
with the typical size constraints faced by real hardware, which might implement the rule cache with
a much smaller (for instance, 512-line) near-associative hash table [32]. Since transfer functions
are pure, we can use the concrete machine to implement most micro-policies without the need for
evicting lines from the cache. Note that this may no longer hold if policies need to change the
meaning of tags during execution for performance reasons—for example, to rearrange the memory
data structures they point to.
In addition to the usual machine registers, there is a special-purpose register 𝑝𝑐u� that saves the
value of the PC on a cache miss, so that control can resume at the faulting point later. The concrete
machine omits the extra state component of the symbolic machine, which must now be interpreted
as data structures in memory manipulated by regular machine code.
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Format Description
AddRule Add line to rule cache
JumpEpc Transfer control to faulting instruction
GetTag 𝑟u� 𝑟u� Extract tag from word
PutTag 𝑟u� 𝑟u�u�u� 𝑟u� Pack payload and tag into an atom
Figure 5.1: New instructions for concrete machine. From now on, any mentions to the sets Instr and
Opcode implicitly include these new instructions (including Definition 5.1).
5.2 Semantics
The symbolic machine makes it impossible for user code to manipulate tags directly; every inter-
action is mediated by the system services and the transfer function of the monitor, which execute
independently of the main processor. On the concrete machine, however, the monitor is just another
program. The concrete machine simply provides basic functionality to isolate the monitor from user
code, and new instructions for manipulating tags, summarized in Figure 5.1.
On each step, the machine constructs the input vector 𝑖𝑣 from the current instruction opcode and
the relevant tags and looks it up in the cache. If a matching rule is found, the machine proceeds with
the execution of the instruction, extracting the tags of its results from the rule. If no rule matches,
then 𝑖𝑣 is saved in memory, the current PC value is saved in 𝑝𝑐u� , and control is transferred to a fixed
address 𝑤u�u�u�u� where a miss handler should be loaded. The job of the miss handler is to analyze the
input vector and decide whether that combination of tags is valid or not. If the combination is valid,
the handler should update the cache, specifying which output vector should be used for them, and
then transfer control back to the faulting instruction. If the combination is invalid, the miss handler
should halt the machine.
The machine provides a special MONITOR tag to identify when the monitor is running (by using
it to mark the PC), and to mark private monitor data to isolate it from user code. This tag influences
the behavior of the cache through a set of masks.
Definition 5.2. An input mask is a quintuple of Booleans (𝑏u�u�, 𝑏u�, 𝑏u�1, 𝑏u�2, 𝑏u�). An output mask
is a pair (𝑡u�u�, 𝑡u�), where both components belong to {⊥, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}.
The semantics of the machine is parameterized by function masks that maps a Boolean 𝑏 and
an opcode 𝑜 to a pair masks(𝑏, 𝑜) of an input mask and an output mask. The Boolean 𝑏 represents
whether the current PC is tagged MONITOR, allowing the cache behavior to change depending on
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storeIVec(𝑚, 𝑜, 𝑡u�u�, 𝑡u�, 𝑡u�1, 𝑡u�2, 𝑡u�) ≜ 𝑚[0,…, 5 ↦ 𝑜@MONITOR,…, 𝑡u�@MONITOR]
maskIn(𝑖𝑚, 𝑡𝑠)u� ≜ {
𝑡𝑠u� if 𝑖𝑚u� = false
− otherwise
maskOut(𝑡𝑠, 𝑜𝑚, 𝑜𝑣)u� ≜ {
𝑡𝑠u� if 𝑜𝑚u� = 𝑗 ≠ ⊥
𝑜𝑣u� otherwise
masks(𝑡𝑠2 = MONITOR, 𝑜) = (𝑖𝑚, 𝑜𝑚) 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒(𝑜,maskIn(𝑖𝑚, 𝑡𝑠)) = 𝑜𝑣
lookup(𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒, 𝑜, 𝑡𝑠) = maskOut(𝑡𝑠, 𝑜𝑚, 𝑜𝑣)
Figure 5.2: Concrete machine auxiliary functions
whether the monitor is currently running or not. The input mask is used to replace the fields of an
input vector marked as “true” by a special dummy tag −. For instance an input mask (0, 0, 1, 1, 0)
turns the 𝑖𝑣 (𝑜𝑝, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) into (𝑜𝑝, 1, 2,−,−, 5) before the cache lookup. This is an optimization
to allow a single cache line to handle multiple input vectors. When an output mask for a field is
defined (that is, diﬀerent from ⊥), the concrete machine uses the corresponding input tag as the
result tag, instead of using those listed in the cache. For instance, an output mask of (1,⊥) instructs
the machine to assemble an output vector by combining the PC component of the 𝑖𝑣 with the second
component of the output vector found in the cache.
In Section 5.3, we describe how to use to the mask mechanism to protect the monitor code,
granting it privilege to use all data stored in the machine while preventing user code from directly
interfering with the monitor’s code and data.
The rules for the concrete machine use a set of auxiliary functions summarized in Figure 5.2.
The storeIVec function stores an input vector into the first six positions of a memory, tagging all the
locations with MONITOR. We assume that there is a fixed encoding of opcodes as words to make this
possible. The maskIn and maskOut functions apply masks to input and output vectors; the indices
in their definition refer to the corresponding positions in the vectors. Finally, lookup tries to find
an input vector in the cache, while applying the necessary masks. Note the 𝑡𝑠2 = MONITOR test, to
determine which set of masks to apply.
Figures 5.3 to 5.6 define the semantics of each instruction for the concrete machine; Figures 5.3
and 5.4 cover the cases of cache hits, while Figures 5.5 and 5.6 cover cache misses. When the
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instruction does not use some of tags of the input vector, those are filled in with the fixed dummy tag
“−.” Note that even the new instructions of Figure 5.1, which have the power to manipulate tags and
the cache, undergo the same checks as regular instructions. The AddRule instruction updates the
cache by reading the new cache line from the first eight positions in memory. Once again, this only
allows adding inputs to the cache: there is no mechanism for deleting an input. The only interaction
with the faulting PC register is done through cache misses, which set it to the current PC, and through
the JumpEpc instruction, which uses it as the next PC.
5.3 Monitor
We now discuss how to use the concrete machine to implement the symbolic machine. Assuming
that we have already fixed a policy for the symbolic machine that we want to encode, the first step
is to find a way of representing symbolic tags as bare words for the concrete machine. Since we
want to use the concrete machine to support arbitrary policies, we take this encoding as a parameter;
however, we impose a few constraints on the encoding to ensure that the monitor is properly isolated
from user code.
The tag encoding is specified by partial functions for interpreting words as symbolic tags.
Definition 5.3. The decoding functions of a policy implementation are three partial functions decM,
decPC and decR
decM ∈ (Word⇀Word×Word) ×Word⇀ {User(𝑡) ∣ 𝑡 ∈ Tagu�} ∪ {Entry}
decPC ∈ (Word⇀Word×Word) ×Word⇀ Tagu�u�
decR ∈ (Word⇀Word×Word) ×Word⇀ Tagu�.
We require that each of these functions dec satisfy the following properties:
• 𝑚(𝑤) = 𝑥1@𝑡1, decM(𝑚, 𝑡1) = User(𝑡
′
1), and decM(𝑚, 𝑡2) = User(𝑡
′
2) imply dec(𝑚[𝑤 ↦
𝑥2@𝑡2], 𝑡) = dec(𝑚, 𝑡) for every𝑚, 𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑡1, 𝑡2, 𝑡
′
1, 𝑡
′
2, 𝑤, and 𝑡; and
• dec(𝑚, MONITOR) = ⊥.
Each of these functions takes as arguments a memory𝑚 and a tag 𝑡, and return the symbolic tag
𝑡′ that corresponds to 𝑡 with respect to𝑚; if no such tag exists, the decoding function is undefined.
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Nop
𝑚(𝑤u�u�) = 𝑖@𝑡u� decode 𝑖 = Nop lookup(𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒,Nop, 𝑡u�u�, 𝑡u�, −,−,−) = (𝑡
′
u�u�, _)
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�@𝑡u�u�, 𝑝𝑐u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒) → (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, (𝑤u�u�+1)@𝑡
′
u�u�, 𝑝𝑐u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒)
Const
𝑚(𝑤u�u�) = 𝑖@𝑡u� decode 𝑖 = Const 𝑖 𝑟u� 𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�) = _@𝑡u�
lookup(𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒,Const, 𝑡u�u�, 𝑡u�, 𝑡u�, −,−) = (𝑡
′
u�u�, 𝑡
′
u�) 𝑟𝑠[𝑟u� ↦ 𝑖@𝑡
′
u�] = 𝑟𝑠
′
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�@𝑡u�u�, 𝑝𝑐u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒) → (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠
′, (𝑤u�u�+1)@𝑡
′
u�u�, 𝑝𝑐u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒)
Mov
𝑚(𝑤u�u�) = 𝑖@𝑡u� decode 𝑖 = Mov 𝑟 𝑟u� 𝑟𝑠(𝑟) = 𝑤@𝑡
𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�) = _@𝑡u� lookup(𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒,Mov, 𝑡u�u�, 𝑡u�, 𝑡, 𝑡u�, −) = (𝑡
′
u�u�, 𝑡
′
u�) 𝑟𝑠[𝑟u� ↦ 𝑖@𝑡
′
u�] = 𝑟𝑠
′
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�@𝑡u�u�, 𝑝𝑐u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒) → (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠
′, (𝑤u�u�+1)@𝑡
′
u�u�, 𝑝𝑐u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒)
Binop
𝑚(𝑤u�u�) = 𝑖@𝑡u�
decode 𝑖 = Binop
⊕
𝑟1 𝑟2 𝑟u� 𝑟𝑠(𝑟1) = 𝑤1@𝑡1 𝑟𝑠(𝑟2) = 𝑤2@𝑡2 𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�) = _@𝑡u�
lookup(𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒,Binop
⊕
, 𝑡u�u�, 𝑡u�, 𝑡1, 𝑡2, 𝑡u�) = (𝑡
′
u�u�, 𝑡
′
u�) 𝑟𝑠[𝑟u� ↦ (𝑤1 ⊕𝑤2)@𝑡
′
u�] = 𝑟𝑠
′
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�@𝑡u�u�, 𝑝𝑐u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒) → (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠
′, (𝑤u�u�+1)@𝑡
′
u�u�, 𝑝𝑐u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒)
Load
𝑚(𝑤u�u�) = 𝑖@𝑡u�
decode 𝑖 = Load 𝑟 𝑟u� 𝑟𝑠(𝑟) = 𝑤@𝑡 𝑚(𝑤) = 𝑤
′@𝑡′ 𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�) = _@𝑡u�
lookup(𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒, Load, 𝑡u�u�, 𝑡u�, 𝑡, 𝑡
′, 𝑡u�) = (𝑡
′
u�u�, 𝑡
′
u�) 𝑟𝑠[𝑟u� ↦ 𝑤
′@𝑡′u�] = 𝑟𝑠
′
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�@𝑡u�u�, 𝑝𝑐u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒) → (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠
′, (𝑤u�u�+1)@𝑡
′
u�u�, 𝑝𝑐u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒)
Store
𝑚(𝑤u�u�) = 𝑖@𝑡u�
decode 𝑖 = Store 𝑟u� 𝑟u� 𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�) = 𝑤u�@𝑡u� 𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�) = 𝑤u�@𝑡u� 𝑚(𝑤u�) = _@𝑡u�
lookup(𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒,Store, 𝑡u�u�, 𝑡u�, 𝑡u�, 𝑡u�, 𝑡u�) = (𝑡
′
u�u�, 𝑡
′
u�) 𝑚[𝑤u� ↦ 𝑤u�@𝑡
′
u�] = 𝑚
′
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�@𝑡u�u�, 𝑝𝑐u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒) → (𝑚
′, 𝑟𝑠, (𝑤u�u�+1)@𝑡
′
u�u�, 𝑝𝑐u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒)
Jump
𝑚(𝑤u�u�) = 𝑖@𝑡u� decode 𝑖 = Jump 𝑟
𝑟𝑠(𝑟) = 𝑤′u�u�@𝑡 lookup(𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒, Jump, 𝑡u�u�, 𝑡u�, 𝑡, −,−) = (𝑡
′
u�u�, _)
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�@𝑡u�u�, 𝑝𝑐u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒) → (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠
′, 𝑤′u�u�@𝑡
′
u�u�, 𝑝𝑐u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒)
Figure 5.3: Semantics of concrete machine: successful cache look up
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Bnz
𝑚(𝑤u�u�) = 𝑖@𝑡u� decode 𝑖 = Bnz 𝑟 𝑛 𝑟𝑠(𝑟) = 𝑤@𝑡
lookup(𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒,Bnz, 𝑡u�u�, 𝑡u�, 𝑡, −,−) = (𝑡
′
u�u�, _) 𝑤
′
u�u� = if 𝑤 = 0 then 𝑤u�u� + 1 else 𝑤u�u� + 𝑛
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�@𝑡u�u�, 𝑝𝑐u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒) → (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤
′
u�u�@𝑡
′
u�u�, 𝑝𝑐u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒)
Jal
𝑚(𝑤u�u�) = 𝑖@𝑡u� decode 𝑖 = Jal 𝑟 𝑟𝑠(𝑟) = 𝑤
′
u�u�@𝑡1 𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�) = _@𝑡u�u�
lookup(𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒, Jal, 𝑡u�u�, 𝑡u�, 𝑡1, 𝑡u�u�, −) = (𝑡
′
u�u�, 𝑡
′
u�u�) 𝑟𝑠[𝑟u� ↦ (𝑤u�u�+1)@𝑡
′
u�u�] = 𝑟𝑠
′
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�@𝑡u�u�, 𝑝𝑐u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒) → (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠
′, 𝑤′u�u�@𝑡
′
u�u�, 𝑝𝑐u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒)
AddRule
𝑚(𝑤u�u�) = 𝑖@𝑡u�
decode 𝑖 = AddRule lookup(𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒,AddRule, 𝑡u�u�, 𝑡u�, −,−,−) = (𝑡
′
u�u�, _)
𝑚(0,…, 7) = (𝑜, 𝑡1, 𝑡2, 𝑡3, 𝑡4, 𝑡5, 𝑡6, 𝑡7)
∀𝑖𝑣, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒′(𝑖𝑣) = (if 𝑖𝑣 = (𝑜, 𝑡1, 𝑡2, 𝑡3, 𝑡4, 𝑡5) then (𝑡6, 𝑡7) else 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒(𝑖𝑣))
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�@𝑡u�u�, 𝑝𝑐u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒) → (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠
′, (𝑤u�u�+1)@𝑡
′
u�u�, 𝑝𝑐u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒
′)
JumpEpc
𝑚(𝑤u�u�) = 𝑖@𝑡u�
decode 𝑖 = JumpEpc lookup(𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒, JumpEpc, 𝑡u�u�, 𝑡u�, 𝑡u�u�u� , −,−) = (𝑡
′
u�u�, _)
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�@𝑡u�u�, 𝑤u�u�u�@𝑡u�u�u� , 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒) → (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�u�@𝑡
′
u�u�, 𝑤u�u�u�@𝑡u�u�u� , 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒)
GetTag
𝑚(𝑤u�u�) = 𝑖@𝑡u� decode 𝑖 = GetTag 𝑟u� 𝑟u� 𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�) = 𝑤@𝑡 𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�) = _@𝑡u�
lookup(𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒,GetTag, 𝑡u�u�, 𝑡u�, 𝑡, 𝑡u�, −) = (𝑡
′
u�u�, 𝑡
′
u�) 𝑟𝑠[𝑟u� ↦ 𝑡@𝑡
′
u�] = 𝑟𝑠
′
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�@𝑡u�u�, 𝑝𝑐u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒) → (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠
′, (𝑤u�u�+1)@𝑡
′
u�u�, 𝑝𝑐u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒)
PutTag
𝑚(𝑤u�u�) = 𝑖@𝑡u�
decode 𝑖 = PutTag 𝑟u� 𝑟u�u�u� 𝑟u� 𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�) = 𝑤@𝑡1 𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�u�u�) = 𝑡@𝑡2 𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�) = _@𝑡u�
lookup(𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒,PutTag, 𝑡u�u�, 𝑡u�, 𝑡1, 𝑡2, 𝑡u�) = (𝑡
′
u�u�, _) 𝑟𝑠[𝑟u� ↦ 𝑤@𝑡] = 𝑟𝑠
′
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�@𝑡u�u�, 𝑝𝑐u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒) → (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠
′, (𝑤u�u�+1)@𝑡
′
u�u�, 𝑝𝑐u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒)
Figure 5.4: Semantics of concrete machine: successful cache look up (continued)
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Nop-Miss
𝑚(𝑤u�u�) = 𝑖@𝑡u� decode 𝑖 = Nop
𝑖𝑣 = (Nop, 𝑡u�u�, 𝑡u�, −,−,−) lookup(𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒, 𝑖𝑣) = ⊥ storeIVec(𝑚, 𝑖𝑣) = 𝑚
′
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�@𝑡u�u�, 𝑝𝑐u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒) → (𝑚
′, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�u�u�@MONITOR, 𝑤u�u�@𝑡u�u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒)
Const-Miss
𝑚(𝑤u�u�) = 𝑖@𝑡u� decode 𝑖 = Const 𝑖 𝑟u� 𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�) = _@𝑡u�
𝑖𝑣 = (Const, 𝑡u�u�, 𝑡u�, 𝑡u�, −,−) lookup(𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒, 𝑖𝑣) = ⊥ storeIVec(𝑚, 𝑖𝑣) = 𝑚
′
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�@𝑡u�u�, 𝑝𝑐u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒) → (𝑚
′, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�u�u�@MONITOR, 𝑤u�u�@𝑡u�u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒)
Mov-Miss
𝑚(𝑤u�u�) = 𝑖@𝑡u� decode 𝑖 = Mov 𝑟 𝑟u� 𝑟𝑠(𝑟) = 𝑤@𝑡 𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�) = _@𝑡u�
𝑖𝑣 = (Mov, 𝑡u�u�, 𝑡u�, 𝑡, 𝑡u�, −) lookup(𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒, 𝑖𝑣) = ⊥ storeIVec(𝑚, 𝑖𝑣) = 𝑚
′
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�@𝑡u�u�, 𝑝𝑐u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒) → (𝑚
′, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�u�u�@MONITOR, 𝑤u�u�@𝑡u�u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒)
Binop-Miss
𝑚(𝑤u�u�) = 𝑖@𝑡u�
decode 𝑖 = Binop
⊕
𝑟1 𝑟2 𝑟u� 𝑟𝑠(𝑟1) = 𝑤1@𝑡1 𝑟𝑠(𝑟2) = 𝑤2@𝑡2 𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�) = _@𝑡u�
𝑖𝑣 = (Binop
⊕
, 𝑡u�u�, 𝑡u�, 𝑡1, 𝑡2, 𝑡u�) lookup(𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒, 𝑖𝑣) = ⊥ storeIVec(𝑚, 𝑖𝑣) = 𝑚
′
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�@𝑡u�u�, 𝑝𝑐u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒) → (𝑚
′, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�u�u�@MONITOR, 𝑤u�u�@𝑡u�u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒)
Load-Miss
𝑚(𝑤u�u�) = 𝑖@𝑡u�
decode 𝑖 = Load 𝑟 𝑟u� 𝑟𝑠(𝑟) = 𝑤@𝑡 𝑚(𝑤) = 𝑤
′@𝑡′ 𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�) = _@𝑡u�
𝑖𝑣 = (Load, 𝑡u�u�, 𝑡u�, 𝑡, 𝑡
′, 𝑡u�) lookup(𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒, 𝑖𝑣) = ⊥ storeIVec(𝑚, 𝑖𝑣) = 𝑚
′
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�@𝑡u�u�, 𝑝𝑐u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒) → (𝑚
′, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�u�u�@MONITOR, 𝑤u�u�@𝑡u�u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒)
Store-Miss
𝑚(𝑤u�u�) = 𝑖@𝑡u�
decode 𝑖 = Store 𝑟u� 𝑟u� 𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�) = 𝑤u�@𝑡u� 𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�) = 𝑤u�@𝑡u� 𝑚(𝑤u�) = _@𝑡u�
𝑖𝑣 = (Store, 𝑡u�u�, 𝑡u�, 𝑡u�, 𝑡u�, 𝑡u�) lookup(𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒, 𝑖𝑣) = ⊥ storeIVec(𝑚, 𝑖𝑣) = 𝑚
′
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�@𝑡u�u�, 𝑝𝑐u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒) → (𝑚
′, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�u�u�@MONITOR, 𝑤u�u�@𝑡u�u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒)
Jump-Miss
𝑚(𝑤u�u�) = 𝑖@𝑡u� decode 𝑖 = Jump 𝑟 𝑟𝑠(𝑟) = 𝑤
′
u�u�@𝑡
𝑖𝑣 = (Jump, 𝑡u�u�, 𝑡u�, 𝑡, −,−) lookup(𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒, 𝑖𝑣) = ⊥ storeIVec(𝑚, 𝑖𝑣) = 𝑚
′
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�@𝑡u�u�, 𝑝𝑐u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒) → (𝑚
′, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�u�u�@MONITOR, 𝑤u�u�@𝑡u�u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒)
Figure 5.5: Semantics of concrete machine: cache miss
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Bnz-Miss
𝑚(𝑤u�u�) = 𝑖@𝑡u� decode 𝑖 = Bnz 𝑟 𝑛 𝑟𝑠(𝑟) = 𝑤@𝑡
𝑖𝑣 = (Bnz, 𝑡u�u�, 𝑡u�, 𝑡, −,−) lookup(𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒, 𝑖𝑣) = ⊥ storeIVec(𝑚, 𝑖𝑣) = 𝑚
′
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�@𝑡u�u�, 𝑝𝑐u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒) → (𝑚
′, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�u�u�@MONITOR, 𝑤u�u�@𝑡u�u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒)
Jal-Miss
𝑚(𝑤u�u�) = 𝑖@𝑡u� decode 𝑖 = Jal 𝑟 𝑟𝑠(𝑟) = _@𝑡1 𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�) = _@𝑡u�u�
𝑖𝑣 = (Jal, 𝑡u�u�, 𝑡u�, 𝑡1, 𝑡u�u�, −) lookup(𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒, 𝑖𝑣) = ⊥ storeIVec(𝑚, 𝑖𝑣) = 𝑚
′
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�@𝑡u�u�, 𝑝𝑐u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒) → (𝑚
′, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�u�u�@MONITOR, 𝑤u�u�@𝑡u�u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒)
AddRule-Miss
𝑚(𝑤u�u�) = 𝑖@𝑡u� decode 𝑖 = AddRule
𝑖𝑣 = (AddRule, 𝑡u�u�, 𝑡u�, −,−,−) lookup(𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒, 𝑖𝑣) = ⊥ storeIVec(𝑚, 𝑖𝑣) = 𝑚
′
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�@𝑡u�u�, 𝑝𝑐u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒) → (𝑚
′, 𝑟𝑠′, 𝑤u�u�u�u�@MONITOR, 𝑤u�u�@𝑡u�u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒)
JumpEpc-Miss
𝑚(𝑤u�u�) = 𝑖@𝑡u� decode 𝑖 = JumpEpc 𝑖𝑣 = (JumpEpc, 𝑡u�u�, 𝑡u�, 𝑡u�u�u� , −,−)
lookup(𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒, 𝑖𝑣) = (𝑡′u�u�, −) storeIVec(𝑚, 𝑖𝑣) = 𝑚
′
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�@𝑡u�u�, 𝑝𝑐u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒) → (𝑚
′, 𝑟𝑠′, 𝑤u�u�u�u�@MONITOR, 𝑤u�u�@𝑡u�u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒)
GetTag-Miss
𝑚(𝑤u�u�) = 𝑖@𝑡u� decode 𝑖 = GetTag 𝑟u� 𝑟u� 𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�) = 𝑤@𝑡 𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�) = _@𝑡u�
𝑖𝑣 = (GetTag, 𝑡u�u�, 𝑡u�, 𝑡, 𝑡u�, −) lookup(𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒, 𝑖𝑣) = ⊥ storeIVec(𝑚, 𝑖𝑣) = 𝑚
′
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�@𝑡u�u�, 𝑝𝑐u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒) → (𝑚
′, 𝑟𝑠′, 𝑤u�u�u�u�@MONITOR, 𝑤u�u�@𝑡u�u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒)
PutTag-Miss
𝑚(𝑤u�u�) = 𝑖@𝑡u�
decode 𝑖 = PutTag 𝑟u� 𝑟u�u�u� 𝑟u� 𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�) = 𝑤@𝑡1 𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�u�u�) = 𝑡@𝑡2 𝑟𝑠(𝑟u�) = _@𝑡u�
𝑖𝑣 = (PutTag, 𝑡u�u�, 𝑡u�, 𝑡1, 𝑡2, 𝑡u�) lookup(𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒, 𝑖𝑣) = ⊥ storeIVec(𝑚, 𝑖𝑣) = 𝑚
′
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑤u�u�@𝑡u�u�, 𝑝𝑐u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒) → (𝑚
′, 𝑟𝑠′, 𝑤u�u�u�u�@MONITOR, 𝑤u�u�@𝑡u�u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒)
Figure 5.6: Semantics of concrete machine: cache miss (continued)
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𝑡u�u� = MONITOR 𝑡u�u� ≠ MONITOR
Opcode 𝑏u�1, 𝑏u�2, 𝑏u� 𝑐u�u� 𝑐u� 𝑏u�1 𝑏u�2 𝑏u� 𝑐u�u�, 𝑐u�
Nop true 1 ⊥ true true true ⊥
Const true 1 ⊥ false true true ⊥
Mov true 1 3 false false true ⊥
Binop
⊕
true 1 ⊥ false false false ⊥
Load true 1 4 false false false ⊥
Store true 1 4 false false false ⊥
Jump true 3 ⊥ false true true ⊥
Bnz true 1 ⊥ false true true ⊥
Jal true 3 1 false false true ⊥
JumpEpc true 3 ⊥ true true true ⊥
AddRule true 1 ⊥ true true true ⊥
GetTag true 1 ⊥ false false true ⊥
PutTag true 1 ⊥ false false false ⊥
Figure 5.7: Masks for standard monitor. The 𝑏u�u� and 𝑏u� fields of the input vector are always set to
false.
In the case of decM, the resulting tag can be either User(𝑡
′), which corresponds to a real symbolic
tag, or Entry, which is used to mark the entry points of system services. The memory argument is
needed to allow the encoding to mention data structures stored in memory; the first condition above
guarantees that the encoding does not depend on parts of the memory that are marked with user tags.
The second condition prevents the implementation from using the special-purpose MONITOR tag for
anything that is visible for user code.
In what follows, we assume that we have fixed set of decoding functions for the tags of the policy
we want to implement. We can define other partial functions decIVec and decOVec that convert input
and output vectors to the formats used by the symbolic transfer function, by essentially applying the
decoding functions of the appropriate kind pointwise, and ensuring that no memory tags correspond
to Entry.
We will soon detail the requirements we impose on concrete monitor code to behave correctly.
Before that, however, we specify a set of masks to allow monitor code to execute (Figure 5.7). The
masks for user code (that is, when the current PC is not tagged as MONITOR) are uninteresting: they
do not mask any input tags beyond those that are not used by the instruction, and always use the
tags provided by the output vector stored in the cache. In principle, specific user policies could
take advantage of the masking mechanism for improved performance, but restricting our attention
to the masks defined above does not limit expressive power. The masks for monitor code are more
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Opcode PC, Instr Args PC Res
Nop MONITOR − − −
Const MONITOR − − MONITOR
Mov MONITOR − − −
Binop
⊕
MONITOR − − MONITOR
Load MONITOR − − −
Store MONITOR − − −
Jump MONITOR − − −
Bnz MONITOR − − −
Jal MONITOR − − −
JumpEpc MONITOR − − −
AddRule MONITOR − − −
GetTag MONITOR − − MONITOR
PutTag MONITOR − − −
Figure 5.8: Ground rules for standard monitor
interesting, as they are set to allow the monitor to run with a limited number of rules installed in the
cache. First, they mask out all tags on register and memory arguments, to ensure that monitor code
is allowed to operate on any kind of argument. Second, they use output masks to propagate input
tags directly into the output vector. In most cases, the new PC receives the same tag as the old one
(that is, 𝑐u�u� = 1), but in other cases, its tag comes from the instruction’s argument (when 𝑐u�u� is
3). For JumpEpc in particular, this has the eﬀect of using whatever tag appeared on the faulting PC,
allowing the cache miss handler to return to user code. For result tags, most instructions simply use
whatever is specified by the cache, except instructions that move their arguments: Mov, Load, Store,
and Jal. In these cases, the tags are set to use the tag in whatever atom was moved.
The masks shown above work in cooperation with a set of ground rules that are assumed to be
always present in the cache (Figure 5.8); it is the job of the monitor to never overwrite such rules.
Most rules simply allow the monitor to run following the behavior given by the masks; the only
exceptions are Const, Binop, and GetTag, which always tag their results as MONITOR.
We are now ready to describe how the concrete machine implements the symbolic one. As
usual, we define a refinement relation that explains when a concrete state represents a symbolic
state. This relation comprises several components that say that the abstract data structures of the
symbolic machine are correctly represented at the concrete level. The memories of the states are
related if they agree on the contents that are visible to user code.
Definition 5.4. Let 𝑚u� ∈ Word ⇀ Word × Tagu� be a memory of the symbolic machine, and
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𝑚u� ∈ Word ⇀ Word ×Word be a memory of the concrete machine. We say that 𝑚u� refines 𝑚u�,
noted𝑚u� B𝑚u�, if the following conditions hold.
• If decM(𝑚u�, 𝑡u�) = User(𝑡u�) and𝑚u�(𝑤) = 𝑥@𝑡u�, then𝑚u�(𝑤) = 𝑥@𝑡u�.
• If 𝑚u�(𝑤) = 𝑥@𝑡u�, there exists a concrete tag 𝑡u� such that decM(𝑚u�, 𝑡u�) = User(𝑡u�) and
𝑚u�(𝑤) = 𝑥@𝑡u�.
Because of the requirements on decoding functions, any memory location tagged as MONITOR is
invisible to user code.
The notion of refinement for register banks is similar, except that the relation needs to take the
concrete memory into account, because of the tag encoding.
Definition 5.5. Let 𝑟𝑠u� ∈ Reg⇀Word×Tagu� and 𝑟𝑠u� ∈ Reg⇀Word×Word be register banks,
and 𝑚u� ∈ Word ⇀ Word ×Word be a memory. We say that 𝑟𝑠u� refines 𝑟𝑠u� with respect to 𝑚u�,
noted 𝑟𝑠u� Bu�u� 𝑟𝑠u�, if the following conditions hold.
• If decR(𝑚u�, 𝑡u�) = 𝑡u� and 𝑟𝑠u�(𝑟) = 𝑥@𝑡u�, then 𝑟𝑠u�(𝑟) = 𝑥@𝑡u�.
• If 𝑟𝑠u�(𝑟) = 𝑥@𝑡u�, there exists 𝑡u� such that decR(𝑚u�, 𝑡u�) = 𝑡u� and 𝑟𝑠u�(𝑟) = 𝑥@𝑡u�.
To allow the policy extra state to be implemented, we parameterize the refinement result by a
monitor invariant. The invariant should be preserved by every monitor operation, and roughly states
that the extra state is correctly represented in memory.
Definition 5.6. Amonitor invariant is a relation 𝐼 between concrete memories𝑚u�, concrete register
banks 𝑟𝑠u�, caches 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒, and symbolic extra states 𝑒 that satisfies the following properties.
• The invariant does not depend on user memory: if (𝑚u�, 𝑟𝑠u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒, 𝑒) ∈ 𝐼 ,𝑚u�(𝑤) = 𝑥@𝑡u�,
decM(𝑚u�, 𝑡u�) = User(𝑡u�), and𝑚u�[𝑤 ↦ 𝑥
′@𝑡′u�] = 𝑚
′
u�, then (𝑚
′
u�, 𝑟𝑠u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒, 𝑒) ∈ 𝐼 .
• The invariant does not depend on user registers: if (𝑚u�, 𝑟𝑠u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒, 𝑒) ∈ 𝐼 , 𝑟𝑠u�(𝑟) = 𝑥@𝑡u�,
decR(𝑚u�, 𝑡u�) = 𝑡u�, and 𝑟𝑠u�[𝑟 ↦ 𝑥
′@𝑡′u�] = 𝑟𝑠
′
u�, then (𝑚u�, 𝑟𝑠
′
u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒, 𝑒) ∈ 𝐼 .
• The invariant is stable under storing input vectors: if (𝑚u�, 𝑟𝑠u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒, 𝑒) ∈ 𝐼 and storeIVec(𝑚u�, 𝑖𝑣) =
𝑚′u�, then (𝑚
′
u�, 𝑟𝑠u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒, 𝑒) ∈ 𝐼 .
The concrete machine exposes system services by tagging their entry points accordingly.
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Definition 5.7. Let 𝑚u� be a concrete memory. We say that its entry points are well-formed if the
following holds. For every word𝑤, service(𝑤) ≠ ⊥ if and only if there exists a word 𝑥 and a concrete
tag 𝑡 such that𝑚u�(𝑤) = 𝑥@𝑡 and decM(𝑚u�, 𝑡) = Entry.
7
Finally, we need to guarantee that the answers given by the rule cache are correct according to
the transfer function of the symbolic machine.
Definition 5.8. Let 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒 ∈ IVec⇀ OVec be a cache, and𝑚u� ∈Word⇀Word×Word be a mem-
ory of the concrete machine. We say that 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒 is correct with respect to𝑚u� if the following holds.
For any input vector 𝑖𝑣 and output vector 𝑜𝑣, if lookup(𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒, 𝑖𝑣) = 𝑜𝑣 and decPC(𝑚u�, 𝑡u�u�) ≠ ⊥,
where 𝑡u�u� is the PC tag of 𝑖𝑣, then there exists 𝑖𝑣u� and 𝑜𝑣u� such that decIVec(𝑚u�, 𝑖𝑣) = 𝑖𝑣u�,
decOVec(𝑚u�, 𝑜𝑣) = 𝑜𝑣u�, and transfer(𝑖𝑣u�) = 𝑜𝑣u�.
This brings us to the notion of state refinement.
Definition 5.9. Let 𝑠u� = (𝑚u�, 𝑟𝑠u�, 𝑝𝑐u�@𝑡u�, 𝑝𝑐u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒) be a state of the concrete machine, and
𝑠u� = (𝑚u�, 𝑟𝑠u�, 𝑝𝑐u�@𝑡u�, 𝑒) be a state of the symbolic machine. We say that 𝑠u� refines 𝑠u�, written
𝑠u� B 𝑠u�, if and only if
• The PC is refined (𝑝𝑐u� = 𝑝𝑐u� and decPC(𝑚u�, 𝑡u�) = 𝑡u�);
• 𝑚u� B𝑚u�;
• 𝑟𝑠u� Bu�u� 𝑟𝑠u�;
• 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒 is correct with respect to𝑚u�;
• the first six positions of𝑚u� (that is, those that store the input vector on a cache miss) are tagged
as MONITOR;
• the entry points of𝑚u� are well-formed; and
• (𝑚u�, 𝑟𝑠u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒, 𝑒) ∈ 𝐼 .
7The Coq formalization also requires decode u� = Nop, to simplify the refinement proof by cutting down the number
of possible input vectors to consider at the beginning of a system call. This is useful there because, since system services
can delegate some of their checks to the transfer function, the behavior of the first instruction is exposed in the refinement
statement.
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To actually prove that the concrete machine refines the symbolic one, we must make a few as-
sumptions about the behavior of the monitor code that implements the transfer function and system
services. Roughly speaking, these conditions state that (1) upon a cache miss, if the implementation
of the transfer function returns to user mode, then the cache of the final state is still correct, and the
parts of its state accessible to the user have not changed; and (2) if the implementation of a system
service returns to the user, then the corresponding symbolic system service produces a matching
symbolic state.
Definition 5.10 (Monitor correctness). We say that the monitor code is correct if the following
conditions hold.
• Suppose that (𝑚u�, 𝑟𝑠u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒, 𝑒) ∈ 𝐼 , storeIVec(𝑚u�, 𝑖𝑣) = 𝑚
′
u�, and that 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒 is correct
with respect to 𝑚u�. Suppose furthermore that there exists a state 𝑠u� whose PC is not tagged
MONITOR, such that
(𝑚′u�, 𝑟𝑠u�, 𝑤u�u�u�u�@MONITOR, 𝑝𝑐u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒) →
∗ 𝑠u�,
and that all the intermediate execution states have PCs that are tagged as MONITOR. Let 𝑚″u�
be the memory of 𝑠u�. Then, there exists 𝑖𝑣u� and 𝑜𝑣u� such that
– decIVec(𝑚u�, 𝑖𝑣) = 𝑖𝑣u�;
– transfer(𝑖𝑣u�) = 𝑜𝑣u�;
– the cache of 𝑠u� is correct with respect to𝑚
″
u� ;
– the first six positions of𝑚″u� are all tagged as MONITOR;
– user tags are unchanged: for all 𝑡u�, 𝑡u�, and any decoding function dec, dec(𝑚
″
u� , 𝑡u�) = 𝑡u�
if and only if dec(𝑚u�, 𝑡u�) = 𝑡u�;
– user memory is unchanged: if decM(𝑚u�, 𝑡u�) = 𝑡u�, then 𝑚u�(𝑤) = 𝑥@𝑡u� if and only if
𝑚″u� (𝑤) = 𝑥@𝑡u�;
– user registers are unchanged: if decR(𝑚u�, 𝑡u�) = 𝑡u�, then 𝑟𝑠u�(𝑟) = 𝑥@𝑡u� if and only if
𝑟𝑠′u�(𝑟) = 𝑥@𝑡u�, where 𝑟𝑠
′
u� is the register bank of 𝑠u�;
– the PC of 𝑠u� is equal to 𝑝𝑐u�;
– the entry points of𝑚″u� are well formed; and
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– the monitor invariant 𝐼 holds of𝑚″u� , the register bank of 𝑠u�, its cache, and 𝑒.
• Let 𝑠u� = (𝑚u�, 𝑟𝑠u�, 𝑝𝑐@𝑡u�, 𝑝𝑐u�) be a concrete machine state, and 𝑠u� = (𝑚u�, 𝑟𝑠u�, 𝑝𝑐@𝑡u�, 𝑒)
be a symbolic machine state. Suppose that (𝑚u�, 𝑟𝑠u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒, 𝑒) ∈ 𝐼 ,𝑚u�B𝑚u�, 𝑟𝑠u�Bu�u� 𝑟𝑠u�,
𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒 is correct with respect to 𝑚u�, the first six positions of 𝑚u� are tagged as MONITOR,
service(𝑝𝑐) = 𝑓 , decPC(𝑚u�, 𝑡u�) = 𝑡u�. Suppose furthermore that the cache of 𝑠u� currently
allows a system service to run, in the sense that lookup(𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒, 𝑖𝑣) ≠ ⊥, where 𝑖𝑣 is the input
vector built by the concrete machine when trying to step 𝑠u�. Finally, suppose that 𝑠u� →
∗
(𝑚′u�, 𝑟𝑠
′
u�, 𝑝𝑐
′@𝑡′u�, 𝑝𝑐
′
u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒
′), where 𝑡′u� ≠ MONITOR, but all the intermediate execution
steps go through states whose PCs are tagged MONITOR. Then, there exists𝑚u�, 𝑟𝑠u�, 𝑡
′
u� and 𝑒
′
such that
– 𝑓(𝑚u�, 𝑟𝑠u�, 𝑝𝑐@𝑡u�, 𝑒) = (𝑚
′
u�, 𝑟𝑠
′
u�, 𝑝𝑐
′@𝑡′u�, 𝑒
′);
– decPC(𝑚
′
u�, 𝑡
′
u�) = 𝑡
′
u�;
– 𝑚′u� B𝑚′u�;
– 𝑟𝑠′u� Bu�′u� 𝑟𝑠
′
u�;
– 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒′ is correct with respect to𝑚′u�;
– the first six positions of𝑚′u� are tagged as MONITOR;
– the entry points of𝑚′u� are well-formed; and
– the monitor invariant 𝐼 holds of𝑚′u�, 𝑟𝑠
′
u�, 𝑐𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒
′, and 𝑒′.
Since we are only showing refinement in one direction, the first half of Definition 5.10 does not
have to assert that the updated cache produced when the miss handler finishes executing actually
maps the faulting input vector to the correct output vector; it merely says that, if the cache produces
any result for that input vector, then the result is correct.
When the correctness conditions of the monitor are satisfied, we can show that the concrete
machine refines the symbolic one.
Theorem 5.11. Suppose that 𝑠u� B 𝑠u�, that the monitor is correct (in the sense of Definition 5.10),
and that 𝑠u� →
∗ 𝑠′u�, where the PC of 𝑠
′
u� is not tagged as MONITOR. Then, there exists a symbolic state
𝑠′u� such that 𝑠u� →
∗ 𝑠′u� and 𝑠
′
u� B 𝑠′u�.
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Proof. We decompose the execution of the concrete machine into segments that start and end in
user states, and whose intermediate states are all running inside the monitor (that is, their PCs are
tagged as MONITOR). By induction, it suffices then to prove the result for each segment separately.
There are three cases to consider. The simpler cases are when the segments correspond to a cache
miss or to the execution of a system service; then, it suffices to appeal to the correctness hypotheses
concerning the monitor. The more complicated case is when we hit on the cache; then, we proceed as
in the other refinement proofs, arguing that, because the cache is correct, the updated tags it produces
match those of the symbolic machine.
5.4 Discussion and Related Work
Tagged architectures are an old idea, dating back at least to the 1960s [38]. The rise of vulnerabilities
in contemporary software has spurred renewed interest in the subject, due to the possibility of using
of tags for pervasive and efficient enforcement of various security policies. Recent designs include
hardware tagging schemes that are specialized for individual policies—such as memory safety [73,
84], capabilities [113], control data integrity [20], or taint tracking [102]—as well as more general
ones that allow the behavior of tags to be programmed in software [16, 28, 97, 110]. The PUMP [25,
33, 34], which directly inspired the model presented here, is one of the most flexible of these designs,
allowing policies to use arbitrary data structures as tags, and to tag more parts of the program state,
including instructions and PC. While its first incarnation was designed for SAFE [25]—a clean-slate
design with built-in support for inter-process communication, stack protection, bounds checking,
and context switching, among many other features—recent versions can be layered on top of more
conventional architectures [33], including an ongoing port of the PUMP for the RISC V proces-
sor [24]. As we have argued, it is still possible to provide formal security guarantees even in the
absence of the special capabilities of the SAFE hardware. Despite its generality, the PUMP is fairly
efficient: simulations show a run-time overhead of typically less than 10% when enforcing multiple
policies simultaneously [33]. Furthermore, although earlier versions of the PUMP required 60%
more energy and twice as much memory, ongoing research is working on shrinking those numbers
substantially, by relying on a compression scheme that takes advantage of tag locality.
The results reported in this chapter were developed in two publications. The first [9, 10] proved
that a low-level machine with PUMP-like infrastructure could be used to enforce information-flow
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control, and included a complete machine-code implementation of the monitor plus a proof of cor-
rectness for this implementation. The second [11] essentially corresponds to the development pre-
sented here: it generalizes the first by showing how to encode many other policies through tags, and
is carried on a more realistic processor that does not include a protected stack, like the first one did.
On the other hand, it does not include implementations of the policy monitors: as in Theorem 5.11,
to obtain a complete, fully verified policy, we need to equip the concrete machine with correct im-
plementations of a policy’s transfer function and system services. Although verifying programs all
the way down to running machine code is challenging, it is an active area of research [4, 18, 61, 67,
85], and the presence of metadata tags should not complicate the issue.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
We have reached the end of this thesis. We close with a brief summary of our contributions and
possible directions for future work.
6.1 Summary
This thesis presented the symbolic machine, a new formalism for defining, specifying, and reasoning
about micro-policies—expressive dynamic monitors based on fine-grained metadata tags. In his
seminal work, Anderson [3] laid out three requirements that dynamic monitors should satisfy.
(a) They must be tamper proof.
(b) They must always be invoked.
(c) They must be small enough to be subject to analysis and tests to assure that they are correct.
Micro-policies for the symbolic machine can fulfill all of these requirements. As every modification
to the monitor tags or internal state must be mediated by the transfer function or system services,
the machine semantics guarantees the protection of the monitor from user code, freeing the policy
designer from this responsibility. The transfer function is invoked on every instruction, guaranteeing
that every operation performed by user code is properly inspected. Finally, not only are micro-
policies generally quite small, but they can also be fully verified through mechanized proofs, greatly
increasing our confidence that their design is correct.
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Micro-policies are a good abstraction for programming security monitors. Monitors for a wide
variety of purposes have been developed using metadata propagation, including memory safety,
control-flow integrity, information-flow control, low-level compartmentalization, taint tracking, and
web-session security [9–11, 17, 19, 33]. In addition to these fairly self-contained applications, re-
cent work is demonstrating how micro-policies could be applied to more ambitions goals, such as
secure compilation [63]. Thanks to its high-level view of tag propagation, and to the system-service
mechanism, the symbolic machine provides a convenient platform for developingmicro-policies. We
have illustrated this by defining and conducting a detailed analysis of two advanced micro-policies:
information-flow control and heap memory safety. We have shown that both policies could be ex-
pressed naturally on the symbolic machine, and have connected them to more abstract computation
models where the policy is built in, by proving refinement results that show that every behavior of the
monitor is also a valid behavior of the abstract models—or, taking the contrapositive, that themonitor
halts whenever the abstract machine does so. We have derived high-level extensional properties that
describe the security guarantees that apply to programs running under on these abstract machines,
and used the refinement results to transfer these properties to the symbolic machine running with
these policies installed.
For the information-flow policy, we proved a termination-insensitive noninterference result that
we have adapted from the literature, which bounds the influence that secret data stored in the program
state have on its outputs. One of the biggest challenges in the design of mechanisms for information-
flow control is striking a good balance between soundness and permissiveness. On the one hand,
we would like to avoid implicit flows that leak secrets through a program’s control flow. On the
other hand, we want to be able to determine with good precision what behaviors of the program can
be influenced by a given secret, thus avoiding marking too many outputs as classified information.
Dynamic information-flow control often addresses this issue by trackingwhat secrets have influenced
control flow in a program-counter label, and by relying on control-flow merge points to downgrade
this label. We have shown that this mechanism can be implemented on the symbolic machine with
a protected call stack, which is stored in private monitor state and can be accessed by user code
through specially designated services.
For the memory-safety policy, we have shown that the execution of a program is independent of
memory regions it cannot validly reach through pointers it possesses. Similar properties had been
studied previously in the literature, notably in the frame rule of separation logic [90] or systems of
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logical relations for reasoning about rich languageswith encapsulation features [2, 31, 104]; however,
none of these previous developments had proposed to use such properties to characterize systems
like our monitor, which provide memory safety unconditionally for arbitrary programs and do not
require richer mechanisms for controlling access to state, such as objects or capabilities. We believe
that our proposed isolation properties form thus the first extensional characterization of memory
safety. As argued previously, while other works have also proposed characterizations of memory
safety, these have mostly been stated in terms of instances of memory misuse—buﬀer overflows,
double frees, etc.—that are prevented by memory safety, without analyzing the consequences of
the absence of these errors for reasoning about end-to-end program behavior. We believe that such
extensional reasoning principles are a more robust way of evaluating the security guarantees of dif-
ferent mechanisms for enforcing memory safety, and thus of informing their design.
A fundamental aspect of the notion of micro-policy is that it is informed by recent hardware
advances. We have formalized a simplified model of these features with a concrete machine that
checks and propagates tags by combining a hardware cache and a software monitor. The hardware
cache guarantees that themachine can run efficiently on the common case, while the softwaremonitor
allows the policy enforced by the concrete machine to be almost as flexible as those given by its
symbolic counterpart: if we need to deploy a new monitor in a system to improve its security, it
suffices to change this software component; the hardware does not need to change. We proved a
result connecting the high-level symbolic machine to the low-level concrete machine, showing that
every behavior of the concrete machine is also a valid behavior of the symbolic machine, provided
that the concrete machine is instantiated with valid implementations of the micro-policy in machine
code. This formal connection hints that many interesting policies can benefit from efficient hardware
support without relying on overly specialized mechanisms. For example, while previous versions of
the information-flow policy of Chapter 3 required a special-purpose protected stack in hardware, the
version presented here demonstrates that it suffices to store the stack in generic monitor memory that
is kept private. Although our concrete machine is mostly inspired by the PUMP extension [33], it
should be easy to adapt the model to other similar schemes from the literature, like Harmoni [28] or
FlexiTaint [110].
Micro-policies and Coq Our methodology was designed to serve as a rigorous, yet convenient
platform for reasoning about micro-policies and their security guarantees. The Coq proof assistant
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Component Definitions Proofs
Generic
Symbolic Machine 2027 844
Concrete Machine 619 117
Miscellaneous 1565 282
Policies
CFI 1699 2973
Compartmentalization 1809 3158
Sealing 890 146
Memory Safety 1533 1660
IFC 655 706
Total 10979 10179
Figure 6.1: Size of the components of micro-policy Coq development, measured in lines of code.
was instrumental for achieving this goal, allowing us to build our formalism and policies from first
principles, and to be highly confident about their correctness with mechanized proofs. Our current
development comprises 10797 lines of definitions and specifications, and 10179 lines of proofs, as
measured by the coqwc tool. A more detailed count is summarized in Figure 6.1, including some
policies that were not discussed in this thesis.
Reasoning at the level of rigor imposed by mechanized proofs is challenging, and managing
this complexity requires care. Our most important decision in this respect was how to structure
the development. In its earliest versions, micro-policies were programmed and verified directly on
the concrete machine, but this soon proved to be unwieldy. This difficulty led us to introduce the
symbolic machine as an intermediate step in this workflow, which allowed us to focus on the high-
level tagging patterns of each policy and reason about their security while ignoring the caching
mechanism of the concrete machine and the correctness of assembly code. A crucial ingredient
was the use of Coq’s highly expressive programming language to define policies. Besides typical
functional programming features, such as algebraic data types and pattern matching, this enabled less
conventional idioms, such as the use of dependent types to enforce a simple type discipline on tags,
treating them diﬀerently depending on their location. Moreover, this generality facilitated reusing
other Coq developments. For example, much of the micro-policies development (from its basic
definitions to individual policies) built on the Mathematical Components library.8 In some cases,
the saved eﬀort was substantial: the verification of the compartmentalization micro-policy suﬀered
from severe performance problems, until we replaced its ad-hoc definition of finite sets with the one
8The Mathematical Components development was crucial a ingredient in recent breakthroughs in formal verification,
including the Coq proofs of the four-color theorem [45] and the odd-order theorem [46]. The library is available at
https://math-comp.github.io/math-comp/.
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defined in theMathematical Components library. The more complex policies become—for example,
incorporating richer labels for information-flow control [69, 78]—the more they can benefit existing
code bases. Our formalization also prompted us to develop generic, independent libraries, including
a theory of finitemaps supporting extensional equality, and a basic development of nominal sets, used
to reason about the memory-safety policy; they are available at https://github.com/arthuraa/
coq-utils.
6.2 Future Work
6.2.1 Expressiveness
The micro-policies presented in the literature are good empirical evidence of the expressiveness
of the mechanism. To complement this picture, we would like to have a more solid theoretical
understanding of what micro-policies can express.
Schneider initiated an extensive research program with collaborators to describe what classes of
security properties can be enforced by certain mechanisms, such as execution monitoring or program
rewriting [36, 51, 95]. In this framework, programs are modeled as processes that continuously gen-
erate sequences of actions as they execute. An execution monitor runs alongside this main program
intercepting every action that it produces, and analyzing it to decide whether it is legal or not; in
doing so, the monitor may also take previous actions into consideration, as well as the code of the
program that is running. The actions model the monitor’s observation power: they may include input
and output events, access to system resources, or individual instructions, but need not characterize
completely the program’s execution—some of the program’s operations may remain invisible to the
monitor.
As a first step to characterize the power of tags, we can devise a scheme for implementing arbi-
trarymonitors for an instance of the symbolic machine using only the tagging mechanism itself. The
(admittedly inefficient) idea is to extend the parameters of the symbolic machine to include in the PC
tag a trace of all states that have occurred during execution. Formally, suppose that we have some
instance of the symbolic machine. Let 𝑀 be a monitor for this instance of the symbolic machine
that is allowed to inspect the entire state of the policy—that is, 𝑀 is a computable predicate over
finite sequences of elements of State that is closed under taking prefixes. We define a new set of
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Tag′
u�
= Tag
u�
Tag′
u�
= Tag
u�
Extra′ = Extra Tag′
u�u�
= Tag
u�u�
× State∗
transfer′(𝑜, (𝑡u�u�, 𝑠𝑠 · [𝑠]), 𝑡u�) =
⎧
{
⎨
{
⎩
((𝑡′u�u�, 𝑠𝑠 · [𝑠; 𝑠
′]), 𝑡′u�) if 𝑠 → 𝑠
′, 𝑠𝑠 · [𝑠; 𝑠′] ∈ 𝑀
and transfer(𝑜, 𝑡u�u�, 𝑡u�) = (𝑡
′
u�u�, 𝑡
′
u�)
⊥ otherwise
service′(𝑤, 𝑠) =
⎧
{
⎨
{
⎩
(𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑝𝑐@(𝑡u�u�, 𝑠𝑠 · [𝑠
′]), 𝑒) if service(𝑤, 𝑠−) = 𝑠′ = (𝑚, 𝑟𝑠, 𝑝𝑐@𝑡u�u�, 𝑒)
and 𝑠𝑠 · [𝑠′] ∈ 𝑀
⊥ otherwise.
Figure 6.2: Encoding monitors for the symbolic machine.
parameters for the symbolic machine as depicted in Figure 6.2. There, State∗ denotes the set of finite
sequences of State, and 𝑠− denotes the state of the original instance of the symbolic machine ob-
tained by removing the trace of states from the PC tag. Paraphrasing in words, this policy simulates
the entire execution history of the program on the PC tag, keeping the invariant that the last element
of the sequence is equal to the current state with the trace removed from the PC tag. It extends the
transfer function of the original policy by computing the next state of the machine (if any exists),
and checking whether the extended trace is allowed by the monitor that we want to layer on top of
the original machine. If so, it returns the results of the original transfer function, with the extended
trace added to the PC tag. If not, it halts execution. The system services of the policy are modified in
a similar fashion: it runs the original system service and checks whether the new trace is allowed by
the monitor. For this scheme to work, we assume that there is some loader procedure that correctly
sets up the initial PC tag based on the initial state of the original machine.
While this encoding might be of theoretical interest, it is too inefficient to be used in practice, as
it can never benefit from the caching mechanisms of the PUMP or similar systems: every instruction
produces a completely new PC tag. It seems that a coarse, extensional characterization such as those
traditionally used to study these enforcement mechanisms is not detailed enough for analyzing the
expressive power of the symbolic machine. Indeed, the main motivations for using the symbolic
machine are its hardware acceleration model and its convenience for expressing certain policies; if
a monitor cannot be optimized to run efficiently with a PUMP-like extension and cannot be eas-
ily expressed through tags, there is little reason for preferring an implementation for the symbolic
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machine over a pure software one. It would be interesting to explore possible refinements of Schnei-
der’s theory that account for more intensional or qualitative aspects of monitors, which could help
understanding what security properties we would want to enforce using tags.
6.2.2 Realism
Micro-policies for the symbolic machine are powerful, but still not quite capable of protecting pro-
grams that run on real computers. We need a platform that can run programs and micro-policies
alike—ideally a processor equipped with PUMP-like hardware, like the one currently being devel-
oped on top of the RISCV architecture [24], or a virtual machine that emulates a similar environment.
For strong security guarantees, we would also need to adapt the symbolic and concrete machines to
more closelymodel this platform. Naturally, it would be possible to port a verifiedmonitor developed
for the current version of the symbolic machine to run on the platform. However, the correctness
proof of the monitor would simply prevent gross errors on its high-level design; other vulnerabilities
could arise from errors introduced during the translation between the two implementations, and also
from subtle mismatches between the platform and the machines discussed here.
Adapting our machines to a more realistic computer design should be doable given the current
state of the art in formal verification. Relevant examples include the model of the PowerPC archi-
tecture used in the CompCert verified C compiler [74]; various models of the x86 architecture, such
as the one used in the RockSalt SFI checker [80], and the one developed by Kennedy et al. [65];
and the work of [40] on the ARMv7 architecture. A possible challenge that we foresee is modeling
operations that do not work at the granularity of machine words (such as decoding long instructions
on x86 processors, or accessing individual bytes within machine words). More recent PUMP de-
signs [24] allow monitor rules to take into account what part of a word is being accessed, but no
formal investigation of this programming model has been carried yet.
For our guarantees to cover running machine code, we would also need to relate monitors written
for the symbolic machine tomachine-code implementations, thus filling in the assumptions needed to
establish refinement with Theorem 5.11. In principle, these results could be established by combin-
ing a number of existing techniques and tools. Certified compilers like CompCert [74] or CakeML
[71] allow us to code with higher-level programming languages instead of directly in assembly; these
intermediate representations could then be linked to their specifications on the symbolic machine
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through refinement [4, 48, 67]. With a certified compiler for Coq, this approach would be even more
attractive. (The CertiCoq project is currently building such a compiler.) Another option would be
to generate and verify assembly code directly. We followed this approach by building a simple, cus-
tom infrastructure to verify an information-flow monitor [9, 10], but there are many other systems
available intended for general use; these include Bedrock [18], Fiat [26], XCAP [85], and the work
of Jensen, Benton, and Kennedy [61].
6.2.3 Policy Composition
Besides the deployment questions discussed above, there is another feature that would render our
formalism more practical: a theory of policy composition. It would be useful to develop security
monitors modularly by combining small, independent ones—for instance, enforcing information-
flow control in the presence of memory allocation by running the policies of Chapters 3 and 4 “si-
multaneously.” Naturally, for this to make sense, it should be possible to combine not only policies,
but also their security guarantees: if a property 𝐴1 holds of the symbolic machine when running
with a policy 𝑃1, and if 𝐴2 holds when we use a policy 𝑃2 instead, a sensible composite policy
𝑃1 ⊕ 𝑃2 should enforce both 𝐴1 and 𝐴2—or a slightly modified version thereof, perhaps.
Thanks to its flexibility, the symbolic machine already supports a rudimentary model of policy
composition. In this model, policies are composed horizontally, by attaching one tag of each policy
to each word, and by running their transfer functions in parallel. The composite policy stops the
machine as soon as one of its components decides to do so.
More formally, suppose that we have two micro-policies 𝑃1 and 𝑃2, such that policy 𝑃u� has
sets of tags Tagu�
u�u�
, Tagu�
u�
, and Tagu�
u�
, and a transfer function transferu�. We assume for now that
policies have no private state or system services. We define tags and a transfer function for a policy
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𝑃1 ⊕ 𝑃2—the horizontal composition of 𝑃1 and 𝑃2—as follows:
Tag
u�u�
= Tag1
u�u�
× Tag2
u�u�
Tag
u�
= Tag1
u�
× Tag2
u�
Tag
u�
= Tag1
u�
× Tag2
u�
transfer(𝑜𝑝, 𝑡𝑠) =
⎧
{
⎨
{
⎩
((𝑡1u�u�, 𝑡
2
u�u�), (𝑡
1
u�, 𝑡
2
u�)) if transferu�(𝑜𝑝, 𝑡𝑠.𝑖) = (𝑡
u�
u�u�, 𝑡
u�
u�), 𝑖 = 1, 2
⊥ otherwise,
where 𝑡𝑠.𝑖 denotes the 𝑖-th components of the tuple of tags 𝑡𝑠.
A pleasant feature of horizontal composition is that it preserves any single-trace properties en-
forced by the individual policies. (A similar observation had already been made by Schneider in his
work on execution monitors [95].) Formally, suppose that we have a set 𝑆 of program states. Let
𝑆∞ be the set of finite or infinite sequences of elements of 𝑆. Suppose that we represent a system by
a set𝐸 of possible execution traces. Then we say that the system satisfies a property𝐴 ⊆ 𝑆∞ when
𝐸 ⊆ 𝐴. For instance, 𝐴 could represent the set of traces that refine an execution of a higher-level
machine; then, saying that the property 𝐴 is satisfied is equivalent to stating refinement with respect
to this higher-level machine.
Let 𝐸1 and 𝐸2 represent the execution traces of the symbolic machine instantiated with policies
𝑃1 and 𝑃2, and let𝐸 represent the execution traces of the composite policy. If 𝑡 ∈ 𝐸 is an execution
trace, let 𝜋u�(𝑡) ∈ 𝐸u� be the execution trace of the symbolic machine running 𝑃u� obtained by deleting
all the tags corresponding to the other policy. We know that 𝜋u�(𝑡) is a valid execution trace of 𝑃u�
because of the way 𝑃1⊕𝑃2 is defined. Now suppose that 𝑃u� satisfies a property 𝐴u�. Then 𝑃1⊕𝑃2
satisfies the property
𝐴 = {𝑡 ∣ 𝜋1(𝑡) ∈ 𝐴1, 𝜋2(𝑡) ∈ 𝐴2}.
Roughly, this means that the traces of the composite policy are valid according to each one of the
properties 𝐴1 and 𝐴2. In terms of refinement, suppose that each 𝐴u� states that 𝑃u� causes the sym-
bolic machine to be the refinement of some higher-level abstract machine. Then 𝐴 roughly says that
𝑃1 ⊕ 𝑃2 refines both abstract machines simultaneously.
The problem with horizontal composition is that it does not provide a satisfactory account of
system services. Given a system service associated with policy 𝑃1, there is no canonical way to
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modify its definition to work onmachine states that also contain tags from𝑃2. In general, there might
bemany diﬀerent possible modifications, and some of themmight break the security property that𝑃2
is trying to enforce. Consider for example the scenario mentioned earlier, where we try to enforce
information-flow control and memory safety simultaneously. If not handled with care, dynamic
allocation—which is implemented as a system service—can become a channel for laundering secrets.
Though there are many solutions for combining these features [9, 10, 13, 56, 101], they all require
clever design to enforce noninterference, and it is not clear if these mechanisms can be expressed by
combining two simpler, independent policies in a generic way.
Another potential solution to the composition problem is to compose policies vertically instead
of horizontally. In this model, a base policy is implemented directly on the symbolic machine, but
in such a way that other policies can layered on top of it by specializing its behavior. In a sense,
this pattern is an adaptation of the one we adopted for the monitor of the concrete machine. The
only function of the monitor of the concrete machine is to wrap another monitor that implements a
higher-level policy, isolating it from user-level code. This allows the concrete machine to implement
the symbolic machine, which has this isolation built in, and exposes the choice of the high-level
monitor in its parameters.
What would this pattern look like when replicated at the symbolic-machine level? Imagine that
we wanted to enforce some policy 𝑃 in the presence of memory safety, and that this policy works by
checking and propagating metadata tags drawn from some set 𝑇 . For instance, 𝑃 might implement
an abstract machine like the one of Hrițcu et al. [56], which combines information-flow control and
memory safety. We could do this by adding elements of 𝑇 to every tag of the memory-safety policy
of Chapter 4, leading to the following sets of tags.
Tag
u�
= Tag
u�u�
= Data = NPTR(𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 ) ∣ PTR(𝑖 ∈ Id, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 )
Tag
u�
= FREE ∣ D(𝑖 ∈ Id, 𝑡u� ∈ Data, 𝑡u� ∈ 𝑇)
Note that free memory locations do not carry any extra information, as they are invisible to user
code, and that locations in allocated memory regions carry two tags from 𝑇 : one attached to the
value item stored in the location, and another one attached to the location itself. Harmoni, another
hardware accelerator for tag-based monitors, used a similar distinction [28].
To enforce 𝑃 , we need to modify the behavior of the memory-safety transfer function to take the
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new tags into account. We could achieve this by calling a transfer function transferu� that almost
behaves like one for a regular micro-policy on the symbolic machine where all the tag sets are 𝑇 .
When checking the Nop instruction, for example, this modified transfer function could be defined as
follows:
transfer(Nop, PTR(𝑖, 𝑡u�u�), D(𝑖, NPTR(𝑡u�), 𝑡u�)) = PTR(𝑖, 𝑡
′
u�u�)
if transferu� (Nop, 𝑡u�u�, 𝑡u�, 𝑡u�) = 𝑡
′
u�u�.
We might also define system services for 𝑃 . Some could work independently of memory safety,
but others could be specialized versions of those used for memory safety. For instance, we could
have a parameterized malloc that uses some function given by 𝑃 to decide what tags to put on the
locations of the new region and on the returned pointer. This function might take into account tags
on the argument passed to malloc, as well on its PC.
In addition to combining policy implementations, vertical composition might also provide lim-
ited support for reusing proofs of correctness, just like the general statement of correctness that we
proved for the base monitor of the concrete machine (Theorem 5.11). We could modify the correct-
ness criterion of the memory-safety policy to take the micro policy above into account. Instead of
proving refinement with respect to a fixed abstract machine, we could generalize the abstract ma-
chine of Chapter 4 to make the choice of 𝑃 visible, thus obtaining a new symbolic machine that has
memory safety built in. We could even imagine proving generalizations of the noninterference result
for memory safety (Theorem 4.12) that rely on assumptions about 𝑃 .
Vertical composition would have interesting implications for the concrete machine. Consider a
micro-policy for the symbolic machine that has been parameterized to support vertical composition.
When fully instantiated, we could choose to implement the complete policy at the concrete level with
a single, monolithic monitor—as long as the entire monitor code is fully verified, so that it satisfies
the hypotheses needed to prove refinement between the two machines. In this case, the architecture
of the monitor at the concrete level, which uses a single MONITOR tag to distinguish between trusted
and untrusted code, would suffice. However, there could be other deployment scenarios where only
part of the parameterized policy is verified. For instance, the code responsible for implementing
the base policy could be fully verified, but policy layered on top of it might be implemented by
unverified, user-supplied code. To preserve the guarantees of the base monitor, this scheme would
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require running the concrete machine with three protection domains: the end program, the user
monitor, and the fully verified base monitor. The user monitor could have access to the end program,
from which it is protected, but should not be allowed to tamper with the base monitor.
Although vertical composition seems to overcome some of the issues related to horizontal com-
position, the version sketched here it has its own quirks. It requires ordering micro-policies in ad-
vance to compose them, forcing a policy’s definition to depend on all the others that precede it on the
stack—thus, the later a policy comes on the stack, the less reusable it becomes. Furthermore, it is
not clear how parameterized base policies should be. For example, the memory-safety policy above
could have chosen to take not one, but several sets of tags as parameters, one for each place where
tags can occur. There is naturally a trade oﬀ between expressiveness and complexity—for example,
we could choose to take as parameters sets of tags for memory locations, data stored in those loca-
tions, pointers, non-pointer values… At the present state, the problem of composing micro-policies
is far from solved.
6.2.4 Micro-policies beyond Assembly
Much of the original motivation for the symbolic machine came from the desire to enforce micro-
policies directly at the assembly level. However, many micro-policies are hard to express for assem-
bly programs, because they are formulated in terms of abstractions that exist only at much higher
levels—for example, policies used in the back end of recent proposals for secure compilers [63],
which may target a C-like execution environment, or policies for web-session security [17]. In such
cases, it would make more sense to program the policies directly at an extension of the programming
platform in question. For example, we could imagine having an extension of the C programming
language with micro-policies, or consider the work of Calzavara et al. [17], who developed a core
model of a web browser supporting micro-policies, and used it to enforce web-session security.
Besides the issue of finding the right way of attaching tags to some platform—choosing the
granularity of tagging, the diﬀerent types of tags, etc.—we would like to have a way of running these
higher-level policies efficiently. In a sense, this could be solved with the idea of vertical composition
discussed above, but taken to an extreme: the top-most layer is a relatively high-level executionmodel
parameterized with tags, and it is refined by symbolic machine at the bottom-most layer, running a
composite policy that implements the higher-level one, with possibly a wrapper policy around it.
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Appendix A
Mathematical Preliminaries
We describe here basic concepts and notation that are used throughout the text.
A.1 Relations and Partial Functions
A relation between two sets𝑋 and 𝑌 is a subset 𝑅 ⊆ 𝑋×𝑌 . When𝑋 = 𝑌 , we speak of a relation
on the set 𝑋 instead. We often use infix notations to denote relations, e.g. 𝑥 ∼ 𝑦 to mean that
(𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ ∼. A relation ∼ on set 𝑋 can be:
Reflexive if 𝑥 ∼ 𝑥 for every 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋;
Symmetric if 𝑥 ∼ 𝑦 implies 𝑦 ∼ 𝑥 for every 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋;
Antisymmetric if 𝑥 ∼ 𝑦 and 𝑦 ∼ 𝑥 implies 𝑥 = 𝑦 for every 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋; and
Transitive if 𝑥 ∼ 𝑦 and 𝑦 ∼ 𝑧 implies 𝑥 ∼ 𝑧 for every 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧 ∈ 𝑋.
Given a relation 𝑅 between 𝑋 and 𝑌 , and another relation 𝑆 between 𝑌 and 𝑍, we define the
composite relation 𝑆 ∘ 𝑅 ⊆ 𝑋 × 𝑍 as {(𝑥, 𝑧) ∣ ∃𝑦 ∈ 𝑌 , (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ 𝑅 ∧ (𝑦, 𝑧) ∈ 𝑆}. The identity
relation on a set 𝑋, noted 1u�, is defined as {(𝑥, 𝑥) ∣ 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋}. Given a relation 𝑅 ⊆ 𝑋 × 𝑋, we
define 𝑅u�, the 𝑛-fold composition of a relation with itself by recursion, as follows:
𝑅0 = 1u� 𝑅
u�+1 = 𝑅 ∘ 𝑅u� = 𝑅u� ∘ 𝑅.
The reflexive transitive closure of 𝑅, noted 𝑅∗, is given by the infinite union ⋃
u�∈ℕ
𝑅u�.
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A relation 𝑓 between two sets𝑋 and 𝑌 is a partial function if (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ 𝑓 and (𝑥, 𝑦′) ∈ 𝑓 implies
𝑦 = 𝑦′. We say that 𝑓 is defined at an element 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 if there exists 𝑦 such that (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ 𝑓 . We
often note this by writing 𝑓(𝑥) ∈ 𝑌 or 𝑓(𝑥) ≠ ⊥, and use 𝑓(𝑥) instead of 𝑦. The domain of a
partial function 𝑓 , written dom(𝑓), is the set of input elements for which 𝑓 is defined. We say that 𝑓
is undefined at 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 if there isn’t any 𝑦 ∈ 𝑌 such that (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ 𝑓 ; in this case, we write 𝑓(𝑥) = ⊥.
We note 𝑋 ⇀ 𝑌 the set of all partial functions from 𝑋 to 𝑌 . A partial function 𝑓 ∈ 𝑋 ⇀ 𝑌 is
finite if its domain is finite. We note 𝑋 ⇀fin 𝑌 the set of such partial functions. A partial function
𝑓 ∈ 𝑋 ⇀ 𝑌 is total (or simply a function) if dom(𝑓) = 𝑋.
Given a partial function 𝑓 ∈ 𝑋 ⇀ 𝑌 and elements 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 and 𝑦 ∈ 𝑌 such that 𝑓(𝑥) ≠ ⊥, we
define a partial function 𝑓[𝑥 ↦ 𝑦] as follows.
𝑓[𝑥 ↦ 𝑦] = {(𝑥′, 𝑦′) ∈ 𝑓 ∣ 𝑥′ ≠ 𝑥} ∪ {(𝑥, 𝑦)}
In words, 𝑓[𝑥 ↦ 𝑦] agrees with 𝑓 on every input 𝑥′, except at 𝑥, where its value is 𝑦 instead of 𝑓(𝑥).
Whenever we use the notation 𝑓[𝑥 ↦ 𝑦], we tacitly assume that 𝑓(𝑥) ≠ ⊥.
Definition A.1. Given two partial functions 𝑓, 𝑔 ∈ 𝑋 ⇀ 𝑌 and a binary relation ∼ on 𝑌 , we say
that 𝑓 and 𝑔 are pointwise related by ≡ if, for all 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋, either 𝑓[𝑥] = 𝑔[𝑥] = ⊥, or 𝑓[𝑥] and 𝑔[𝑥]
are both defined, and 𝑓[𝑥] ∼ 𝑔[𝑥].
A.2 Nominal Sets
Nominal sets were introduced by Gabbay and Pitts [41] as a framework to discuss variable binding
and name generation. We use the theory to simplify our treatment of dynamic memory allocation
in Chapter 4. We only cover a few concepts of the theory here, referring interested readers to Pitts’
book [88] for a thorough treatment.
When we allocate an object during the execution of a program, we have to reserve a new region
of memory to store it, and return a pointer to that region to the program. In many memory-safe
languages, this pointer value is immaterial, in the sense that the actual physical address where the
object is stored has little influence on the behavior of the program; the only property that matters is
that the new address is an unambiguous reference to the object that we just created, and cannot be
used to refer to anything else. This suggests adopting an abstract view of the heap in which a pointer
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value is simply an element drawn from some infinite set that we can use to reference objects that we
have allocated.
Definition A.2 (Identifiers). We fix some countably infinite set Id = {𝑖0, 𝑖1, 𝑖2,…} of identifiers.
We order identifiers using some fixed enumeration of the set, and define a function nextId ∈ Id→ Id
that maps each identifier to the next one in this enumeration: nextId(𝑖u�) ≜ 𝑖u�+1.
In usual presentations of the theory of nominal sets, the nextId function is absent. We include it
here because it allows expressing a more concrete implementation of an allocator for our memory-
safety policy.
We are interested in the eﬀect that the choice of diﬀerent identifiers has on the execution of a
program. We express these diﬀerent choices by renaming the pointer identifiers that occur in the state
of a program according to some permutation. A permutation (of identifiers) is a function 𝜋 ∈ Id→
Id that has a two-sided inverse; that is, there exists 𝜋−1 such that 𝜋 ∘ 𝜋−1 = 𝜋−1 ∘ 𝜋 = 1Id, where
1Id ∈ Id → Id denotes the identity function on Id, and ∘ denotes function composition. We note
perm(Id) the set of all such permutations. The identity function 1Id is a permutation. Permutations
are closed under function composition and inverses.
A renaming operation over a set 𝑋 is a function that maps a permutation 𝜋 ∈ perm(Id) and an
element 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 to another element 𝜋 · 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋. This function must satisfy the following properties.
1Id · 𝑥 = 𝑥
𝜋1 · (𝜋2 · 𝑥) = (𝜋1 ∘ 𝜋2) · 𝑥.
We treat renaming as right associative: 𝜋1 · 𝜋2 · 𝑥 means 𝜋1 · (𝜋2 · 𝑥). Typically, elements of
𝑋 are objects that contain identifiers; for example, a set of program states where identifiers are
pointers to memory regions. A renaming operation makes a permutation 𝜋 act on an element 𝑥
by replacing every identifier 𝑖 that occurs on 𝑥 by 𝜋(𝑖). The above properties guarantee that it is
always possible to undo a renaming, by renaming using the inverse permutation: 𝜋−1 · 𝜋 · 𝑥 = 𝑥. It
would also be possible to work with renaming operations that take arbitrary functions on identifiers
as parameters; however, this would complicate the theory, since it would often be necessary to state
supplementary hypotheses saying that the function does not induce any aliasing between identifiers.
With permutations, this comes for free.
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Set Id Discrete (e.g. ℕ)
Renaming 𝜋 · 𝑖 = 𝜋(𝑖) 𝜋 · 𝑥 = 𝑥
Support supp(𝑖) = {𝑖} supp(𝑥) = ∅
Set 𝑋 × 𝑌 𝑋 ⊎ 𝑌
Renaming 𝜋 · (𝑥, 𝑦) = (𝜋 · 𝑥, 𝜋 · 𝑦) 𝜋 · (𝑘, 𝑧) = (𝑘, 𝜋 · 𝑧)
Support supp(𝑥, 𝑦) = supp(𝑥) ∪ supp(𝑦) supp(𝑘, 𝑧) = supp(𝑧)
Set 𝑋 ⇀u�u�u� 𝑌 𝒫fin(𝑋)
Renaming 𝜋 · 𝑓 = {(𝜋 · 𝑥, 𝜋 · 𝑦) ∣ (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ 𝑓} 𝜋 · 𝑋′ = {𝜋 · 𝑥 ∣ 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋′}
Support supp(𝑓) = ⋃
(u�,u�)∈u�
supp(𝑥) ∪ supp(𝑦) supp(𝑋′) = ⋃
u�∈u�′
supp(𝑥)
Figure A.1: Standard nominal sets
Let𝑋 be a set endowed with a renaming operation. We say that a set 𝐼 ⊂ Id supports an element
𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 if the following condition holds:
∀𝜋, (∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼, 𝜋(𝑖) = 𝑖) ⇒ 𝜋 · 𝑥 = 𝑥.
An element 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 is finitely supported if there exists a finite set 𝐼 ⊂ Id that supports 𝑥. Under these
conditions, we can show that 𝑥 possesses a smallest finite supporting set supp(𝑥); that is, supp(𝑥)
supports 𝑥, and supp(𝑥) ⊆ 𝐼 whenever 𝐼 is another finite set supporting 𝑥.
DefinitionA.3. Anominal set is a set𝑋 endowedwith a renaming operation for which every element
is finitely supported.
The support of an object intuitively corresponds to the set of identifiers that occur in that object: if
a permutation does not aﬀect any of those identifiers, it should not change the object when renaming
it. Crucially, when the support of an element is finite, we can always find new identifiers that do not
occur in it (because Id is infinite). This property is useful for defining functions on nominal sets that
allocate fresh identifiers.
We use a few standard constructions to build nominal sets summarized in Figure A.1. Identifiers
themselves form a nominal set by simply applying a renaming permutation to them; this nominal set
forms a “base case” used to define others. We can see every set𝑋 as a nominal set under the discrete
renaming operation given on the second column; we use this structure for sets like ℕ, whose ele-
ments do not have any identifiers in them. The other constructions simply traverse a complex object,
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applying a renaming operation pointwise to all of its sub-objects. In particular, we can picture the
renaming operation on finite partial functions as acting on a table representation of those functions,
where each row relates an input to its output.
The last construction of the theory of nominal sets that we need are nominal restriction sets [88],
which we use to simplify the definition of computations that generate fresh names. We include the
details of the construction here for formal completeness, but we believe that a thorough understanding
of this material is probably not necessary for having a good intuitive grasp of the results of Chapter 4.
Definition A.4. A partial function 𝑓 ∈ 𝑋 ⇀ 𝑌 between two nominal sets is equivariant if (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈
𝑓 ⇒ (𝜋 · 𝑥, 𝜋 · 𝑦) ∈ 𝑓 for every permutation 𝜋, 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 and 𝑦 ∈ 𝑌 . In particular, 𝑓(𝑥) is defined if
and only if 𝑓(𝜋 · 𝑥) is. Furthermore, when this is the case, 𝑓(𝜋 · 𝑥) = 𝜋 · 𝑓(𝑥).
Intuitively, an equivariant function is one such that, if applied to two objects that diﬀer only in the
choice of their identifiers, propagates this diﬀerence to its results without aﬀecting them otherwise.
Roughly speaking, any partial function on identifiers that does not mention any identifier constants,
and that only manipulates identifiers by testing them for equality is equivariant.
Definition A.5. Let 𝑋 be a nominal set. A restriction operation over 𝑋 is an equivariant function
that maps every every finite set of identifiers 𝐼 and element 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 to an element 𝜈𝐼.𝑥 ∈ 𝑋, in a
way such that the following properties hold.
𝐼 ∩ supp(𝜈𝐼.𝑥) = ∅
𝜈∅.𝑥 = 𝑥
𝜈𝐼.(𝜈𝐼′.𝑥) = 𝜈(𝐼 ∪ 𝐼′).𝑥
𝜈𝐼.𝑥 = 𝜈(𝐼 ∩ supp(𝑥)).𝑥.
A nominal restriction set is a nominal set 𝑋 equipped with a restriction operation.
Roughly speaking, in the nominal restriction sets that we will encounter, the restriction operation
allows us to hide some of the identifiers that appear in an object, making their exact values immaterial.
In particular, we will use restriction operations to choose fresh pointers in a language with dynamic
allocation, since wewant the exact values of fresh identifiers to be invisible. Because of equivariance,
the first property implies that 𝜈(𝜋 · 𝐼).(𝜋 · 𝑥) = 𝜋 · 𝜈𝐼.𝑥 = 𝜈𝐼.𝑥 whenever 𝜋 fixes all the elements in
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supp(𝑥)∖𝐼 . Thus, the atoms in supp(𝑥)∖𝐼 are visible “to the outside world,” and cannot be renamed,
whereas all those in 𝐼 can be changed at will. The second property says that hiding no names has
no eﬀect on an object. The third property says that we can combine several hiding operations into a
single one. Finally, the last property says that only the names that appear in 𝑥matter for the restriction
operation; hiding a name that does not appear in 𝑥 has no eﬀect on it.
The main example of restriction operation comes from free nominal restriction sets [7, 88, 108].
Definition A.6. Let 𝑋 be a nominal set. The free nominal restriction set over 𝑋, noted Res(𝑋), is
defined as follows.
Res(𝑋) ≜ 𝐿(𝑋)/∼
𝐿(𝑋) ≜ {(𝐼, 𝑥) ∈ 𝒫fin(Id) × 𝑋 ∣ 𝐼 ⊆ supp(𝑥)}
(𝐼1, 𝑥1) ∼ (𝐼2, 𝑥2) ⇔ ∃𝜋.(𝐼2, 𝑥2) = 𝜋 · (𝐼1, 𝑥1) ∧ ∀𝑖 ∈ supp(𝑥1) ∖ 𝐼1.𝜋(𝑖) = 𝑖
Given a finite set of identifiers 𝐼 and an element 𝑥 of 𝑋, we note [𝐼, 𝑥] the equivalence class of the
pair (𝐼 ∩ supp(𝑥), 𝑥) in Res(𝑋). The set Res(𝑋) can be endowed with the structure of a nominal
set, given by
𝜋 · [𝐼, 𝑥] = [𝜋 · 𝐼, 𝜋 · 𝑥] supp([𝐼, 𝑥]) = supp(𝑥) ∖ 𝐼.
Furthermore, there is a canonical restriction operation associated with Res(𝑋), determined by
𝜈𝐼.[𝐼′, 𝑥] = [𝐼 ∪ 𝐼′, 𝑥].
Intuitively, an element of the form [𝐼, 𝑥] to the result of a computation that produces 𝑥 as a final
result and had to generate fresh identifiers in 𝐼 during its execution. Since [𝐼, 𝑥] = 𝜈𝐼.[∅, 𝑥], this
means that these fresh identifiers are hidden from the outside and can be renamed.
For an example of restriction in use, suppose that 𝑥 is a partial function of the form {(𝑖, 1)},
representing a heap that has exactly one allocated cell in it at address 𝑖, and that cell stores the
value 1. An object of the form [∅, 𝑥] represents a computation that produced that heap in such a
way that the location 𝑖 can alias with objects defined “outside” of that computation. On the other
hand, [{𝑖}, 𝑥] represents a similar computation that, instead of choosing the value 𝑖 so that it aliased
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some preexisting location, chose 𝑖 in a way that is fresh with respect to other identifiers appearing in
the context of this computation. This freedom to rename identifiers has pleasant consequences; for
instance, given an element ̄𝑥 ∈ Res(𝑋) and a finite set of identifiers 𝐼′, we can find another finite
set 𝐼 and an element 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 such that ̄𝑥 = [𝐼, 𝑥] and 𝐼 ∩ 𝐼′ = ∅. In other words, we are always free
to chose fresh identifiers in a way that does not conflict with any other finite set of identifiers that
might have a special meaning somewhere else.
Besides Res(𝑋), there are other nominal restriction sets that will be important for us. If 𝑋 is a
discrete nominal set (that is, one whose elements have empty support), then it carries a canonical
restriction operation given by 𝜈𝐼.𝑥 = 𝑥. Intuitively, if no identifiers occur in 𝑥, then there is no
need to do anything when hiding identifiers in 𝑥. (As a matter of fact, this is the only restriction
operation that can be defined on a discrete nominal set, since its properties force 𝜈𝐼.𝑥 = 𝜈(𝐼 ∩
supp(𝑥)).𝑥 = 𝜈∅.𝑥 = 𝑥.) The other restriction operation that we use is on the disjoint union of
two nominal restriction sets. If 𝑋 and 𝑌 are nominal restriction sets, then we define a restriction
operation on𝑋 ⊎ 𝑌 by setting 𝜈𝐼.(𝑘, 𝑧) = (𝑘, 𝜈𝐼.𝑧)—that is, we just apply the renaming operation
that corresponds to whatever side of the sum we are in.
By combining these two constructions, we can define a restriction operation on a nominal set
of the form Res(𝑋) ⊎ {error}, where the right side of the sum is treated as a discrete nominal set.
This restriction structure is used to define allocation for the memory-safe imperative language of
Section 4.5.
We now summarize some results that we use to define functions on nominal restriction sets. The
first result takes as input a computation 𝑓 that depends on an element of 𝑋 and a choice of a fresh
identifier 𝑖. It then produces another computation ̂𝑓 that calls 𝑓 while choosing the fresh identifier
that is fed into it.
Lemma A.7. Let 𝑋 be a nominal set, 𝑌 be a nominal restriction set, and 𝑓 ∈ 𝑋 × Id ⇀ 𝑌 an
equivariant partial function. There exists an equivariant partial function ̂𝑓 ∶ 𝑋 ⇀ 𝑌 such that
̂𝑓(𝑥) = 𝜈{𝑖}.𝑓(𝑥, 𝑖) whenever 𝑖 ∉ supp(𝑥). If 𝑓(𝑥, 𝑖) for any 𝑖 ∉ supp(𝑥), then ̂𝑓(𝑥) is also
undefined.
Note that, since the fresh identifier 𝑖 is bound by the brackets, the choice of 𝑖 performed by ̂𝑓 is
invisible, as 𝑖 can be renamed to any other identifier that is fresh with respect to 𝑥.
The second result allows us to compose computations that generate fresh identifiers.
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Lemma A.8. Let 𝑋 be a nominal set, 𝑌 be a nominal restriction set, and 𝑓 ∶ 𝑋 ⇀ 𝑌 be an
equivariant partial function. There exists an equivariant partial function ̃𝑓 ∶ Res(𝑋) ⇀ 𝑌 satisfying
the following property. Let 𝐼 be a finite set of identifiers and 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋. If 𝑓(𝑥) = ⊥, then ̃𝑓([𝐼, 𝑥]) = ⊥.
If 𝑓(𝑥) is defined, then ̃𝑓([𝐼, 𝑥]) = 𝜈𝐼.𝑓(𝑥).
We can interpret this result roughly as follows. Suppose that we have a computation 𝑓 that
takes an element of𝑋 as input and produces an element of 𝑌 . Now, suppose that we have the result
̄𝑥 ∈ Res(𝑋) of a computation that produced an element of𝑋 while allocating some fresh identifiers.
Then, we can apply 𝑓 to ̄𝑥 by materializing the hidden identifiers of ̄𝑥 to any set of fresh values 𝐼 ,
computing 𝑓 , and in the end of the computation hiding the identifiers in 𝐼 again.
Finally, we note a result that we use to define the semantics of iteration in the memory-safe
language of Section 4.5. Instead of stating it in its most well-known (and general) form, we content
ourselves with the following simplified form.
Theorem A.9 (Kleene’s fixed-point theorem). Let 𝑋 and 𝑌 be nominal sets. Let 𝑋 ⇀eq 𝑌 be the
set of equivariant partial functions from𝑋 to 𝑌 . Suppose there is a function 𝐹 from that set to itself
that satisfies the following properties:
Monotonicity 𝑓 ⊆ 𝑔 ⇒ 𝐹(𝑓) ⊆ 𝐹(𝑔); and
Continuity if 𝑓0 ⊆ 𝑓1 ⊆ ⋯ is an infinite increasing sequence of equivariant partial functions, then
𝐹 (⋃
u�
𝑓u�) = ⋃u� 𝐹(𝑓u�).
In this case, there exists fix(𝐹) ∈ 𝑋 ⇀eq 𝑌 such that𝐹(fix(𝐹)) = fix(𝐹) and fix(𝐹) ⊆ 𝑓 whenever
𝐹(𝑓) = 𝑓 .
Intuitively, 𝑓 ⊆ 𝑔 means that 𝑔 is defined on all the inputs that 𝑓 is, and both functions give the
same answers for those inputs. Kleene’s fixed point allows us to build a solution to the recursive
equation 𝐹(𝑓) = 𝑓 that is the smallest possible—that is, defined on as few points as possible.
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